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Abstract
Subjective and affective elements are well-known to influence human decision making. This
dissertation presents a theoretical and empirical framework on how human decision makers'
subjective experience and affective prediction influence their choice behavior under uncer-
tainty, frames and emotions. The framework extends and integrates existing theories of
prospect theory (PT) and reinforcement learning (RL), drawing on a growing literature of-
fering the role of affect in decision making and the neural underpinnings of human decision
behavior. The proposed Affective-Cognitive (AC) model extends Prospect Theory (PT)-
based subjective value functions to model human experienced-utility and predicted-utility
functions. The AC model assumes that the shapes (or parameters) of these subjective value
functions dynamically vary with the decision makers affective states in sequential decision
making. Human decision-making experiments were conducted to empirically infer how peo-
ple adjust the parameters (i.e., shape and reference point) of their experienced-utility and
predicted-utility functions in sequential decision-making situations involving incidental af-
fective states (e.g., anger, fear, economic fear) and task-related confidence. I constructed
a new model combining measures to evaluate risk preferences: behavioral choices, self-
reported experience self-reported experience, self-reported predicted utility, self-reported
confidence. The analysis results show how domain uncertainty, framing, and emotion state
of decision makers influence their subjective experience and discriminability, affective pre-
diction, optimal decisions and exploratory regulation. I found empirically that there were
significant interaction effects of framing and emotion on risk preferences: negative emotions
made people more risk-averse in face of gains. When it comes to losses, anger made people
more risk-averse and fear more risk seeking. I also characterized how gender and emotion
influence confidence and exploratory choice behavior. The theoretical analysis nicely sup-
ports empirical findings from human experiments. The new model provides a theory that
better explain and simulate human behavior under uncertainty, frames and emotions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Human affect and emotional experience play a significant, and useful, role in human decision
making and learning. Recent research in decision making and learning has integrated ideas
from psychology, economics, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence and machine learning,
and created new interdisciplinary areas such as behavioral economics, neuroeconomics and
computational neuroscience. One of the core themes and key problems in these new areas
is to verify and model the important role of subjective experience and affective prediction
in decision making and learning [7, 12, 5, 41, 42, 24, 29, 36, 50].
Yet, the research for exploring and exploiting those affective and subjective influences
in computational decision-making and learning models and their applications currently lags
behind that in other fields. Most computational models for analyzing and simulating human
experience, prediction and decision are still based on cognitive models. Traditional models
based on expected utility theory assume that humans make decisions on the basis of a
deliberative cost and benefit analysis. Recent models based on behavioral decision theory
focuses on cognitive errors and heuristics in human judgments and decision making, but
still ignore the role of emotion in human decision making [36].
This cognitive perspective is not suitable for analyzing human decision behavior in
such situations where people's affective state experienced at the time of making a decision
often influences their experience and prediction. For example, people have different risk
attitudes and action tendencies when they are in different mood states. Incidental fear
or anger influences risk perceptions and judgments [34, 33]. Investors' incidental emotion
state influences financial investment choices [36]. Therefore, for daily-life situations in which
there are interactions or conflicts between affect and cognition, an affect-integrated model
will be more desirable in describing human behavior than traditional cognitive models.
Furthermore, the cognitive view cannot shed light on the beneficial aspects of affective
decision making in synthesizing human-like decision behavior for agents interacting with
humans.
The main objective of this dissertation is to redress the old cognitive view on human
decision making and learning by proposing a new model, called the "affective-cognitive (AC)
decision model" drawing on a growing literature offering social-psychological aspects and
neural underpinnings of human decision-making behavior. The AC model assumes that an
agent's decision preference for a choice mainly arises from the feedback of past subjective
experiences in similar choice situations (the "experience-based" mode) and the affective
prediction about future hedonic impact of choice outcomes (the "prediction-based" mode).
Human decision experiments were designed and conducted to empirically infer how
people adjust the parameters (i.e., risk attitude and reference point) of their experienced-
utility and predicted-utility functions in sequential decision-making situations involving
incidental affective states (e.g., anger, fear, economic fear) and task-related confidence.
The experimental analysis and results show how domain uncertainty, frames, and emotion
state of decision makers influence their subjective experience and discriminability (i.e., the
level of easiness in discriminating which choice has a greater overall outcome), affective
prediction, optimal decisions and exploratory regulation (i.e., trade-offs between exploration
and exploitation). The theoretical analysis nicely supports empirical findings from human
experiments. Figure 1-1 represents the main topics of the research, that is, decision making
under uncertainty, frames and emotions.
1.1 Affective-Cognitive (AC) Decision Model
The AC model extends and integrates existing theories of prospect theory (PT) [29, 61, 30]
and reinforcement learning (RL) [58], drawing on a growing literature offering the role of
affect in decision making and the neural underpinnings of human decision behavior. The pro-
Decision Making under Uncertainty, Frames, and Emotions
Uncertainty Emotions
Decision makers do not know probabilities Incidental emotion (mood)
of outcomes for each choice- e.g., neutral, anger, fear
Decision makers tend not to have an
explicit model of outcome probabilities. Task-related Confidence
Decisions
Frames
Low-variance outcome (=Safe) option vs.
High-variance outcome (=Risky) option
Prefer safe option in face of gains,
Prefer risky option in face of losses
(Framing depends on reference point)
Figure 1-1: The main topics of the research: decision making under uncertainty, frames and
emotions
posed framework assumes that an agent's decision preference for a choice mainly arises from
the feedback of past subjective experiences in similar choice situations (the "experience-
based" mode) and the affective prediction about future hedonic impact of choice outcomes
(the "prediction-based" mode). Broadly speaking, the experience-based mode is a reflexive,
associative and automatic process, whereas the prediction-based mode is a goal-directed
reflective process [1, 14, 29, 50]. The AC model elucidates how the current state-including
both cognitive and affective states-systematically influences the computation of decision
utility of a choice through the experience-based and prediction-based modes. The AC model
employs Prospect Theory (PT)-based parameterized subjective value functions to model
people's experienced-utility and predicted-utility functions. It assumes that the shapes (or
parameters) of these subjective value functions dynamically vary with the decision-maker's
task-related and/or incidental affective states in sequential decision making.
The PT-based parameterized subjective value functions (i.e., experience-utility function,
: ,: . .......... . .... . ..... ........ ... . ........ ..
predicted-utility function) in the AC model can realize different risk attitudes and framing
varying with task-related affective states and how this setup helps regulate the trade-off be-
tween exploration (seeking new information) and exploitation (seeking to maximize overall
utility under current information) in uncertain domains and offer great overall performance
for fewer resources. For example, in one of the states I model, a positive confidence state
(i.e., positive goal-achieving state, being very confident in the current task), the learner
becomes more sensitive to both likely gains and likely losses. The result facilitates com-
putational exploitation, and can be expressed in terms of the temperature in a Boltzmann
model as affect-parameterized cooling. Similarly, there is a negative confidence state (i.e.,
negative goal-achieving state, being not at all confident in the current task), where an agent
becomes less sensitive to both likely gains and likely losses, which facilitates exploration and
appears as affect-parameterized heating. Thus, instead of temperature being a scalar value
following some kind of (typically fixed, monotonic) annealing schedule, the affective state
can drive it up or down, regulating it based on moment-by-moment circumstances.
The AC model describes how people's subjective experience and reference point selection
(framing) influence their "subjective discriminability" (i.e., the level of easiness in discrimi-
nating which choice has a greater overall outcome), exploration-exploitation regulation and
optimal decisions. Computational simulations demonstrate that subjective discriminability
can be increased by the use of a PT-like experienced-utility function, the shape of which
reflects people's loss-averse attitude, risk-averse attitude when it comes to their gains, and
risk-seeking attitude when it comes to their losses, with an appropriate reference point.
An increased subjective discriminability enables an affective-cognitive agent employing the
nonlinear experienced-utility function to need fewer exploratory trials for optimal decisions,
compared to the rational agent employing the linear experienced-utility function. That
is, an affective-cognitive agent with a good framing can achieve greater subjective dis-
criminability and quicker optimal decisions under uncertainty than a rational agent whose
discriminability (called "objective discriminability") is always the same regardless of the
reference point selection (gain or loss framing).
The incidental emotion state (e.g., a mood state) can influence the risk attitude (risk
seeking or risk averse) adjusting the parameter values (the shape and the reference point)
of the subjective value functions. Different affective states such as anger, fear, sadness and
hope may lead to different subjective discriminabilities for the same underlying objective
outcome distribution.
I present two-armed bandit-task experiments for humans as a framework to infer how
people's incidental emotion influences their subjective experience (experienced utility func-
tion), confidence and affective prediction (predicted utility function) in decision making
under domain uncertainty, framing and emotions, based on people's actual choice behavior
and self-reported data. Also, the AC model was used to infer subjective value functions ex-
plaining human behavioral and self-reported data. Human decision experiments confirmed
the validity of simulation results of the AC model about framing and emotional effects on
subjective discriminability and optimal decisions, i.e., the interactions of framing and emo-
tion in uncertain domains influenced people's subjective discriminability, predictions and
optimal decisions.
1.2 Dissertation Contributions
This dissertation presents a new computational perspective on the role of subjective ex-
perience and affective prediction in human decision making and learning, drawing on the
findings in diverse areas of decision science as behavioral economics, neuroeconomics, psy-
chology and machine learning.
The proposed framework of human behavioral experiment and computational analysis
shows how we can observe and infer the subjective and affective influence on decision making
under uncertainty, frames and emotions. This research empirically infers how people ad-
just the parameters (i.e., risk attitude and reference point) of their experienced-utility and
predicted-utility functions in sequential decision-making situations. Also, I present how we
can computationally model subjective experience and affective prediction to build artificial
agents with quicker optimal decisions in learning and decision making under uncertainty.
The AC model will be able to regulate the agents' risk attitude (risk seeking or risk averse)
and reference point selection with a simulated affective state in order to achieve increased
adaptability and robustness. In more detail, the dissertation
" Defined subjective discriminability. Showed both computationally and empirically
that bigger subjective discriminability leads to more optimal decisions.
" Characterized how subjective and affective influences may help or harm human deci-
sion making depending on domains, frames, emotions and their interactions.
" Constructed a new model combining measures to evaluate risk preferences: behavioral
choices, self-reported experience (subjective discriminability), self-reported predicted
utility (predicted-utility difference), self-reported confidence.
" Introduced two different kinds of subjective value functions (experienced-utility (EU)
function and predicted-utility (PU) function) whose parameters change with emotions
and provided a method to infer PU and EU functions from self-reported EU and PU
data in each emotion condition.
* Showed how to compute reference points (EU frame, PU frame) for each of the EU
and PU functions.
" Analyzed risk attitudes based on EU and PU frames as well as on the frame given by
experimenter.
" Observed how emotions influence the reference point selection (framing).
" Discovered the frame and emotion effects (main and interaction effects) in decision
making under uncertainty.
" Measured how experience, gender and emotion influence confidence and prediction.
" Introduced the confidence-dependent predicted utility function.
" Presented a new emotion-refresher method.
" Defined the value of risk (VOR).
" Characterized how domain, frame, emotion influence decision making: Negative emo-
tions in face of gains (more risk-averse), Anger in face of losses (more risk-averse),
Fear and Economic fear in face of losses (more risk-seeking).
" Showed how human behavior can be described by emotion-shaped EU and PU func-
tions.
" Provided a theory that better explain/simulate human behavior under uncertainty,
frames and emotions.
1.3 Dissertation Outline
The contents of the remaining chapters are as follows:
Chapter 2. Background and Proposed Model covers some relevant concepts and
approaches in prospect theory (PT), reinforcement learning (RL) and psychological theories
on the role of subjective experience and affective prediction in decision making. Then it
presents the essential features of the affective-cognitive (AC) decision model, and compares
and compares the AC model with other existing models.
Chapter 3. Modeling Subjective Experience and Affective Prediction describes
the computational model of subjective experience and affective prediction in the AC model
employing the PT-based parameterized experienced-utility and predicted-utility functions,
and defines a new concept called "subjective discriminability". Compares this with the
objective discriminability. Computational simulations confirm that framing (reference point
selection) influences subjective discriminability, and that subjective decision agents (relying
on subjective experiences) can achieve quicker optimal decisions in simple learning situations
such as two-armed bandit tasks, compared to objective decision agents (relying on objective
outcomes).
Chapter 4. Human Decision Experiments: Method and Hypotheses describes
the experimental design and procedure of human decision experiments (based on two-armed
bandit tasks) conducted to observe and infer the subjective and affective influence on deci-
sion making under uncertainty, frames and emotions. It also presents the main hypotheses
behind experiments.
Chapter 5. Human Decision Experiments: Analysis and Results details the
analysis and results of human decision experiments. The analysis confirms main hypotheses
of the experiments.
Chapter 6. Discussion and Future Work summarizes the dissertation and suggests
future work.
Chapter 2
Background and Proposed Model
The proposed affective-cognitive (AC) decision model extends and integrates existing theo-
ries of prospect theory (PT) and reinforcement learning (RL), drawing on a growing liter-
ature offering the role of affect in decision making and the neural underpinnings of human
decision behavior. Prospect theory (PT) mostly focuses on people's subjective prediction
and choice behavior in one-shot decision situations under risk (i.e., situations in which peo-
ple make a one-shot choice with full knowledge of the outcome probability distributions
of options). Although some behavioral decision-making models [20, 22, 23] and reinforce-
ment learning models in computational learning theory [16, 56, 58] have been applied to
analyze people's behavior in decision-making situations under uncertainty, they have not
fully incorporated the characteristics of PT-based subjective value functions (i.e., risk at-
titudes depending on reference-point dependency, diminishing sensitivity, loss-aversion) for
modeling people's subjective experience and affective prediction. The AC model uses PT-
based parameterized subjective value functions to model people's experienced-utility and
predicted-utility functions. It hypothesizes that the shapes (or parameters) of these sub-
jective value functions adjust to a decision-maker's task-related and/or incidental affective
states on the fly during a sequence of decision-making trials.
The AC model adopts Kahneman's utility taxonomy [28] and combines the different
concepts of utilities to provide a computational decision-making framework for more gen-
eral situations. Kahneman's utility taxonomy is useful for distinguishing multiple concepts
of "utility." In modern economics, the utility of outcomes usually refers to their weight
in decisions: utility is inferred from observed choices and in turn used to explain choices.
This behavioral concept of utility is called decision utility. Kahneman distinguished experi-
enced utility from decision utility, although he did not propose a computational model that
combines the two kinds of utility concepts. Experienced utility refers to the experiences
of pleasure and pain, as Bentham used it [31]. It is the affective or hedonic impact of an
obtained outcome after a choice. Also, predicted utility is a belief about the future expe-
rienced utility of a choice before making a decision. Also, recent findings in neuroscience
suggest that the neural substrates of liking (pleasure) are separate from those of wanting
(motivation) in the human brain [6], so there is evidence from neuroscience that supports
treating these concepts differently when modeling human decision making. Kahneman's
concepts of experienced utility and decision utility are associated with liking and wanting,
respectively [7].
2.1 Prospect Theory (PT): subjective influence on predic-
tions and decisions
Prospect theory (PT) [30] was designed to describe people's decision-making behavior under
risk (i.e., one-shot choice in a situation where outcomes are "uncertain" but the outcome
probability distributions of candidate options are "known" to the decision maker). For
instance, in the domain of potential gains, as in the situation where one option yields a
sure-outcome of winning $5 ((outcome, Pr) = ($5, 1.0)) and the other option has a 50%
chance of winning $10 and 50% chance of getting nothing ((outcome, Pr) = ($10, 0.5; $0,
0.5)), people tend to prefer the sure-outcome situation to the gamble or variable-outcome
situation of equal expected value. People don't want to bet on an uncertain choice that
might spoil their chance at a gain. That is, people are "risk-averse in the domain of likely
gains." In the domain of potential losses, however, as in the situation where one option
yields a sure-outcome of losing $5 ((outcome, Pr) = (-$5, 1.0)) and the other option has a
50% chance of losing $10 and 50% chance of getting nothing ((outcome, Pr) = (-$10, 0.5;
$0, 0.5)), people prefer the gamble of equal expected value to the sure-outcome situation.
People want to bet on the choice that might mitigate the loss. That is, people are "risk-
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Figure 2-2: The Prospect Theory (PT) Value Function, Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
aversion refers to the tendency for people to strongly prefer avoiding losses to acquiring
gains.
PT describes human behavior with a subjective value function. This function has three
essential characteristics. First, gains and losses are defined relative to a reference point
(reference dependence). If an outcome x is greater or smaller than a reference point Xref,
the relative outcome X - Xref is viewed as a gain or a loss, respectively. The reference point
might depend on the decision maker's expectation of the average outcome over relevant
choices. Second, the function has a concave form in the domain of gains and a convex
form in the domain of losses (diminishing sensitivity). Third, the function is steeper in the
negative domain than in the positive domain (loss aversion). These three characteristics
describe how people make a prediction on the hedonic impact ("experienced utility") of the
future outcome of a candidate option. This cognitive belief or expectation on the future ex-
perienced utility is called "predicted utility." That is, the PT subjective value function was
originally constructed as a predicted-utility function, which describes the decision maker's
predictions before a decision (i.e., in the predicting phase). Note that "predicted utility"
is distinguished from "experienced utility" which means the actual hedonic impact of the
outcome obtained after a decision (i.e., in the experiencing phase).
Research in PT, however, mostly focuses on the single-stage unambiguous decision-
making problems where future outcomes are uncertain but the outcome probability distri-
butions of candidate actions are known to the decision maker, rather than on sequential
decision-making problems involving learning in unknown stochastic domains such as in the
Reinforcement Learning (RL) literature. In other words, existing work in prospect theory
has focused mostly on non-sequential decision scenarios with known outcome distributions.
While PT has been developed in economics for domains with known outcome distribu-
tions, the AC model enables PT to be used in decision making and learning for unknown
and changing stochastic outcome distributions. The AC model will thus extend PT in that
it explains the human decisions PT explains and also learning behaviors in more complex
and realistic situations. Also, while PT just describes human decision behaviors, the AC
model can both describe and synthesize behaviors.
2.2 Reinforcement Learning (RL): decision making under
uncertainty
Most traditional work on RL and Markov decision processes (MDP) has assumed that
agents make decisions to maximize the expected total reward and that all the reward sig-
nals influencing an agent's behavior come from the environment and depend on only the
external state. Yet, "intrinsically motivated RL framework" assumes that an agent's re-
ward signals are determined by processes within its brain that monitor not only external
events through exteroceptive systems but also the agent's internal state, which includes
information pertaining to critical system variables as well as memories and accumulated
knowledge [3, 55, 56, 57]. The AC model can be viewed as consistent with the intrinsically
motivated RL framework. The new model, however, focuses on how the form of the util-
ity function as the critic changes with the agent's internal state (e.g., affective state) and
influences decisions and learning. Note that most traditional RL simulations often involve
a linear utility function (reward function) to evaluate outcomes or just use a fixed form of
the utility function without focusing on how the changes in the shape of utility function
(i.e., changes in sensitivities to the expected gains and gains) have an impact on the agent's
learning and decision making.
A few RL and MDP models have taken into account both the expected total reward
and the risk by transforming the total reward by exponential utility functions (Howard
and Matheson, 1972; Koenig and Simmons, 1994), by applying the worst-case criterion for
total discounted return (Heger, 1994), or by transforming temporal differences through a
risk-sensitive linear utility function (Mihatsch and Neuneier, 2002). Yet, none of the exist-
ing methods are informed by recent Nobel-prize winning findings in behavioral economics-
namely prospect theory (PT), which addresses important subjective effects known to influ-
ence human decision making. Moreover, none of the existing approaches discuss how the
current affective state at the time of decision making can influence decision making and
help regulate the trade-off between exploration (i.e., selecting a currently-estimated subop-
timal action to gather new information on that action) and exploitation (i.e., selecting a
currently-estimated best action).
A variety of reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms for sequential decision making under
uncertainty have been used to model learning and decision making in situations where the
agent initially does not know the exact outcome distributions of candidate options and
should learn them by trials (these sorts of learning problems are often called "decision
making under ambiguity (Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004)" or
"decision making from feedback (Barron and Erev, 2003)" in decision-making literatures).
There are two distinct kinds of RL approaches: model-free RL and model-based RL [14, 58].
The model-free RL, such as Q-learning algorithms, updates a cached value (or a weighted
average outcome) for each state-and-action pair, and then, whenever a new experience
happens in a similar situation, it updates the cached value by a new outcome. It does
not keep any models of state transitions and outcome probability distributions. Thus,
the model-free RL is computationally simple but comes at the cost of inflexibility. In
contrast, the model-based RL estimates the explicit models of state transitions and outcome
probability distributions. Thus, it allows the agent to make predictions on outcome values of
alternatives on the fly, and to quickly adapt to the dynamic change of the environment. The
model-free and model-based RL approaches, respectively, can be associated with the models
of the automatic affective habit-based control and reflective goal-directed control [14]. In
the perspective of RL algorithms, the experience-based mode can be linked to the model-free
RL and the prediction-based mode can be linked to the model-based RL.
Although RL is generally treated as a computational theory within the machine learn-
ing and operation research communities, there have also been some attempts to apply RL
principles to analyze human decision behavior [9, 15, 19]. Note that the existing RL the-
ories have not been developed to describe human behavior. Therefore, the RL theories
have not examined the subjective and affective influences on human prediction and expe-
rience of choice outcomes. In contrast, the AC model draws on subjective experiences and
affective prediction. As the first step of the AC model development, I use the Prospect
Theory (PT)-based parameterized subjective value functions in order to model the subjec-
tive characteristics of human decision making. I assume that the shapes (or parameters)
of subjective value functions dynamically vary with a decision-maker's task-related and/or
incidental affective states.
2.3 Affective influence on decisions
2.3.1 Integral emotion, incidental emotion, and task-related emotion
Expected emotion (cognition) and immediate emotion (genuine emotion): In
the affective decision-making literature, predicted utility is often called expected emotion
(a.k.a. anticipated emotion) [36]. That is, expected emotion means a cognitive belief on the
affective impact of future outcomes (i.e., a prediction on the future experienced utility of
outcomes). Note that expected emotion is a cognitive belief, not a genuine affective response.
Compared to expected emotion, immediate emotion is a genuine affective response.
Different types of immediate emotion: There are three types of immediate emotion
experienced at the time of decision making: integral emotion (a.k.a. anticipatory emotion),
incidental emotion, and task-related emotion [36, 38, 12]. Cohen et al. [12] classified them
as follows: "Integral emotion is affective responses that are genuinely experienced and di-
rectly linked to the object of decision. These integral affective responses include momentary
feelings elicited by features of the object, whether these features are real, perceived, or only
imagined. Incidental emotion is affective responses whose source is clearly unconnected to
the object to be evaluated. In addition to a person's current mood that is typically unre-
lated to the decision at hand, incidental emotion may also come from a person's emotional
dispositions and temperament, or from any contextual stimuli associated with integral emo-
tion. Task-related emotion is affective responses that are elicited by the task or process of
making decisions, as opposed to direct, integral responses to features of the target objects
or purely incidental feelings. For example, the emotional stress of having to choose between
two very attractive offers would be considered task-induced in that it is the process of having
to choose between these two offers that is stressful, not the offers themselves."
It appears that there are several mechanisms involved in how emotions influence deci-
sions. First, Integral emotion provides target evaluation either through a noninferential,
associative and automatic way (e.g., approach/avoidant action tendency and an embodied
mode of evaluation) [41, 4, 44] or through an inferential and reflective way such as the
"how-do-I-feel-about-it?" heuristic [51, 43]. Second, Incidental emotion influences judg-
ments through the cuing of mood-congruent thoughts ("affective referral", noninferential,
associative and automatic accesses to a prior evaluation of the target stored in memory)
[25] or affect-as-information mechanisms ("affective coloring", inferential and reflective pro-
cesses involving a constructive search for additional information) [10, 43, 46]. According to
the mood-congruency hypothesis [25], mood states (pleasant or unpleasant) automatically
cue similarly valenced materials in memory, thereby biasing people's perceptions of the tar-
get at the time of evaluation. Also, the affect-as-information hypothesis [10] is that people
often examine their feelings in their evaluation, and positive or negative feelings from the
mood state at the time of judgment may be misattributed to the target. Also, this misattri-
bution tend to disappear when people recognize the true source of incidental affect. In the
AC model, the automatic and associative processes are linked with the experience-based
mode, and the inferential and reflective processes are with the prediction-based mode.
2.3.2 Incidental affective influence on risk attitudes
I begin with a review of some findings on the literature already.
Positive incidental emotions
When the decisions involve low risks and low stakes, positive mood individuals tend to have
more optimistic (mood-congruent) expectations about the outcomes and, therefore, take
greater risks compared to neutral mood individuals. Yet, when the stakes are high and the
potential for losses significant, positive mood individuals become risk-averse because they
want to sustain their positive affective state, which a loss would break. That is, compared
to neutral moods, positive moods promote risk-taking attitude in the domain of likely gains
(or in situations with only upsides) but risk-avoidance in the domain of likely losses (or in
situations with only downsides) [12, 25, 26].
Negative incidental emotions
People's risk attitude under negative affective states is not only a function of the level of
arousal associated with the affective state, but also a function of the appraisal content of
the affective state. Thus, different emotions with the same valence but differing appraisals,
such as fear and anger, influence people's risk perception in different ways [32, 33, 34, 46].
Fear and Anger: Although fear and anger are both high-arousal negative emotions, fear
triggered in one situation tends to evoke more pessimistic risk estimates and risk-averse
choices in other unrelated situations, whereas anger does the opposite, evoking optimistic
risk estimates and risk-seeking choices [32, 33, 34]. This is because fear is typically coupled
with situations of uncertainty and low control, whereas anger is typically coupled with
situations of certainty and high control.
Anxiety and Sadness: Raghunathan and his colleagues [46, 47] found that in gambling
decisions (a gamble offering a 6/10 chance of winning $5 vs. a gamble offering a 3/10 chance
of winning $10) and in job selection decisions (an average salary with high job security vs. a
high salary with low job security) involving low-risk/low-reward and high-risk/high-reward
options, anxious individuals tend to prefer low-risk/low-reward options and sad individuals
tend to prefer high-risk/high-reward options. The authors state that this is because anxiety,
which is typically coupled with situations of low control and high uncertainty, triggers a
goal of risk and uncertainty minimization, whereas sadness, which is typically experienced
in response to the loss of a source of reward, triggers a goal of reward maximization. In
other words, because, even though their states are incidental, sad individuals tend to infer
that they have lost something of value, which activates a goal of reward acquisition that
shifts preferences toward high-reward options. In contrast, anxious individuals tend to infer
that the situation is uncertain and beyond control, which triggers a goal of risk avoidance
that shifts preferences toward low-risk options.
Also, Lerner et al. [35] found that incidental states of sadness reverse the classic endow-
ment effect, that is, the tendency to place a higher value on objects that are already in
our possession compared to identical objects that not in our possession. According to the
authors, this is because sadness creates a motivation to change the current situation, which
increases the willingness to pay for objects that are not in our possession (higher purchase
prices) and also increases the willingness to sell objects that currently are (lower selling
prices).
Disgust: According to Lerner et al. [35], incidental states of disgust eliminate the endow-
ment effect. That is, disgust triggers an impulse to get rid of objects that are currently in
our possession (lower selling prices) without necessarily distorting the value of objects that
are not in our possession (unchanged purchase prices).
2.4 The role of subjective experience in decision making un-
der uncertainty
The human adaptive learning studies on a task known as the Iowa gambling task (IGT)
have shown that people with a normal decision-making ability are good at quickly detecting
the optimal decision in the task, whereas patients with emotional deficits related to the
vmPFC damage are not [4, 5, 40]. The IGT involves repetitive trials in each of which
the participant selects a card among four decks of cards and obtains a monetary outcome
written in the selected card. Participants have no initial information about the underlying
outcome distributions of four decks. Decision making under uncertainty in this sort of
situation is often called "decision-making under ambiguity," distinguished from decision
making under the full information of underlying outcome distributions. Two decks produce
higher regular value but occasionally with big penalty so they are risky and disadvantageous
(or lower expected outcome), whereas the other two decks produce lower regular value but
occasionally with lesser penalty so they are relatively non-risky and advantageous (or higher
expected outcome). Compared with patients with prefrontal damage, after experiencing a
big penalty, normals began to generate anticipatory skin conductance arousal whenever they
made a choice from the decks that would turn out to be risky, even before they explicitly
recognized that it was risky. Yet, vmPFC patients never developed anticipatory arousal
although some eventually realized which choices were risky. Overall, vmPFC patients were
found to select more from risky decks, obtaining less overall outcome than normals.
Glimcher and Rustichini [21] have pointed out the following: First, "patients with
vmPFC lesions seem to lack an aversion to ambiguity or losses that normal participants
have, an aversion that may be quite advantageous under many conditions." Second, "the
process of learning and evaluating feedback may involve emotion-related areas." Third, "the
process of decision making under ambiguity may be very different from when participants
simply choose between options without any feedback or learning taking place at the same
time."
Also, Pham [44] has suggested the following: First, "in tasks that do not involve outcome
feedback, VMPC patients and normal participants exhibit comparable levels of risk-seeking
and impulsivity. This suggests that presumably emotionally impaired VMPC patients are
not inherently more risk-seeking and impulsive; rather they differ in how they respond to
and learn from outcome feedback." Second, "it is well established that integral affective
responses to a target that are positive generally trigger approach tendencies, whereas those
that are negative generally trigger avoidant tendencies, even if descriptions of the targets
and their cognitive assessments are held constant." Third, "integral affective responses
often serve as distinct proxies for value. What the Damasio studies [5], along with other
studies, suggest is simply that integral-affect-motivated approach and avoidance - that is,
affective behavioral regulation - is very sensitive to emotion-producing outcome feedback."
Consistent with these researchers' hypotheses, the AC model has a view that antic-
ipatory arousal relates to ambiguity aversion and is an indicator of the influence of the
experience-based mode involving experience-based emotional feedback and integral (antici-
patory) affective responses on human decision making.
2.5 Proposed Model: Affective-Cognitive Decision Model
The Affective-Cognitive (AC) model proposed in this dissertation extends Prospect Theory
(PT)-based subjective value functions to model people's experienced-utility and predicted-
utility functions. It is assumed that the parameters of these subjective value functions
can change with the current affective state in order to include the subjective and affective
influences such as loss aversion, the reference point dependency (framing effect) and risk
attitudes in adaptive decision making. Experienced utility (liking), which is associated with
the consummatory and hedonic properties (pleasure or displeasure) of current outcomes of a
choice, arises from the evaluation of our experience of the outcomes. Thus, this is about how
much people like or dislike the outcomes of our choice. Decision utility (wanting), which is
associated with the appetitive and motivational properties of future expected outcomes of
a choice, relates to the degree to which a choice is selected, and can be associated with and
inferred from actual observed behaviors. Also, it is very important to note that decision
utility (wanting) does not result from a unitary process [7, 28].
The experience-based and prediction-based modes of the AC model can be linked to
the model-free RL and model-based RL approaches [14, 58], respectively. In contrast to
the traditional RL approaches, however, the AC model incorporates subjective experiences
and affective prediction by means of subjective value functions. The experience-based mode
employs the experienced-utility function to evaluate the subjective (or hedonic) impact of
resulted outcomes, and the predicted-based mode capitalizes on the predicted-utilty function
to allow for the affective influence on the prediction about future outcomes.
The AC model aims to model the multiple pathways of how the current state-including
both affective and cognitive states-systematically influences decision utility. The AC model
assumes that the agent is in a certain cognitive and affective state at the time of decision
making, and that the decision utility for a candidate option in the current state is composed
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Figure 2-3: Comparisons of PT, RL, and AC models
of two main influences: the experience-based mode and the prediction-based mode.
Figure 2-3 shows comparisons of PT, RL and the proposed AC model. The following
sections will discuss main features of the AC model such as:
" The experience-based mode and total-experienced utility
* The prediction-based mode and predicted utility
" The experienced-utility function differs from the predicted-utility function
e Decision utility and the tradeoffs between affect and cognition
" Affective shaping can model incentive salience
" Confidence state (goal-achieving state) influences prediction
---- _ _ _ ---- ........ . ....................... ........................................... ....................................... I .  
* Incidental emotion state and framing influences experience, prediction and risk atti-
tude
2.5.1 The experience-based mode and total-experienced utility
Past affective experiences associated with a candidate option in similar situations to the
current state are automatically retrieved from the episodic memory and reactivated in the
short-term memory [5, 41]. This overall reactivation contributes to the motivation of se-
lecting the option. In the AC model, the "experience-based mode" refers to the overall
valence-based automatic affective influences.
The experience-based mode in the AC model can be approximated by model-free caching
reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms [58]. This computation method is also similar to
Kahneman's moment-based approach to evaluate a statistically aggregated overall value
(e.g., the recency-weighted average value) over past experienced utilities (past moment
likings). According to Kahneman's definitions on different utilities [28], this statistically
computed value is called "total-experienced utility" (a.k.a. "total utility"). Note that the
concept of total-experienced utility relates to the overall liking of past experiences, whereas
that of experienced utility relates to the moment liking of an experienced outcome. Total-
experienced utility or the experience-based mode in the AC model explains the role of
past experiences in the computation of decision utility (wanting). It can be associated with
"action value" in model-free RL and "anticipatory emotion" in the affective decision making
literature [4, 12, 36, 44].
The experience-based mode keeps a cached value for each state and option pair, and
then, whenever a new experience happens in a similar situation, it updates the cached
value (total-experienced utility) by a new experienced utility (moment liking). In other
words, this mode computes the weighted average over the past experienced utilities. The
"experienced-utility function" is employed to compute the experienced utility (moment
liking) for an experienced outcome. This function is modeled by a Prospect Theory (PT)-
based parameterized subjective value function whose shape changes with the experiencing
affective state, that is, the affective state at the moment of actual consummatory experience.
2.5.2 The prediction-based mode and predicted utility
The prediction about the affective experience of future outcomes of a candidate option
contributes to the motivation of selecting the option. In the AC model, the influence of
prediction on the motivation of behaviors is called the "prediction-based" mode. Note
that the cognitive belief on future experienced utility is influenced by the current affective
state (i.e., drive states, anticipatory, incidental and task-related affective states, etc.) as
well as the current cognitive state (i.e., goal-relevant environmental stimuli and cognitive
goals). Thus, this prediction-based mode includes both deliberative and affective processes.
The prediction-based mode can be associated with Kahneman's definition on "predicted
utility" [28].
In the AC model, computing the predicted utility for a candidate option is approx-
imated by two phases: the "deliberative estimation" phase and the "affective shaping"
phase. Although the estimation of the future long-run outcome distribution for a choice is
very deliberative and goal-directed (i.e., deliberative estimation), the ultimate prediction is
influenced by the current affective state at the moment of prediction (i.e., affective shaping).
Deliberative estimation attempts to estimate the long-run objective outcome distribu-
tion (costs and benefits in terms of goals) for a candidate option. From a theoretical
perspective, any model-based learning method can be employed if it is useful for approx-
imating the distribution. In contrast to traditional RL algorithms in which the expected
future outcome is directly used for the action-selection model (decision-making policy), the
AC model computes predicted utility, which incorporates the affective influence on the pre-
diction. This additional step, that is, transforming the long-run outcome distribution into
a predicted utility, is called the "affective shaping" phase.
Affective shaping approximates the influence of the current predicting affective state
on the predicted utility. This step takes cognitive beliefs on the long-run outcome as an
input, and transforms those expected outcomes into predicted-utility samples through the
predicted-utility function. The predicted utility is the average of the predicted-utility sam-
ples.
In the AC model, the predicted-utility function is another PT-based parameterized
subjective value function, which is distinguished from the experienced-utility function.
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Figure 2-4: Risk attitudes (risk seeking or risk averse in the domain of likely gains and
losses, sensitivity to losses) depend on the values of the PT parameters
Figure 2-4 shows how the PT value function (predicted utility function) is parameterized
to describe different risk attitudes including the risk attitudes (risk seeking or risk averse)
in face of gains and losses, and the sensitivities to losses.
2.5.3 The experienced-utility function differs from the predicted-utility
function
Note that AC model employs two different kinds of subjective value functions for a certain
kind of outcome, an "experienced-utility function" and a "predicted-utility function," al-
though both functions are modeled by PT-based parameterized functions. The experienced-
utility function (used in the consummatory, experience stage) is to evaluate moment-
experienced utility for an obtained outcome, whereas the predicted-utility function (used in
the preparatory, prediction stage) is to modulate a deliberative belief on the future outcome
into an affective value or predicted utility in order to compute the expected hedonic impact
of the future outcome. The AC model assumes that the subjective value function employed
in evaluating current experience (i.e., experienced-utility function) is different from that
employed in predicting future experience (i.e., predicted-utility function).
In the affective decision making literature "projection bias" tells that people often
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project their current affective state (i.e., the affective state at the time of prediction (decision
making)) into their prediction because they fail to correctly predict their future experiencing
affective state (i.e., the affective state at the time of future experience) [24]. In particular,
when people have not had much previous experience in similar decision-making situations,
they often make their prediction as if their future experiencing affective state were the same
as their current affective state at the time of prediction. Yet, it is very often that the
affective state at the time of actual experience in the future (employed in the experienced-
utility function) is different from the affective state at the time of prediction (employed in
predicted-utility function). Thus, this supports the assumption of the AC model that there
are two separate subjective value functions for experience and prediction.
2.5.4 Decision utility and the tradeoffs between affect and cognition
The AC model assumes that decision utility for a candidate option is composed of total-
experienced utility (experience-based mode) and predicted utility (prediction-based mode).
Psychological experiments have shown that cognitive load at the time of decision making
as well as personal disposition may influence the trade-off between the influences of the
experience-based mode and the prediction-based mode and the trade-off between the goal-
directed deliberative estimation and the affective shaping [53]. In other words, when a
person is stressed or more cognitively loaded, he or she tends to rely more on the experience-
based mode and may be more strongly influenced by the affective shaping.
Lowenstein and O'Donoghue's decision-making model [37] assumes that one mode to-
tally relates to the affective system and the other mode totally relates to the deliberative
system. In the AC model, however, both experience-based and prediction-based modes are
influenced by the current affective state in its own way, and the prediction-based mode in-
cludes deliberative estimation. The experience-based mode has direct influence through the
caching mechanism where total-experienced utilities for distinct affective states are stored
independently, whereas the prediction-based mode has indirect influence through the affec-
tive shaping.
2.5.5 Affective shaping can model incentive salience
In the computational-modeling perspective, incentive salience (cue-triggered 'wanting') can
be also modeled by affective shaping, which uses a parameterized predicted-utility function
for each kind of outcome. Incentive salience is irrational motivation, distinguished from
the goal-directed prediction. Berridge et al. [6, 7] says, "Attribution of incentive salience
transforms mere sensory information about rewards and their cues (sights, sounds and
smells) into attractive, desired, riveting incentives. Its attribution to a percept or other
representation is to make it a 'wanted' target of motivation. For instance, if drug cues trigger
activation of sensitized mesolimbic dopamine systems, then an addict may be moved to take
drugs again by hyper-incentive wanting. In general, the incentive salience hypothesis and
relevant experimental results are fully supportive of Loewenstein's visceral factors theory,
and provide one specific mechanism by which visceral factors might actually overwhelm
volition to produce irrational choices." The computational method of incentive salience in
the AC model involves the same "affective shaping" phase as in that of predicted utility.
Yet, the incentive salience mechanism (where "irrational" wanting is triggered by activation
of the brain dopamine system) should be viewed as an independent pathway into decision
utility. This is consistent with Berridge's view. For instance, experienced people (e.g.,
experienced addicts, compared to first-time drug users) usually know that they will not
actually 'like' the outcomes related to cues later, but they still 'want' and work for the
outcomes.
2.5.6 Confidence state (goal-achieving state) influences prediction
The AC model implements one specific kind of task-related affective state, called the "con-
fidence state (goal-achieving state)". The model assumes that the confidence state is asso-
ciated with how much experienced utility (pleasure or displeasure) the agent has achieved
in terms of its goal, and that the confidence state is a measure of how much the current
strategy is appropriate for achieving the goal. If this affective state is positive, the agent
feels confident in the current decision strategy.
Here are two hypotheses on the predicted-utility function whose shape changes with the
agent's confidence state. The hypotheses explains how the agent with the confidence-based
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Figure 2-5: The shape of the predicted-utility function changes with the confidence (goal-
achieving) state: this change influences discriminability.
affective prediction can be more efficient in controlling the exploitation-exploration balance
in learning situations, compared to the agent without the confidence state. Figure 2-5
shows how the confidence-based shape change of the predicted utility function influences
discriminability (regarding the separation of expected subjective values of two options).
(1) As the agent becomes more confident in achieving the goal (i.e., a good goal-achieving
state), it becomes more sensitive to both likely gains and losses.
(2) As the agent becomes less confident in achieving the goal (i.e., a bad goal-achieving
state), it becomes less sensitive to both likely gains and losses.
When the agent feels high confidence (good goal-achieving state) from cumulative gains
on past choice trials, she has a more sensitive predicted utility function in both domains of
gains and losses. Because of this greater sensitivity in high confident state, there are greater
separations between the predicted utilities of the currently-estimated best option and the
other options. In other words, compared to neutral or low confidence state, the agent in
high confidence state feels as if the estimated subjective values of the currently-estimated
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best option and the other options were more separated. Thus, the agent will have greater
discriminability and be more likely to select the currently-observed best option (called the
exploitative choice). On an unpredictable dynamic domain under uncertainty, when the
domain is temporarily stationary, the agent will be more likely to make the exploitative
choice.
Yet, when the agent feels low confidence (bad goal-achieving state) from cumulative
losses on past choice trials, she has a less sensitive predicted utility function in both domains
of gains and losses. Because of this smaller sensitivity in low confidence state, there are
smaller separations between the predicted utilities of the currently-observed best option
and the other options. In other words, compared to neutral or high confidence state, the
agent in low confidence state feels as if the estimated subjective values of the estimated
subjective values of the currently-estimated best option and the other options were less
separated. Thus, the agent will have smaller discriminability and be more likely to select
currently-observed suboptimal options (called the exploratory choice). On an unpredictable
dynamic domain under uncertainty, when the domain is temporarily changing, the agent
will be more likely to make the exploratory choice.
2.5.7 Incidental emotion state and framing influences experience, predic-
tion and risk attitude
The standard PT subjective value function as shown in Figure is concave (0 < a < 1) in
the domain of potential gains, and convex (0 < b < 1) in the domain of potential losses.
f X ref~a a ~ e
V = fPT(X - aref) --
-A(-(x - Xref))b, x - Xref < 0
0<a<1, 0<b<1, A>1
A PT-based parameterized subjective value function can model the risk attitude (risk
seeking or risk averse) and the sensitivity either in the domains of potential gains or in the
domain of potential losses by changing the values of its parameters.
First, in the domain of potential gains:
e When a > 1 (convex): risk-seeking
" When a = 1 (linear): risk-neutral
" When 0 < a < 1 (concave): risk-averse
* As a increases, more risk-seeking
" As a decreases, more risk-averse
Second, in the domain of potential losses:
" When b > 1 (concave): risk-averse
" When b = 1 (linear): risk-neutral
" When 0 < b < 1 (convex): risk-seeking
" As b increases, more risk-averse
" As b decreases, more risk-seeking
" As A increases, more sensitive to losses
" As A decreases, less sensitive to losses
Note that the sensitivities to potential gains and losses, respectively, relate to the asymp-
totic slopes of the function in the domain of gains and losses, and the uncertainty attitudes
in the domain of potential gains and losses relate to the curvatures (convexity and concavity)
in the corresponding domain.
In a gambling task involving potential gains, people with a smaller a have more risk-
averse attitude, whereas people with a larger a have more risk-seeking attitude. Also, in
a gambling task involving potential losses, people with a smaller b (> 0) have more risk-
seeking attitude, while people with a larger b have more risk-averse attitude.
The parameter values of the PT-based subjective value function change with the in-
cidental mood state. Based on a variety of psychological experiments on the influences
of different mood states on the risk attitude, the hypotheses on the change of parameters
under different mood states are as follows.
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Figure 2-6: Positive mood changes the predicted-utility function
Positive incidental affects
The promoted risk-seeking attitude under positive moods in potential-gain situations [12,
25] could be associated with an increased a (i.e., more risk-seeking and more sensitive
to gains). Likewise, the promoted risk-averse attitude under positive moods in potential-
loss situations [12, 25] could be associated with an increased b (i.e., more risk-averse and
more sensitive to losses). The shape of the subjective value function that Isen and her
colleagues [26] experimentally inferred for people in positive moods can be also related to
this explanation.
Negative incidental affects
Fear and Anger: The promoted risk-averse attitude in fear [32, 33, 34] could be associ-
ated with a decreased a (i.e., more risk-averse and less sensitive to gains) and an increased
b (i.e., more risk-averse and more sensitive to losses). Likewise, the promoted risk-seeking
attitude in anger [32, 33, 34] could be associated with an increased a (i.e., more risk-seeking
and more sensitive to gains) and a decreased b (i.e., more risk-seeking and less sensitive to
losses).
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Figure 2-7: Fear (anxiety) and Anger change the predicted-utility function
Anxiety and Sadness: The promoted risk-averse attitude in anxiety [46, 47], which is
a fear-like emotion, could be associated with a decreased a (i.e., more risk-averse and less
sensitive to gains) and an increased b (i.e., more risk-averse and more sensitive to losses).
From the facts that sad people prefer high-risk/high-reward options to low-risk/low-reward
options and place a lower value on objects that they have possessed [46, 47], it could be
inferred that sad people tend to be less sensitive to potential losses, more sensitive to
potential gains and take risks for gains. Also, the reverse endowment effect in sadness [35]
could be associated with the less sensitivity to potential losses. This attitude in sad moods
could be associated with an increased a (i.e., more risk-seeking and more sensitive to gains)
and a decreased A (i.e., less sensitive to losses).
Disgust: The elimination of endowment effect in disgust [35] could be associated with a
decreased A (i.e., less sensitive to losses).
2.5.8 Comparison with other models
The AC model is distinguished from other cognitive approaches such as Bayesian belief
updating [18, 15], model-free reinforcement learning [58], and EWA (experience-weighted
attraction) learning [9], in terms of the concept or computation of decision utility. In
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Figure 2-8: Sadness and Disgust change the predicted-utility function
Bayesian belief updating, decision utility for a choice means a belief about future outcomes
predicted in Bayesian way. This Bayesian concept of decision utility involves only the
cognitive aspect of predicted utility neglecting the affective influence on prediction. In
model-free reinforcement learning, decision utility for a choice is a weighted average outcome
over past experiences. Thus, decision utility in model-free reinforcement learning represents
the cognitive aspect of total-experienced utility neglecting the subjective influence (i.e.,
reference dependence, loss-aversion and diminishing sensitivity) on outcome evaluations. In
EWA learning, decision utility is a combination of the cognitive aspects of predicted utility
and total-experienced utility.
In the AC model, affect has two important functional roles. First, affect in the experience
phase serves as experience-feedback (reinforcement or punishment) signals. This role of
affect is similar to Panksepp's concept of sensory affects [42] or Kahneman's concept of
experienced utility [28, 31]. In the AC model, this subjective evaluation signal is modeled
by the PT-based parameterized experienced-utility function. Second, affect in the decision-
making phase serves as processing modulation signals that influence on both the experience-
based mode (total-experienced utility) and the prediction-based mode (predicted utility) as
follows:
* In the experience-based mode, a built-in action tendency associated with an affective
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state may motivate the decision maker to take an associated action (i.e., an affectively
attractive action). The affective state at the time of decision making directly influences
the experience-based mode in such a way to automatically reactivate past memories
experienced in similar situations to the affective state. In terms of computation mod-
eling, the affective state is used as an index for finding similar situations to be taken
into account for the computation of the overall experience value (total-experienced
utility). This direct influence is called "affective referral" in the AC model.
" In the prediction-based mode, the affective state influences the computation of the
predicted utility through the change of the predicted utility function. Thus, the
predicted utility in the AC model is not a pure-cognitive Bayesian belief on future
outcomes, but it is affectively modulated belief on the hedonic impacts of future
outcomes. This indirect influence is called "affective shaping" in the AC model.
" In the AC model, the decision utility is a linear combination of the total-experienced
utility and the predicted utility whose weights can be adjusted by a cognitive-load
parameter.
Several important decision-making models in psychology, economics and neuroscience,
such as
" Kahneman and Tversky (prospect theory) [30]
" Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (animal spirits: affective and deliberative processes) [37]
" Kahneman (objective happiness: moment-based approach) [28, 31, 29]
" Loewenstein and Lerner (risk-as-feelings, the role of affect in decision making) [38, 36]
* Berridge and Robinson (incentive salience) [7, 6]
" Bechara and Damasio (somatic marker hypothesis) [4, 5]
" Dayan and Daw (Pavlovian and instrumental actions) [16]
" Yechiam and Busemeyer (expectancy-valence model) [63]
e Camerer and Ho (EWA: experience-weighted attraction) [9]
are compared with the AC model in terms of the following criteria:
" What is the main field of the model? (Behavioral economics, Psychology, Neuro-
science, Machine learning, etc)
" Is it a model for animal behavior or human decision making? Is the model descriptive
or generative or both?
" Does the model provide a computational framework?
" What kinds of situations can the model deal with? (decision making under the full
information of risks, or decision making under uncertainty (adaptive learning))
" How does the model evaluate an obtained outcome? What is the concept of experi-
enced utility in the model? Does the model employ a subjective experienced-utility
function?
" Does it model the influence of past overall experience on decision making? Does the
concept of total-experienced utility involve both cognitive and affective influence?
" Does it model the influence of prediction on decision making? Does the concept
of predicted utility involve both cognitive and affective influence? Does the model
employ a subjective predicted-utility function?
" Does it model the influence of emotions in decision making?
" Does it model an intertemporal affective dynamics with a model of task-related emo-
tion state?
" How does it explain the decision preference (determining decision behavior)? What
kinds of influences contribute to the decision preference?
" What is the rationality criterion of the model?
The following Figures 2-9, 2-10, 2-11 and 2-12 compare the AC model with other
models.
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Chapter 3
Modeling Subjective Experience
and Affective Prediction
3.1 Utilities and subjective experience
Kahneman [28, 31] suggests that there are distinct concepts of utility: the pleasure or
displeasure of subjective experience of a choice outcome is defined as "experienced utility",
that is, the affective and hedonic concept of utility, whereas the probability of selecting a
choice draws on "decision utility", that is, the behavioral and motivational concept of utility.
Thus, decision utility is the concept used for describing actual (observed) choice behaviors
and this concept is similar to that of option value in the reinforcement-learning literature.
Also, "predicted utility" is the decision-maker's belief about the future experienced utility
of a choice outcome.
The role of subjective prediction in decisions under risk - when outcome probabilities of
each choice are explicitly described in the problem and fully known to the decision maker -
has been extensively examined in traditional decision theories such as prospect theory. For
decisions under risk, the main determinant of decisions is the decision maker's predicted
utility (i.e., decision utility = predicted utility). Prospect theory employs a subjective utility
function called the "predicted-utility function" by which the decision maker's risk attitudes
and framing (dependence on the reference point) can be described for decisions under risk.
Yet, the role of subjective experience in decisions under uncertainty - when outcome
probabilities of each choice are not explicitly described and should be learned from past
experiences by the decision maker - has less been investigated, compared to the role of
subjective prediction in decisions under risk. For decisions under uncertainty, the overall
experience of the decision maker on previous trials in the same situation has a critical
impact on future decisions, the experience-based mode (total-experienced utility) critically
influences decision utility.
In this section I focus on two-armed bandit problems with stationary distributions of
stochastic outcomes to understand the impacts of past overall subjective experience on the
current decision through both computational approaches. To model subjective experience,
I proposed and tested another kind of a PT-based parameterized subjective value function
called the "experienced-utility function", which is independent of and separate from the
predicted-utility function. I investigate how framing (reference point selection) influences
subjective experiences and in turn, the "(subjective) discriminability" of choices. The con-
cept of discriminability characterizes the level of easiness in figuring out which choice has
a greater average utility than other ones with fewer trials; thus, the discriminability is a
key factor in regulating the trade-offs between exploration and exploitation and quickly
detecting the optimal decision in learning. Computational simulation results will show that
discriminability can be increased by the use of the experienced-utility function in some
domains with an appropriate reference point.
The nonlinear shape of the experienced-utility function reflects the decision maker's risk-
averse experience when it comes to their gains, and risk-seeking experience when it comes to
their losses. This implies that a distinct shape of the experienced-utility function may lead to
a different "subjective discriminability" for the same underlying outcome distribution. An
increased subjective discriminability enables the decision maker to need fewer exploratory
choice trials to achieve the best overall outcome. That is, the decision maker when employing
a nonlinear experienced-utility function with a good decision frame (or a good reference
point) may achieve greater overall outcome than when employing a linear experienced-
utility function. Note that the decision maker with a linear experienced-utility function has
the same discriminability (or "objective discriminability") regardless of the reference point
selection.
Although reinforcement-learning (RL) algorithms focus on decisions under uncertainty,
most have not focused on how the shape of the function modeling subjective experiences
influences the decision maker's learning and discriminability; in most applications, the
experienced-utility function is simply assumed to be linear.
While PT theory has been developed in economics for domains with known outcome
distributions, this new model enables PT theory to be used for unknown and changing
stochastic outcome distributions.
3.2 Decisions under uncertainty
In the decision-making literatures, decision situations under "risk" (stochastic outcomes
but known outcome distributions of alternatives) are distinguished from decision situations
under "uncertainty" (stochastic outcomes and unknown outcome distributions of alterna-
tives). Thus, in situations under uncertainty, decision makers should learn the values of
each option from their overall previous experience.
In this section, I focus on the experience-based mode in the AC model and investi-
gate the benefits and pitfalls that it can bring in different decision-making domains under
uncertainty.
The experience-based mode is similar to the model-free RL, but it employs an "experienced-
utility function" to evaluate the subjective value (called "experienced utility" or "moment
utility") of the obtained outcome and update the cached overall subjective value (called
"total-experienced utility") of the choice by current experienced utility. In this way, the
experience-based mode can model the decision maker's different risk attitude (risk-seeking
or risk-averse with experienced gains and losses) and sensitivity to experienced losses. Note
that "predicted-utility function" models the decision maker's risk attitude in face of poten-
tial gains and losses and sensitivity to potential losses.
Here the experience-based mode of the AC agent employing the PT-based experienced-
utility function (i.e., experienced utility = subjective value (pleasure or displeasure)) will
be compared with the model-free RL agent employing the linear utility function (i.e., expe-
rienced utility = objective outcome (gain or loss)).
The total-experienced utility (or weighted average over past sampled experienced utili-
ties) for an option represents the agents overall experienced feeling (i.e., positive or negative
valence) about that option. Assume that the AC agent only depends on the experience-
based mode (i.e., decision utility = total-experienced utility). Under this assumption, if
option 1 has a greater total-experienced utility than option 2, the difference in the utilities
for two options shows the relative preference in choosing option 1 over option 2. In this
case, option 1 is called "positively valenced" and option 2 is called "negatively valenced",
where these labels reflect relative preference.
Two distinct kinds of stationary two-armed bandit domains are considered to explain
how subjective valuation in the experience phase influence the earlier detection of the op-
timal option in some domain.
In two-armed bandit problems, there are two options (i.e., option 1 and option 2). Thus,
when option k (=1,2) is selected and then outcome x is obtained, the total-experienced
utility V(k) is updated as follows:
(1) Reference point xref is modeled by the average of the estimated expected outcomes
of option 1 and option 2: xref = (A(1) + A(2))/2
Note that there could be other ways of reference point selection. This average-based
reference is one particular setup for simulations here.
(2) Experienced utility v for outcome x and reference point xef is computed through
the experience-utility function fEU in the current state: v = fEU(x - xref).
(3) Total-experienced utility for option k is updated: V(k) <- V(k)+a (v -V(k)) where
a is the learning rate parameter.
(4) The estimated expected outcome for option k is updated as follows (if it is not
separately modeled in the prediction-based mode): A(k) <- A(k) + a (x - A(k)) where a is
the learning rate parameter.
Note that when a = count(k) where count(k) is the number of trials of option k until
now, A(k) and V(k), respectively, compute the exact averages of sampled outcomes and
sampled subjective values of option k. In the simulations on the stationary domains below,
a = count(k) is assumed.
I- otin1
opton2 option2
a. a.
Outcome Outcome
The option with a higher mean The option with a lower mean
has a lower variance in outcomes has a higher variance in outcomes
(a) Domain 1 (b) Domain 2
Figure 3-1: (Example) domains under uncertainty: Domain 1 vs. Domain 2
3.2.1 Objective discriminability vs. Subjective discriminability
Task Domains: The following two-armed bandit tasks (See Figure 3-1) used in simula-
tions are very useful in examining how framing influences subjective experience and optimal
decisions.
1. There are two options: one "risky" option with high variance in outcomes and the
other "safe" option with low variance in outcomes. Both options have Gaussian outcome
distributions.
2. There were two domains (Domain 1 and Domain 2) used in simulations: For Domain
1, the safe option is the optimal option (i.e.,the option with a greater outcome on average)
and the risky option is the suboptimal option (or with a smaller outcome on average). For
Domain 2, the risky option is the optimal option and the safe option is sub-optimal.
Discriminability: The concept of discriminability has been largely investigated under
different names in a variety of areas such as psychophysical judgment and decision the-
ory [60, 8], pattern classification [18], signal detection theory (called the "sensitivity index"
or d') [62] and statistical power analysis (called the "effect size") [11]. Discriminability can
be used for characterizing the level of easiness in discriminating which choice is optimal with
fewer trials. Figure 3-2 shows how the "true" objective and subjective discriminabilities are
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defined. The subjective value distributions are the transformation of the objective outcome
distributions through a PT-based subjective value function (experienced-utility function).
Note that the transformed subjective value distributions (and the subjective discriminabil-
ity) depend on the reference point location as well as the shape of the experienced-utility
function. The subjective discriminability depends on the decision maker's subjective-value
distributions, whereas the objective discriminability depends on the original outcome dis-
tributions.
A larger subjective discriminability makes the decision maker more likely to choose
the optimal option on the next trial, whereas a smaller subjective discriminability makes
the decision maker more likely to choose the suboptimal option. Also, a positive value of
subjective discriminability indicates that experiences contribute to selecting the optimal
option more, whereas a negative value means the opposite tendency.
If the subjective discriminability is greater than the objective discriminability, the agent
with a subjective value function can tell which option is optimal with fewer exploratory
trials, compared to the agent with a linear utility function.
Below are the definitions of the "estimated" objective discriminability and subjective
discriminability in a two-armed bandit task.
Defining objective discriminability: dbj (objective discriminability) is defined as
, p1 - P 2
dobj 277-2
-2
where
A1 = the average of obtained outcomes from the optimal option (i.e., the safe option on
Domain 1 or the risky option on Domain 2) over trials,
A2 = the average of obtained outcomes from suboptimal option (i.e., the risky option on
Domain 1 or the safe option on Domain 2) over trials,
&i = the standard deviation of obtained outcomes from the optimal option over trials,
&2 = the standard deviation of obtained outcomes from the suboptimal option over trials.
The definition of objective discriminability depends on a decision maker's obtained out-
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Figure 3-2: Objective discriminability d'b3 vs. Subjective discriminability d'ubj (true values)
comes over trials. That is, the measure of objective discriminability relies only on the
underlying outcome distributions and samplings from them, but should not be affected by
the gain or loss frame used to evaluate experienced utilities.
Defining subjective discriminability: d'subj (subjective discriminability) is defined as
d _ A1,subj - 12,subjsubj ~ -2
1,subj + &2,subj
where
A1,subj = the average of experienced-utilities from the optimal option over trials,
/2,subj = the average of experienced-utilities from suboptimal option over trials,
&1,subj = the standard deviation of experienced-utilities from the optimal option over trials,
0 2,subj = the standard deviation of experienced-utilities from the suboptimal option over
trials.
The following sections will show why the above definitions of discriminabilities are useful
. ........... . ...... .... .........................  - - _________ --. ............
in the analysis of optimal decision making under uncertainty: the concept of discriminability
is associated with the probability of selecting the optimal option after some exploratory
trials (assuming the greedy selection strategy). That is, a higher discriminability leads to
a greater probability of selecting the optimal option.
3.2.2 Objective discriminability
Consider a two-armed bandit task in which each option k (=1, 2) is associated with a nor-
mal (Gaussian) outcome distribution r - N(pk, ok) (assuming p1 > p2). Note that these
underlying outcome distributions are initially unknown to the decision maker. The goal of
the decision maker is to maximize the total outcome during N trials. It is well known that
decision problems under uncertainty require the dilemma between exploration and exploita-
tion [59, 39]. Most strategies to solve this dilemma have proposed some initial exploratory
trials or the exploration bonus. To easily define the relevant concepts of discriminability
associated with exploration and exploitation, here I focus on the greedy selection strategy
with initial 2nB exploratory trials (assuming 2nB << N). In this strategy, the decision
maker clearly distinguishes initial 2nB exploratory trials from later N - 2nB exploitative
trials. During the exploratory trials, the decision maker alternatively selects one of the op-
tions; thus, after these trials, random outcomes of nB trials for each option will be obtained.
During the exploitative trials, the decision maker selects the option with a current higher
average outcome (or sample mean of obtained outcomes during past trials from the option):
denoting the average outcome of each option as A' and A' on trial t (;> tB 2nB +1), the
decision maker selects option 1 when A4 > A' and option 2 when At < A.
Here, to define a concept of discriminability associated with the initial 2 nB-trial ex-
ploration, I focus on the trial tB(= 2nB + 1) immediately after 2nB exploratory trials.
On this trial the average outcome or the sample mean of nB observed outcomes after
nB exploratory trials of each option k(= 1, 2) is computed as A=B A (1/nB) E" r
where rf) is the ith sampled outcome of option k. Also, sample means AB follow nor-
mal distributions: A ~ N(yk, (k/ iB)) for each k. Now the probability of choosing
option 1 over option 2 on trial tB (- 2nB + 1) according to the average objective out-
comes is Prb(option = 1) = Pr(AtB > #2B) = Pr(AtB -t2 > 0) = Pr(y > 0) where
y=A - A2. SinceAtB and A"t are normal variables, y is also a normal variable following
y ~ N(pi - P2, (o + o)/nB). Now the standard normal variable z y-(~1-2)1 ~+u')/nB
N(O, 1) whose cumulative distribution function (cdf) is 1(x) = + (+ erf( ) leads to
Pr(y > 0) = Pr(z > -dB) = 1 - D(-dB) = D(dB) where dB A -A2
Defining the objective discriminability (called objective d-prime) db Al-/- - , dB =
v'inB d'lb3 and thus, Probj (option = 1) = d(D in d',bj). Note that dobj depends only on the
statistics of objective outcome distributions given in the problem and that as d of the
underlying domain increases, the objective decision maker's probability of choosing option
1 over option 2 after 2nB exploratory trials becomes close to 1 with the objective-outcome
based greedy selection strategy.
3.2.3 Subjective discriminability
Now consider what happens to the discriminability when the decision maker employs the
subjective value (or experienced-utility) function with a pre-fixed reference point.
Monte Carlo simulations can be used to estimate the statistics of the subjective value
distributions (vk = f(rk) for k = 1, 2) obtained by shaping the original objective out-
come distributions (rk ~ Npk, o)) through the subjective value function f(.). The true
means (psubj,k) and standard deviations (osubj,k) of the subjective value distributions can
be estimated as follows: for a large positive integer M and the mth sampled outcome
rM ~ N(yk, 2j) (m = 1,-.- ,M),
psubj,k = E[vk] = Ef(rk)] = (1/M) I k
Usubj,k Var[vk Va[f (rk)] = /1/(M - 1) { _ f(r )- psubj,k) 2
The average subjective value of option k after nB exploratory trials is the sample mean
of nB subjective values, At Bj, A (1/nB) En1 ('). Assuming the number of exploratory
trials (nB) is sufficiently large, according to the central limit theorem, I approximate the
distributions of the subjective-value sample means ftB. k by normal distributions: Atubj,k
N(suby,k, (osubj,k/VWn ) 2 ) for option k(= 1, 2). Now the probability of choosing option 1
over option 2 on trial tB(= 2 nB + 1) according to the average subjective values ,subj,1 and
uBj,2 can be obtained in a manner similar to computing the probability according to the
average outcomes. Pr8 sby (option = 1) = Pr( b > I'sbJ,2) - sruy,1 - 0 subj,2 > 0) =
d1(dsubj,B) where dsubj,B = V subj,1- -subj,2
(subj,2 ±subj,2)n
Defining the subjective discriminability (called subjective d-prime) d' A subj,1 -subj,2(cle sbet~edprm)subj 
- ;2 +o2 2
ubj,1 subj,2
the following relationships are obtained: dubJB -= / d'ubj and Prub1 (option = 1) =
r(/B d'sub). Note that dubj depends not only on the underlying outcome distributions,
but also on the decision maker's subjective value function whose shape and reference point
are described by the parameters. As d'Ub increases, the subjective decision maker's prob-
ability of choosing option 1 over option 2 after 2nB exploratory trials becomes close to 1
with the subjective-value based greedy selection strategy.
3.2.4 Comparison between objective and subjective discriminabilities
The decision maker's probability of choosing option 1 over option 2 after nB trials of each
option depends on their discriminability (d'lb3 or d'Ub): Probg (option = 1) = 4( /nB d)
and Prsub (option = 1) = (In-B d'ubj). Therefore, if subjective discriminability d'ubj is
greater than objective discriminability d'b for a decision maker with an appropriate shape
and reference point of the subjective value function in some domains, subjective decision
making may provide a better overall performance (or the rate of choosing the optimal
option during all trials) due to a higher probability of choosing option 1 over option 2
during the remaining exploitative trials. In other words, to get the same level of confidence
of which option is optimal (which is proportional to Probj (option = 1) or Prsubj (option = 1)
), subjective decision making with a larger d'Ub should usually require fewer exploratory
trials than objective decision making with a smaller d'
3.2.5 Interaction effects of domain and framing on subjective discrim-
inability
Figure 3-3 graphically represents how the domain type (Domain 1 and Domain 2) and
the framing (gain frame or loss frame) influence subjective discriminability. Here the gain
frame or loss frame, respectively, is defined as the frame viewing sampled outcomes from
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Figure 3-3: The interaction of domain and framing influences subjective discriminability
and optimal decisions
the safe option as gains or losses. That is, the reference point location determines whether
the framing is the gain or loss frame. By the definition of subjective discriminability, the
increased d' leads to more selections of the optimal option (the safe option on Domain
1, the risky option on Domain 2).
" On Domain 1 (where optimal option = safe option) (Figure 3-3 (a) and (b)), the
gain frame increases d', due to the risk-averse attitude (motivating to select the
safe option), whereas the loss frame decreases d'Ub due to the risk-seeking attitude
(motivating to select the risky option). Yet, the framing does not influence d'b.
* On Domain 1, for the decision maker with the PT-based subjective value function, the
........................  .................... 
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gain frame helps optimal decision making but the loss frame harms optimal decision
making.
" On Domain 2 (where optimal option = risky option) (Figure 3-3 (c) and (d)), the
gain frame decreases d'Ub due to the risk-averse attitude (motivating to select the
safe option), whereas the loss frame increases d'Ub due to the risk-seeking attitude
(motivating to select the risky option). Yet, the framing does not influence d',bj.
" On Domain 2, for the decision maker with the PT-based subjective value function, the
loss frame helps optimal decision making but the gain frame harms optimal decision
making.
3.2.6 The influence of the reference point selection (framing) on the sub-
jective discriminability
Figures 3-4, 3-5 and 3-6 show the simulation results on how the reference point selection
(framing) influences subjective discriminability on different domains (Domain 1, Domain
2, and a domain where two options have equal variance in outcomes, respectively) for the
decision maker employing a subjective value function (experienced-utility (EU)) function
with shape parameters a = 0.8, b = 0.5, A = 2.5. In all simulations, the estimated dis-
criminabilities d',lJ and d'b were computed based on 10000 randomly sampled outcomes
from distributions of each option. Note that d'lbJ significantly changes as the reference
point location changes, whereas d'bj (estimate) is almost the same as the true objective
discriminability (d' bj (true)). This is because objective discriminability does not depend on
the reference point selection.
On Domain 1 (Figure 3-4), option 1 (average outcome p1 = 5 and standard deviation o-
= 5) is safe (lower variance) and optimal (higher average), and option 2 (average outcome
-1 = -5 and standard deviation o- = 10) is risky (higher variance) and suboptimal (lower
average). In this domain, the gain frame (e.g., Xref = -5) and the neutral frame, whose
reference point is near the mean of the average outcomes of two options, e.g., Xref = 0,
lead to an increased subjective discriminability (d'Ub > d'), whereas the loss frame (e.g.,
Xref > 5) leads to a decreased subjective discriminability (d'Ub < d'9.
Domain 1 1 5
p2 = -5 o
a2 =10
Xref = -5 Xref = 10 outcome
(Gain frame) (Loss frame)
0.95
0'9 4A 0
0.85- d'subi (estimate)
-- - d'obi (estimate)
0.8-- - d'obj (true)
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0.7
-10 -5 0 5 10
reference point (Xref)
Figure 3-4: Discriminabilities vs. reference point (Domain 1): showing how the reference
point selection influences d'ubj, employing the EU function a = 0.8, b = 0.5, A = 2.5. Green
lines indicate two example reference-point selections to show the framing effect.
On Domain 2 (Figure 3-5), option 1 (p1 = 5, o- = 10) is risky (higher variance) and
optimal (higher average), and option 2 (p1 = -5, ui = 5) is safe (lower variance) and
suboptimal (lower average). In this domain, the loss frame (e.g., Xref = 5) and the neutral
frame, whose reference point in near the mean of the average outcomes of two options, e.g.,
Xref = 0, lead to an increased subjective discriminability (d,.bj > d' ), whereas the gain
frame (e.g., xref < -5) leads to a decreased subjective discriminability (dsub < dj).
On the domain with equal variance (Figure 3-6), option 1 (average outcome P1 = 5
and standard deviation ai = 5) is optimal (higher average), and option 2 (average outcome
p1 = -5 and standard deviation 0i = 5) is suboptimal (lower average). In this domain,
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Figure 3-5: Discriminabilities vs. reference point (Domain 2): showing how the reference
point selection influences d'ubj, employing the EU function a = 0.8, b = 0.5, A = 2.5. Green
lines indicate two example reference-point selections to show the framing effect.
the neutral frame, whose reference point is near the mean of the average outcomes of two
options, e.g., xref = 0, leads to an increased subjective discriminability (d' >d )
whereas gain and loss frames (e.g., Xref = -10 (gain frame), xref = 10 (loss frame)) lead
to a decreased subjective discriminability (d', < d').
From these simulations (Figures 3-4, 3-5 and 3-6) on how the reference point selection
influences the subjective discriminability on different domains, it is important to note that
the neutral frame (whose reference point is near the mean of the average outcomes of two
options) led to an increased subjective discriminability independently of underlying domains
(Domain 1, Domain 2, Domain with equal variance). In other words, the neutral frame
- -- ------------------ --
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Figure 3-6: Discriminabilities vs. reference point (on a domain where two options have
equal variance in outcomes), employing the EU function a = 0.8, b = 0.5, A = 2.5. Green
lines indicate two example reference-point selections to show the framing effect.
helped make more optimal decisions in learning independently the underlying domains.
Thus, it may be beneficial for the decision maker to employ a reference point near the mean
of the average outcomes of two options (i.e., the currently-estimated best and second-best
options) leading to more optimal decisions in learning under uncertainty.
Similarly, when the reference point is near the mean outcome of the risky option (option
2 on Domain 1, option 1 on Domain 2), the decision maker obtained an increased subjective
discriminability. In other words, the gain frame on Domain 1 (e.g., xef = -5) and the
loss frame on Domain 2 (e.g., xref = 5) led to an increased subjective discriminability, and
those reference point selections corresponded to the mean outcome of the risky option on
............... _ ............. 
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each domain. Thus, it may be also beneficial for the decision maker to employ a reference
point near the mean of the risky option.
3.2.7 The influence of outcome variances on discriminabilities
Figure 3-7 shows how the outcome variances of two options (o-I and 02) influence discrim-
inabilities when the decision maker employs different subjective value functions.
First, subplots (a) and (c) in Figure 3-7 show simulation results on Domain 1 where
si - p2 = 10 (fixed), a- is varying from I to 5, and U2 = 20-. Note that subplots (a) and
(c) employed different sets of subjective value function parameters. Here the parameter
set employed for subplot (c) (a = 0.5, b = 0.4, A = 2.5, Xref = 1) led to greater subjective
discriminability over varying u, compared to that employed for subplot (a) (a = 0.8, b =
0.5, A = 2 .5, xref = 0).
Second, subplots (b) and (d) in Figure 3-7 show simulation results on Domain 2 where
P1 - P2 = 10 (fixed), o- is varying from 2 to 10, and o-2 = 0.5-1. Note that subplots (b) and
(d) employed different sets of subjective value function parameters. Here the parameter
set employed for subplot (d) (a = 0.5, b = 0.4, A = 2.5, Xref = 1) led to greater subjective
discriminability over varying o-1 , compared to that employed for subplot (b) (a = 0.8, b =
0.5, A = 2 .5, xref = 0).
On both domains the subjective discriminability is reliably greater than the objective
discriminability when the levels of outcome variances of each option are not very large.
Also, the subjective value function parameters (the shape and the reference point) influence
the subjective discriminability. Thus, some sets of parameters may lead to better optimal
decisions in learning under uncertainty.
3.2.8 The subjective experience-based decisions may be helpful or harm-
ful in optimal learning under uncertainty
The subjective experience-based decisions may be helpful or harmful in optimal learning
under uncertainty, depending on the underlying domain type and the frame employed by
the decision maker. Simulation results on subjective discriminability are consistent with
findings from human decision experiments in the psychology literature. Also, the results
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Figure 3-7: The influence of outcome variances on discriminabilities for each domain. Sub-
plots (a) and (c): Domain 1 with a2 = 2a 1 . Subplots (b) and (d): Domain 2 with a2 = 0.5a1
were confirmed by the human decision experiments in Chapter 4.
On Domain 1 with the gain frame (Figure 3-3 (b)), the experience-based mode allows
............ ...... .... ..... .
the decision maker to detect the valence (good or bad) of each option quickly and correctly
by increasing the subjective discriminability. Similarly, the human decision-making studies
such as the IOWA gambling experiments have shown that humans with normal affective
decision-making ability are good at quickly detecting the optimal decision in this kind of
domain (where the optimal option involves low variance in outcomes and the suboptimal
option involves high variance), whereas patients with the vmPFC damage are not [5, 4, 40].
Since most outcomes in IOWA experiments were gains (in particular, all outcomes from
the optimal option were gains), normal participants would view the decision task in the
gain frame. Thus, their quick optimal decisions on this domain employing the gain frame
may be related to their subjective experience-based learning and the increased subjective
discriminability. The loss-averse attitude and the risk-averse attitude in face of gains were
helpful in optimal learning on this domain.
Subjective experience and emotional reactions, however, might impair decision making
in the other domain. On Domain 2 with the gain frame (Figure 3-3 (d)), people often fail
to detect the optimal option under uncertainty. Shiv et al.'s experiment [54] may be associ-
ated with this harmful side of the subjective experience-based learning in optimal decision
behavior. In Shiv et al.'s experiment, the task involved 20 rounds of investment decisions
between one safe option (no investment, i.e., $1 gain for sure) and the other risky option
(investment, i.e., $3.5 gain with 50% chance and $1 loss with 50% chance). Interestingly,
target patients (patients with stable focal lesions in brain regions related to emotion) made
more advantageous decisions and ultimately earned more money from their investments
than normal participants and control patients (patients with stable focal lesions in brain
regions unrelated to emotion). Normal participants and control patients, more affected by
the outcomes of decisions made in the previous rounds, adopted a conservative strategy
and became more reluctant to invest on the subsequent round than target patients. This
non-optimal decision-making behavior found from normal participants and control patients
may arise from their risk-averse attitude in face of gains in their subjective experience-based
learning.
3.3 Discriminability during exploitative trials
In sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, the concepts of objective and subjective discriminabilities
with initial 2nB exploratory trials were defined. In this section, the concept of discrim-
inability after the initial exploratory trials is investigated regarding each of four different
decision strategies (objective outcome-based greedy selection, probability matching (action
value sampling), myopic VPI (value of perfect information), subjective value-based greedy
selection).
3.3.1 Greedy selection based on objective outcomes
Suppose that after an initial 2nB exploratory trials, the decision maker follows the greedy
selection rule based on objective outcomes. Here it is investigated what concept of discrim-
inability is associated with this greedy selection-based decisions.
The mean of sampled outcomes of option k = 1, 2 is denoted as = (1/nt) E=i
where n' is the number of sampled outcomes of option k before trial t. Also, (&')2 denotes
the variance estimate of outcomes of option k on trial t: (&1)2 n _
On trial t ;> tB + 1 the probability of choosing option 1 over option 2 can be computed
as:
Probj (option = 1) = Prob (at = 1) = Pr(At > A)
= Pr(At > AtlAI- 1 > At2') Pr(A- 1 > t1) + Pr(At > AtlA-1 < A2 ') Pr(A - 1 < A- 1)
= Pr(At > AtlA- 1 > At2 1) Prebj(at_1 = 1) + Pr(At > At - 1 < At-1 )(1 - Prebj(at_ = 1)
= 4(dt 1 ) Probj(at-1 = 1) - 4(d - Pr)bj(at- 1
r1-1 I -12 t -1 _ -1
where dt 1  1 ( 2 and dG2  2 1
The condition At- > /4 means that the decision maker selected option I on trial t -1
according to the greedy selection rule and obtained a new random outcome ri"~ N(pi, a );
thus, there is no change on the sample mean of option 2 (i.e., At = At'). The sample mean
of option 1, At is updated (given At-') as follows: At = At-1 + Kt(rt-1 - At-) using
the gain Kt - 1/-N. Thus, lAt-1 ~-- N(At- 1 + Kt(p1 - At-1), (K'o-1) 2). Taking it
t-1into account that pt is a normal random variable and pt is a fixed number given Pt1
t-t A
and I , the new random variable y = At - A' is also normal following y - N(At-
A'2' + Kt(pu1 - A41), (KtoUi) 2 ). Thus, Pr(A > A'lAI- 1 > At2') = Pr(y > 0) = c(dtm)
/1 t-1-11/n A2 1~ 2 -beA'~fowhere d' = 2A' + ~ nt ecause > for a
sufficiently large n). In like manner, under the condition At-1 <t2, there is no change
on the sample mean of option 1 (i.e., At = At-). Also, #t - I4 + Kj(rt - A2 1 ) using
the gain Kt - 1/nt. Here, At is a fixed number and At is a random variable, that is,
2|A ~ N(j*4~ + Kjp 2 - /2), (Kjo2 )2 ). The new random variable y A [t - At is
also normal following y ~ N(A 1 - A- - Kt(p 2 - At!), (Ko 2 )2). Thus, the following
relationships are obtained: Pr(At > A -1 < At-') = (dt 2) where d = 2 _
2-2 ~n ( 1(because >> for a sufficiently large n2).
U2 2 02U2 /f 2  > U722
3.3.2 Probability matching (action value sampling)
Suppose that after an initial 2nB exploratory trials, the decision maker follows the proba-
bility matching (action value sampling) rule [17]. Here it is investigated what concept of
discriminability is associated with this probability matching-based decisions.
The following update rule is applied to incorporate the observation rt-1 (the outcome
of option k on trial t - 1): When t > tB + 1, k - -1 + K(rt-1 - A/-1) using the gain
Kt - i/nt where nt is the number of observed outcomes of option k before trial t. Note
that rt-1 is the ntth observed outcome of option k, that is, rn , and that At' can be
obtained from initial exploration. Also, when t > tB + 1, (k)2 = (1 - K k)(s7-)2 . Note
that (stB)2 (&B)2 /n tB
The probability distribution of outcome rk for option k is normal: rk - N(pk, ok). Now
the probability distribution of the mean pk on trial t > tB + 1 given all past observed
outcomes r (i = , nt) can be described as pt ~ N(At, (t)2) where (st )2 (&t)2/nt
On trial t ;> tB + 1 the probability of choosing option 1 over option 2 can be computed
as: Pr ampiing(option = 1) = Pr(p > pi) = Pr(p -/i > 0) = Pr(y > 0) where y = P -pA
Thus, Prliing(option = 1) = @D(dt) where ct = )2/n
V(& t)2/ n t±+(&2/n2
3.3.3 Myopic VPI (Value of Perfect Information) selection
Suppose that after an initial 2nB exploratory trials, the decision maker follows the greedy
selection (based on objective outcomes) with myopic VPI (value of perfect information) [17].
Here it is investigated what concept of discriminability is associated with this myopic VPI-
based decisions.
The probability distribution of the mean pk on trial t given all past observed outcomes
r( (i = 1,- , n4) can be described as p4 ~ N(At, (it )2) where (st)2 2
For option pair (u, v) = (1, 2) or (2,1), defining x P p, thenp(z; /4, (s)2) = N(A4, ( )2).
When > A, VPI V = f _(-x) p(X; At, (st)2) dz = -(/4t) l )+sq( 4 )
When At < A, VPut = f? (x - ) p(z;/A,(s) 2 ) dx (At - A') @( ) + t 4( ).U V00v U UV U U
Thus, VPh = -/4- I 4,) ( 0 ) + ( for any option pair (u, v). Note
that VPI can be viewed as a sort of exploration bonus provided to outcome uncertainty.
That is, the option with a greater outcome uncertainty will be selected more often due to
the exploration bonus. The idea of uncertainty-based exploration strategy arises from a
Bayesian formulation in which the new information gathered from the option with greater
outcome uncertainty is more likely to change the future decision strategy, compared to that
from options with smaller outcome uncertainty.
Using a similar method as in Section 3.3.1, on trial t > tB+l the probability of choosing
option 1 over option 2 can be computed as:
Pri (option = 1) = Prvpi(at = 1) = Pr(A4 + VPIj > At + VPI2)
=D (dtGO Prvpi(atI = 1) + D(dt 2)(1 - Prvpi(atI = 1))
where dG -- P- ) and dG2  2 ( -A7-(PIf-VPIt)
3.3.4 Greedy selection based on subjective values
This approach is exactly the same as in Section 3.3.1, except for employing subjective
values instead of objective outcomes.
The mean of sampled subjective values of option k (= 1, 2) is denoted as Ask -
(1/n') k 0 where o) f(r)) and nt is the number of sampled outcomes of option
k (= 1, 2) before trial t. Also, (&ubj,k )2 denotes the variance estimate of subjective values
of option k on trial t: (&, )2 = 1/(nt - 1) Z2 ( - Asubjk)2
On trial t( > tB + 1) the probability of choosing option 1 over option 2 can be computed
as:
Prsubj (option = 1) = Prsbj (at = 1) = Pr(A4 > At)
= Pr(At > At lpt-1 > At-') Pr(At-1 > A-2) + Pr(A' > pp- < At2 ) Prp-1 <pt21)
Pr(At > AtIpA-1 > A2 1) Pr b -(at_1 = 1) + Pr(At > AllI- 1 < At ) (I - PrSsbJ(at_1 = 1))
- 1(dtm) Prsubj(at_1 = 1) + 4(dG 2 )(1 - Prsebj(at-1 = 1))
where dtm ~ ( 1 2 and d t2 (
Figure 3-8 shows the probability of selecting the optimal option over trials on each
domain (Domain 1 and Domain 2) for different decision strategies (Subj: subjective value-
based greedy selection, Obj: objective outcome-based greedy selection, Sampling: proba-
bility matching, VPI: myopic VPI). In both simulations (Domain 1 and Domain 2), each
strategy had an initial 10 exploratory trials (nB = 5 trials for each option). Also, the refer-
ence points were set to the mean outcome of the risky option (i.e., the gain frame on Domain
1 and the loss frame on Domain 2) to obtain an increased subjective discriminability, ac-
cording to the findings in Section 3.2.6. Simulation results showed that on both domains
the subjective value-based greedy selection strategy with those reference point selections led
to the greatest probability of selecting the optimal option over trials (and thus, the greatest
total outcome), compared to other strategies.
3.4 Affective reinforcement learning for Markov decision pro-
cesses (MDPs)
Subjective and affective elements are well-known to influence human learning and decision
making. The research for exploring and exploiting these important influences in computa-
tional learning theory, however, is still in its early stage. This section presents a new model
combining subjective and affective influences within the RL and MDP framework. The
affective-congitive (AC) model involves two different modes: the experience-based mode and
the prediction-based mode. To model the total-experienced utility from past experiences,
the AC model introduces a prospect theory (PT)-based parameterized "experienced-utility
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Figure 3-8: The probability of selecting the optimal option over trials on each domain for
different decision strategies (Subj: subjective value-based greedy selection, Obj: objective
outcome-based greedy selection, Sampling: probability matching, VPI: myopic VPI)
function". In order to model affective-subjective characteristics of prediction-based mode,
the AC model employs a prospect theory (PT)-based parameterized "predicted-utility func-
tion". It also models one specific kind of affective state, called the "goal-achieving (confi-
dence) state," which relates to the sense of confidence in the current decision-making policy.
In economics theory, the PT value function is fixed, but it is hypothesized that the affective
state influences the shape of the predicted-utility function (i.e., sensitivities to the expected
gains and losses). An RL-based computational framework that implements this hypothesis
automatically regulates trade-offs between exploration and exploitation while beating the
performance of five other well-known model-free learning algorithms.
The AC model includes both a subjective component (PT value function) and a compo-
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Domain 2
nent that captures part of how affective states may influence decision making. It is further
hypothesized that the latter component can influence the former to give performance that
is closer to human behavior. Furthermore, while PT theory has been developed in eco-
nomics for domains with known outcome distributions, this new model enables PT theory
to be used for unknown and changing stochastic outcome distributions. Finally, it is known
that in the face of multiple unknown nonstationary distributions of outcomes, balancing
the trade-offs between exploration and exploitation is very critical; this new model achieves
this balanced trade-off in an automatic and internally-regulated way.
3.4.1 Markov Decision Processes
A discrete-time finite MDP is a tuple M = (S, A, T, -y, R), where S is a finite set of states,
A is a finite set of actions, p, = Pr{st+i = s'|st = s, at = a} are one-step state-transition
probabilities when taking action a in state s, and - E [0, 1) is the discount factor, and
r," =E{rt+ 1st = s, at = a} are one-step expected outcomes [58]. A stochastic policy is a
mapping from states to probabilities of taking each action 7r : S x A F-* [0, 1]. The state-value
function V'(s) is the expected discounted future outcome from each state s:
V'(s) = E.,[rt+I + -rt+2 + 7/2 rt+3 + - -st = s]
= E,[rt+1 + yV'(st+1)Ist = s] (3.1)
= Sr (s, a) [r"+- E Pa , V,'(s')]
a S
The action-value function Q'(s, a) is the expected discounted future outcome for taking a
in s and thereafter following r:
Q'(s, a) = E,[rt+1 +yrt+2 + - st = s, at = a]
= E,[rt+1 + TV'(st+1)|st = s, at = a] (3.2)
S PrS ±' '8 V'(s)
S/
Note that V'(s) = E ir(s, a)Q (s, a). The optimal action-value function is
a
Q*(s, a) = max Q(s, a) = r?" + a p", max Q*(s', a').
a'
3.4.2 Affective Reinforcement Learning
Suppose that the agent with a policy 7r takes action at E A at state st E S in timestep
t, and then reaches next state st+1 E S and obtains the immediate outcome rt+1. For
this experience tuple < st, at, rt+1, st+1 >, the estimated action-value function Q uses the
following Q-learning based update rule to approximate the optimal action-value function
Q*
Rt = rt+1 + -y maxa' Q(st+1, a') ()
Q(st, at) <- Q(st, at) + a (Rt - Q(st, at))
where a is a learning rate parameter. Thus, Q(s, a) estimates the expected long-term future
outcome for taking action a at state s. Note that Rt is a sampled estimate for the long-
term future outcome. In the proposed model, I call this sort of action-value estimation the
"deliberative estimation" phase.
Deliberative estimation estimates the expectation of the long-term future (objective)
outcome for each candidate action. Although I present a model-free Q-learning method for
this estimation here, any model-based learning methods can be employed if they are useful
for approximating the long-term outcomes.
In contrast to traditional RL algorithms in which the expected future outcome is di-
rectly used for the action-selection model (decision-making policy), the proposed algorithm
computes predicted utility, which models affective-subjective prediction in decision making.
This additional step, that is, transforming an expected future outcome into a predicted
utility, is called the "affective shaping" phase.
Affective shaping approximates the influence of the current affective state, at the moment
of prediction and decision making, on the predicted utility. Thus, in the proposed model,
computing the predicted utility for each candidate action is approximated by two phases:
the "deliberative estimation" phase and the "affective shaping" phase. I model the "goal-
achieving (confidence) state e(s)," which is a kind of task-related affective state. This
Q, (Predicted Utility) Qr (Predicted Utility)
More Sensitive to Gains Less Sensitive to Gains
X: increasing AG: decreasing
(Losses) (Gains) (Losses) (Gains)
More Sensitive to Losses Q(s,a) - p(s) Less Sensitive to Losses Q(sa) - p(s)
XL: increasing (Expected Relative Outcome) XL: decreasing (Expected Relative Outcome)
(a) High Confidence State (b) Low Confidence State
Figure 3-9: The shape of the predicted-utility function changes with the confidence state.
confidence state is analogous to how the agent "feels" about the current policy in terms
of achieving the goal (in this case, how confident (or not) the agent is using the current
policy).
In learning situations the agent should regulate the trade-offs between exploration and
exploitation [58, 131. To model this exploratory regulation, I focus on a policy based on
the Boltzmann distribution. The agent selects action a at state s with the probability:
E exp( QD(8a)
iEA
where n is called the inverse temperature parameter.
QD (s, a) is called decision utility, which the agent actually employs to compute the pol-
icy ir(s, a). Decision utility can be thought of as the preference for taking action a in state
s. Note that as /3 is greater, the selection of actions with higher QD is more likely. Since
/3 globally influences the level of exploration at all states, /3 can be viewed as a "global"
control parameter for the balance between exploration and exploitation. In contrast, the
confidence state (s) is a "local" control parameter, which can be viewed as the local in-
verse temperature parameter. The following four assumptions are made for the affective RL
framework, summarized in Figure 3-10.
Assumption 1. The agent's decision Utility QD (s, a) is the linear combination of experi-
enced utility QE(s, a) and predicted utility Qp (s, a): QD(s, a) (1 q) QEa(s, a)a+q Qp(s, a)
................... . ......... .........  .
Parameters: # (inverse temperature), a (learning rate), K (emotion sensitivity), 7
(cognitive control), Qo (initial action values), -y (discount factor).
Initialization: action values Q(s, a) = Qo and reference points p(s) = Qo for all
state s and action a.
(1): For current state s, choose action a according to policy ir(s, a) in Equation 3.4.
(2): Take action a, and then reach new state s' and obtain outcome r.
(3): Update action value Q(s, a) according to the deliberative estimation method,
such as in Equation 3.3.
(4): Update action values on history paths up to state s according to Equation 3.10.
(5): Update total-experienced utility QE(s, a) according to Equation 3.8.
(6): Update reference point p(s) according to the reference point model, such as in
Equation 3.6.
(7): Update confidence state e(s) according to Equation 3.9.
(8): Compute predicted utility Qp(s, a) according to Equation 3.5.
(9): Compute decision utility QD(s, a) = (1 - rl)E(s, a) + q Qp (s, a).
(10): Go to (1).
Figure 3-10: The Affective RL Framework
where 1 E [0, 1] is a cognitive control parameter between the experience-based mode and
the prediction-based mode. For example, when q = 0 (e.g., the computational (cognitive)
load is extremely high), the agent can rely only on the experienced-based mode (i.e., QD =
QE)-
Assumption 2. The predicted utility Qp(s, a) can be modeled by the predicted-utility
function, a parameterized PT value function to incorporate affective-subjective influences
into the agent's prediction. I focus on the confidence state e(s), which is relevant for ex-
ploratory regulation. Thus, the predicted utility Qp(s, a) can be computed by the predicted-
utility function fp( - le(s)) whose shape (i.e., sensitivities to losses and gains) depends on
the confidence state e(s) E [0, 1], as follows: Qp(s, a) = fp(Q(s, a) - p(s)|e(s)) where
Q(s, a) is the estimated action value and p(s) is the reference point (explained below). For
v = Q(s, a) - p(s), the expected relative (long-term) outcome,
fP(v I e(s)) -AG(e(s)) a, > 0 (3.5)
-AL(e(s)) (-V)b v < 0
ZG(e(s)) = AGbase + AGslope(2 e(s) - 1)
AL (e(s)) = ALbase + ALslope(2 e(s) - 1)
where AGbase, AGslope, ALbase, ZLslope are the parameters that determine how the sensitivi-
ties of the predicted-utility function change with e(s).
The following two hypotheses are assumed:
(1) As the agent becomes more confident in achieving the goal (i.e., higher e(s)), it
becomes more sensitive to potential gains and losses. See Figure 3-9 (a).
(2) As the agent becomes less confident in achieving the goal (i.e., lower e(s)), it becomes
less sensitive to potential gains and losses. See Figure 3-9 (b).
Thus, a > 0, b > 0, AGbase > AGslope > 0 and ALbase > ALslope > 0. Note that the function
is a loss-aversive piecewise linear function if a = 1, b = 1, AGbase = 1 and ZLbase > 1-
Experiments below will show that the first hypothesis will tend to lead to well-timed choices
of using the strategy of exploitation, while the second hypothesis will tend to lead to well-
timed choices of using the strategy of exploration.
Assumption 3. The reference point p(s) is modeled as the average of the currently-
estimated best action afirst(s) = argmaxQ(s, i) and second best action asecond(s) = arg max Q(s, i)
i6A iEA,
iSafirst
at state s:
p(s) = (Q(s, afirst (s)) + Q (s, asecond (s)))/2 (3.6)
This model appears to have a nice algorithmic advantage of making the predicted utility of
afirst(s) positive and those of all other choices negative.
Assumption 4. The total-experienced utility QE(s, a) can be modeled by the average of
sampled (long-run) experienced utilities: QE (s, a) = E, [fE (t - p(st))|st = s, at = a] where
fE is the experienced-utility function, another PT-based subjective value function that is
different from the predicted-utility function fp. Here it is assumed that fE is the same
as fp but with a fixed neutral confidence (e(s) = 0.5); thus, fE is a fixed-shape function
independent of e(s).
Experienced utility Xt from a sampled long-term relative outcome vt = Rt - p(st) is
computed as follows:
AGbase Vt > 0
Xt = fE (Ut) = Abs (3-7)
-ALbase (-vt)b, Vt < 0
where AGbase, ALbase are the parameters that determine the sensitivities of the experienced-
utility functions.
For the experience tuple < st, at, rt+1, st+1 >, total-experienced utility QE(st, at) is
updated as follows:
QE(st, at) *- QE(st, at) + a (Xt - QE(st, at)) (3.8)
where a is a learning rate parameter.
Assumption 5. The confidence state e(s) can be modeled by the following update rule:
for an experience tuple < st, at, rt+1, st+1 >,
Rt = rt+1 + y max Q(st+1, a')
a'
if at = afirst(st), q(st) +- q(st) + Xt (3.9)
otherwise, q(st) <- q(st) - Xt
1
e (st) +- 1 + exp(-rq(st))
where , > 0 is a sensitivity parameter.
Note that 0 < e(s) < 1 where 0 is analogous to the agent "feeling bad" about the current
policy, 0.5 is neutral, and as e(s) gets closer to 1, the value represents the agent "feeling
better," being more confident the current policy will achieve the desired goal.
Action-value updates based on history paths. For each state s, the agent keeps Npath
kinds of history paths of length Lpath up to state s in memory for later action-value updates
whenever the agent reaches state s again. For example, one history path of experience tu-
ples up to state s(= St) is {< st-L, at-L, rt-L+1, st-L+1 >, ... ,< st-2, at-2, rt-1, st-1 >,
st_1, at_1, rt, st >} {= < s(1), a(i), r( 2 ), S(2) >, ' ' -, < S(L-1), a(L-1), ?(L), S(L) >i < S(L), a(L), r(L+1), s(L+1)
Predicted utility
. high confidence
- neutral confidence
-low confidence
expected loss ref expected gain (Q(s,a) - p(s))
ofoption2 ofoptionI
Q(s,a 2)- p(s) Q(s,a)- p(s)
Figure 3-11: The Influence of Affective Shaping on Prediction: for instance, the case of two
actions (two sky dots show the expected relative outcomes of two actions.)
At state st = S(L+1), the agent updates action values on each history path:
For k = L,.. ,1,
R(k) -- r(k+1) + 'y maXa/Q(s(k+1), a') (3.10)
Q(s(k), a(k)) *- Q(S(k), a(k)) + a (R(k) - Q(S(k), a(k)))
3.4.3 Balancing the Trade-offs between Exploration and Exploitation
The confidence state e(s) is locally defined for each state s. In Equation 3.9, if Xt > 0
(pleasurable experience) for the exploitative action (at = afirst(st)), or if Xt < 0 (displea-
surable experience) for exploratory actions (at = afirst(st)), then q(st) increases and thus
confidence e(st) increases; that is, the agent becomes more confident in the current local
policy at st and will be more likely to take the exploitative action at that state in the future
trials. However, if Xt < 0 for the exploitative action or Xt > 0 for exploratory actions,
q(st) decreases and thus confidence e(st) decreases; that is, the agent becomes less confident
in the current local policy at st and will be more likely to take exploratory actions at that
state in future trials.
Note that the sensitivity changes of the predicted-utility function according to e(s)
(Equation 3.5) help automatically balance the trade-offs between exploration and exploita-
tion at state s. When the agent is more confident in the current policy (e(s) > 0.5, high
confidence state), the predicted-utility function becomes more sensitive to expected gains
and losses. Because of this larger sensitivity in a confident state, there are larger separations
in the predicted utilities of the exploitative action and other actions. That is, compared
to a neutral confidence state (e(s) = 0.5) or a low confidence state (e(s) < 0.5), the agent
in a high confidence state predicts as if the estimated values of the exploitative action and
other actions were more separated (See Figure 3-11); thus, the agent favors exploitation.
When the agent becomes less confident, however, it has a less sensitive predicted-utility
function in both domains. Because of this smaller sensitivity, there are smaller separations
in the predicted utilities of the exploitative action and the other actions; thus, it promotes
exploratory actions. This is made formal in the following theorem:
Theorem 1 Assume that there are K available actions ak E A = {ai, - -- , aK} at state
s satisfying Q(s, ak) Q(s, ak+1) for k = 1, ... , K - 1. Let the reference point p(s) be
given by p(s) = (Q(s, ai)) + Q(s, a 2 ))/2. Then, the exploitation-exploration ratio at state
denoted as w(7r(s)) = (s,ai) increases with higher e(s), and decreases with lower e(s).
E 7r(s,ak)
k=2
(Proof) The exploitation-exploration ratio at state s, w(7r(s)) is:
7r(s, a1) exp(#Qp(s, ai))K K
E r(s, ak) E exp(#Qp(s, ak))
k=2 k=2
= exp (#(Qp (s, ai) - Z)) .
Let A = (Q(s, ai) - Q(s, a2 ))/2. Note A > 0. Assuming the reference point p(s) =
(Q(s, ai)) + Q(s, a2))/2,
Q(s, al) - p(s) = (Q(s, al) - Q(s, a2))/2 = A
Q(s, a2) - p(s) = -(Q(s, ai) - Q(s, a2))/2 = -A
From Equation 3.5, the predicted utilities are:
Qp(s, a1) = AG(e(s))(Q(s, a1) - P(s))a = AG(e(S))Aa
Qp(s, a2) = -AL (e(s))(-(Q(s, a2 ) - P(s)))b =-AL (e(s))b
Also, since Qp(s, ak) < Qp(s, a2) for each k(= 3, - ,K), Qp(s, ak) -Zk - Qp(s, a2)
using a non-negative constant Zk (> 0) for each k.
Qp (s, ak) = -AL (e(s))(-(Q(s, ak) - P(s)))b - -AL (e(s))(-(Zk + Q(s, a2) - P(s)))b
= -AL (e(s))(Zk + A)b
Note that AG(e(s)) and AL(e(s)) in Equation 3.5 increase with higher e(s). Thus, Qp(s, a1)
increases with higher e(s), and Qp(s, ak)(k = 2, . .. , K) decrease with higher e(s). This
means that the numerator of w(ir(s)), exp(fQp(s, ai)) increases with higher e(s), whereas
K
the denominator of w(7r(s)), E exp(#Qp(s, ak)) decreases with higher e(s). That is, the
k=2
exploitation-exploration ratio w(ir(s)) increases with higher e(s) at state s. Q.E.D.
The prediction-based mode interacts with the experience-based mode in agent's learning
and decision making. The affective RL model assumes that the agent's decision utility
arises from the feedback of past subjective experiences in similar choice situations (total-
experienced utility QE (s, a), "experience-based mode") and the affective prediction about
the future experienced utility of choice outcomes (predicted utility Qp (s, a), "prediction-
based mode"): QD(s, a) = (1 - r/)QE(s, a)r/7Qp(s, a) where r/ E [0, 1] is a model parameter
related to computational (cognitive) load. Psychological experiments on human decision
making have shown that trade-offs between the two modes may depend on cognitive load
at the time of decision making as well as personal disposition [53]. That is, when people are
stressful or more cognitively loaded, they tend to rely more on the experience-based mode
(77 = 0).
The affective regulation using e(s) is very useful for regulating the balance between
exploration and exploitation in unpredictable dynamic worlds. When the world is tem-
porarily changing, the agent becomes less confident in its current exploitative action and
e(s) facilitates exploration ("affective heating"). When the world is temporarily station-
ary, however, the agent becomes more confident in its current exploitative action and e(s)
facilitates exploitation ("affective cooling").
While simulated annealing typically moves only from hot to cold, the new affective
regulation dynamically adjusts the local inverse temperature e(s) to regulate the annealing,
inducing momentary increases in temperature (analogous to "feeling uneasy") to favor more
exploration in a changing world. If the agent finds, for example, that it is stuck in a local
minimum, then this internal mechanism "heats up" the process automatically, allowing it
to once again explore outside that minimum. Thus, this model of affect allows the learning
system to dynamically regulate its behavior and improve its performance as it learns.
3.4.4 EXPERIMENTS
Several well-known RL algorithms will be compared with the affective RL algorithm in
terms of the learning performance in three problems (from [17]) devised for testing ex-
ploratory regulation: (1) Q-learning with semi-uniform random exploration (2) Q-learning
with Boltzmann exploration (3) Q-learning with Interval Estimation [27] (4) IEQL+ [39]
(5) Bayesian Q-learning with VPI + mixture updating [17] (6) the affective RL model with
only the experience-based mode (i.e., q = 0) (7) the affective RL model with only the
prediction-based mode (i.e., q = 1) (8) the affective RL model with both experienced-based
and prediction-based modes. I test in the following domains: Chain, Loop and Maze.
Chain: Figure 3-12 (a) shows the "Chain" problem that has five states and two actions
a and b. With probability 0.2, the agent "slips" and its action actually has the consequence
of the other action. The optimal policy of this problem is to choose action a at all states,
even though the agent sometimes slips. In order to maximize the total return for a given
b,O 5 1 a,b,0
6,0 0,0
b,2 0,10 6 2
a,0 ! 0 3a,O ,0 0 b,0 0 a ,b,01 2 3 4' 5 ,
b12 7 3
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Figure 3-12: Three Test Problems
number of trials, the agent should not be trapped at the start state (state 1). Thus, the
agent needs to balance the trade-offs between exploration and exploitation effectively.
Loop: Figure 3-12 (b) shows the "Loop" problem that has two loops linked at the start
state (state 0). There are two deterministic actions a and b. The optimal policy of this
problem is to choose action b at all states. The inferior exploration policies will converge
too fast on action a for state 0.
Maze: Figure 3-12 (c) shows the "Maze" problem where the agent's goal is to collect
flags and reach the goal. The start state is marked as S, the goal state is G, and each flag
is located in one of three F states. When it gets to the goal state G, the agent obtains
the reward based on the number of flags collected, and then is immediately moved to the
start state. The agent can move in one of four directions: right, left, up and down. Also,
with probability 0.1, the agent "slips" and actually moves in a perpendicular direction. If
it attempts to move into a wall, it does not move. The maze has 33 discrete positions and
there are eight kinds of combinations that represent the status of the three flags at any
moment; thus, we assume that this problem has a total of 264 states.
In affective RL-based implementations, the following parameters were used for utility
CHAIN 1st Phase 2nd Phase
Uniform 1519.0 ± 37.2 1611.4 ± 34.7
Boltzmann 1605.8 ± 78.1 1623.4 ± 67.1
Interval 1522.8 ± 180.2 1542.6 t 197.5
IEQL+ 2343.6 ± 234.4 2557.4 i 271.3
Bayes VPI+MIX 817.6 t 101.8 1099.5 t134.9
Affective RL (experience-based) 3381.3 ± 324.9 3576.6 ± 354.7
Affective RL (prediction-based) 3321.5 ± 317.6 3604.3 ± 311.1
Affective RL (both modes) 3395.9 + 333.9 3708.9 t 261.1
LOOP 1st Phase 2nd Phase
Uniform 185.6 ± 3.7 198.3 ± 1.4
Boltzmann 186.0 + 2.8 200.0 ± 0.0
Interval 198.1 ± 1.4 200.0 i 0.0
IEQL+ 264.3 ± 1.6 292.8 i 1.3
Bayes VPI+MIX 326.4 ± 85.2 340.0 t 91.7
Affective RL (experience-based) 387.7 ± 6.3 400 ± 0.0
Affective RL (prediction-based) 391.0 t 2.5 400 ± 0.0
Affective RL (both modes) 391.2 t 2.5 400.0 t 0.0
MAZE 1st Phase 2nd Phase
Uniform 105.3 ± 10.3 161.2 + 8.6
Boltzmann 195.2 i 61.4 1024.3 i 87.9
Interval 246.0 i 122.5 506.1 ± 315.1
IEQL+ 269.4 + 3.0 253.1 + 7.3
Bayes VPI+MIX 817.6 t 101.8 1099.5 ±134.9
Affective RL (experience-based) 1332.1 ± 103.3 1596.7 ± 27.7
Affective RL (prediction-based) 1543.2 + 140.6 1654.9 ± 133.0
Affective RL (both modes) 1554.1 i 167.4 1772.0 ± 102.9
Table 3.1: The Average and Standard Deviation of Accumulated Rewards for Each Phase
functions: a = 0.8, b = 0.5, AGbase = 1, AGslope = 1, ALbase = 2.5, ALslope = 1 1 (in Equations
3.5 and 3.7). The discount factor -y = 0.99 was used. Also, two history paths of length 5
for each state were kept in memory for action value updates.
Although a fixed inverse temperature # is used without any global annealing schedule
for it, the agent could automatically regulate the trade-offs between exploration and ex-
ploitation through the local goal-achieving affective state e(s). To measure the learning
performance, parameters #, a (learning rate), n (emotion sensitivity in Equation 3.9) and
Qo (to initialize Q(s, a) = Qo and p(s) = Qo for all s and a) in the affective RL algorithm
'these parameters were not tuned for optimizing performance.
were optimized to find the best-performing values. In addition, r/ was optimized in the
Affective RL model with both experienced-based and prediction-based modes.
The simulation results 2 in Table 3.1 show the average and standard deviation of total
rewards received during each phase.Each phase is composed of 1,000 steps in Chain and
Loop, and of 20,000 steps in Maze. Also, the statistics for the affective RL algorithm were
taken over 100 runs for Chain and Loop, and 10 runs for Maze. 3 . The results show that the
affective RL algorithm beats other learning algorithms in terms of accumulated rewards.
Affective RL-based implementations performed better than other algorithms. Also,
note that adding the prediction-based mode (affective RL with both modes) improved the
performance significantly in the Maze problem, compared to the affective RL with only the
experience-based mode. This is because the local confidence-based controls greatly helped
the balance between exploration and exploitation in this large-scale domain (Maze).
2For comparison with other Q-learning based algorithms (Uniform, Boltzmann, Interval, IEQL+), we
present the simulation results by (Dearden et al. 1998) tested with best-performing parameters for each
algorithm.
3The statistics for other algorithms were taken over 10 runs for all three problems.
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Chapter 4
Human Decision Experiments:
Method and Hypotheses
Prospect theory (PT) was originally constructed to describe people's behavior in one-shot
decision situations under risk (i.e., situations in which people make a one-shot choice with
full knowledge of the outcome probability distributions of alternatives). Although some
behavioral decision-making models and reinforcement learning models in computational
learning theory have been applied to analyze people's behavior in decision-making situa-
tions under uncertainty, they have not fully incorporated the characteristics of PT-based
subjective value functions (i.e., risk attitudes depending on reference-point dependency, di-
minishing sensitivity, loss-aversion) for modeling people's subjective experience and affective
prediction. The proposed AC model uses PT-based parameterized subjective value func-
tions to model people's experienced-utility and predicted-utility functions. The AC model
hypothesizes that the shapes (parameters) of these subjective value functions dynamically
vary with the decision-maker's task-related and/or incidental affective states in learning and
decision making under uncertainty. Human decision-making experiments were conducted to
empirically infer how people adjust the parameters (i.e., risk attitude and reference point)
of their experienced-utility and predicted-utility functions in sequential decision-making sit-
uations involving incidental affective states (e.g., anger, fear) and task-related affects (e.g.,
confidence). This chapter presents the method and hypotheses of the experiments.
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4.1 Experiment Method
Experiments were devised to observe human learning and decision making under uncer-
tainty, frames and emotions. Basically there were four emotion conditions (neutral, anger,
fear, economic fear) compared in a between-subject design. In each emotion condition, there
were two framing conditions (gain frame and loss frame, between-subject) set by the exper-
imenter. All respondents conducted two kinds of gambling tasks (Domain 1 and Domain 2,
within-subject) involving different uncertain outcome distributions.
4.1.1 Respondents
Eighty-four respondents (49 males, 35 females) in the age range of 18-65 years (with a mean
of 34 and a standard deviation of 12) participated in this experiment. Most respondents were
recruited by advertisements offering a $50 gift card plus the chance to add $20 according
to their achievement of goals in the experiment tasks (i.e., more incentive of $20 for the top
10% of the best decision makers who have won the most money in total over the tasks) in
exchange for one hour of participation. The majority (about 70% of all respondents) were
bachelor's degree holders (38%) or more advanced degree holders (32%).
4.1.2 Procedure
In the separate experiment-preparation room, the experimenter explained the purpose of the
study (i.e., gathering data to develop a computational model of human decision-making) and
asked each respondent to fill out a consent form. The respondent was also asked to wear a
wristband-type skin conductance sensor on the non-dominant hand. This skin conductance
sensor [45] developed at the Media Lab is a wristband with two Ag/AgCl electrodes to
measures electrodermal activity (EDA) from the wrist at the sampling frequency of 32Hz
and record the signal into an internal 2GB microSD card. No conductive gel was applied
to the electrodes.
Then, each respondent was seated in a private cubicle (equipped with computers and
headsets) in the experiment room and asked to follow the instructions on the computer.
The computer in front of the respondent included a tiny built-in webcam taking video of
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his or her face. When respondents launched the computer-based experiment program, they
were assigned to one of the emotion conditions, based on the order that they signed up to
participate in the study for practical purposes, which was random. After asking respondents
to answer the profile survey (sex, age, education level, etc.), the program introduced a
tutorial session for helping them understand the experiment tasks, and then started an
actual experiment session. There were instructions before every step of the experiment
session; thus, respondents were able to conduct all the experiment steps in the experiment
session without any help or interruption of the experimenter. The experiment session in
the neutral, anger and fear conditions is composed of the following steps:
1. Watching a neutral video clip (for inducing neutral affect as the baseline affect)
2. Answering the baseline measures of affect and the baseline financial survey
3. Writing a diary on a personal experience (congruent to the emotion condition)
4. Watching the first video clip (congruent to the emotion condition)
5. Performing the first decision task
6. Watching the second video clip (congruent to the emotion condition)
7. Performing the second decision task
8. Watching the third video clip (congruent to the emotion condition)
9. Answering the financial survey task on the banking attitude
10. Answering the post-experiment questionnaire (for emotion-manipulation check)
In the neutral, anger and fear conditions, respondents were asked to perform three
main tasks in the following sequence, the first decision task - the second decision task -
the financial survey task on the banking attitude, watching a video clip between any two
of these main tasks. Yet, in the economic fear condition, respondents did these tasks in a
different sequence, the financial survey task on the banking attitude - the first decision task
- the second decision, still watching a video clip between any two of these main tasks. 1
In the analysis, we assumed that the sequence effect could be ignored due to the fact that
respondents watched a video clip every time before starting a new task. Using the after-
the-experiment questionnaire for manipulation checks, we checked that watching a video
'This was because we also wanted to compare the economic fear condition with other economic Ad
conditions for another experimental purpose. Thus, the economic fear condition had to use a sequence that
other economic Ad conditions employed.
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clip reset respondents' emotional state to the target emotion for the emotion condition.
In the economic fear condition, the experiment session had the following steps:
1. Watching a neutral video clip (for inducing neutral affect as the baseline affect)
2. Answering the baseline affect measures and the baseline financial survey
3. Writing a diary on a personal experience (congruent to the emotion condition)
4. Watching the first video clip (congruent to the emotion condition)
5. Answering the financial survey on the banking attitude
6. Watching the second video clip (congruent to the emotion condition)
7. Performing the first decision task
8. Watching the third video clip (congruent to the emotion condition)
9. Performing the second decision task
10. Answering the post-experiment questionnaire (for emotion-manipulation check)
On every trial in a decision task (with total 25 trials), respondents were asked to select
one of two options and to answer questions on the computer. Each decision task lasts
approximately 10 minutes.
4.1.3 Instructions during the tutorial session
The following shows an example of the instructions during the tutorial session provided to
a respondent given decision tasks in the gain frame:
This is a tutorial section for the gambling games you will complete during this study.
You will have two INDEPENDENT gambling games in the actual study. For each game
you will begin with an initial balance of $0. Each game includes 25 trials.
For each trial you will pay $20 and then select one of two options. Each selection will
provide a random outcome (so you may win some money back).
It is very important to note that, in each game, one option has a higher average outcome
than the other option. Your goal of each game is to figure out which option is better (in the
long run) with fewer trials in order to minimize your total financial loss.
Also, please carefully answer the questions following each trial. Your opinions about
your experience are really important in our data analysis.
For only the respondents who carefully answered their opinions, we will choose the top
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10% of the best decision makers (who have won the most money in total over the games)
and give an additional reward (up to $20) to them later. (We will email you later if you
are in the top 10%.)
Note that when respondents were given the decision tasks in the loss frame, the following
instruction was given instead of the one above: For each trial you will receive $20 and then
select one of two options. Each selection will provide a random outcome (so you may lose
some money).
4.1.4 Baseline affect measures
After the tutorial session, respondents started the experiment session. First, they watched
a short (one-min) video clip "sticks" previously shown to induce neutral affect [49]. Then,
they completed the form on the baseline measures of affect. Eight affective states ("angry",
"anxious", "disgusted", "fearful", "happy", "interested", "irritated", "sad") were included
on the form. Response scales ranged from 0 (do not feel the emotion the slightest bit) to 8
(feel the emotion even more strongly than ever before) for each affective state [35].
4.1.5 Baseline financial survey
Respondents were asked to answer the baseline financial survey on the banking services and
the prospects of US economy as follows:
(Qi) Please think about the banking and financial services industry as a whole. How
would you rate your overall impression of the banking industry?
Poor Excellent
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(Q2) Using a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is "Poor" and 5 is "Excellent", how would you
rate the health of the U.S. economy today?
Poor Excellent
1 2 3 4 5
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(Q3) Now, thinking about how today's economy compares to the past, using the scale
below how would you compare today's economy to as it was...
Compared to this time last year, today's economy is:
much worse a little worse the same a little better much better
Compared to this time 3 years ago, today's economy is:
much worse a little worse the same a little better much better
(Q4) Thinking about where you expect the economy to be in the future relative to today,
using the scale below, how would you expect the economy to be...
Compared to today's economy, this time next year would be:
much worse a little worse the same a little better much better
Compared to today's economy, this time in 3 years would be:
much worse a little worse the same a little better much better
4.1.6 Emotion manipulations
To elicit the emotional state associated with each emotion condition, respondents were asked
to write about a personal experience in five minutes, and then they were guided to watch a
short video clip depending on the emotion condition (neutral, anger, fear, economic fear).
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Writing a diary on a personal experience
As for the diary part, respondents in the neutral condition were asked to write about
their daily activities. Respondents in the anger (or fear) condition were asked to write
about one situation that made them angry (or fearful). Also, respondents in the economic
fear condition were asked to write about one event that makes them most fearful about
the economy (in the economic fear condition). The following introduction messages were
presented for each emotion condition:
(Neutral condition) Please describe, as best you can, how you typically spend your evenings.
You might begin by writing down a detailed description of your activities, and then figure out how
much time you devote to each activity. If you can, please write your description so that someone
reading this might be able to reconstruct your typical routine.
(Anger condition) Please describe, as best you can, one situation that made you ANGRY. In par-
ticular, please write about a situation in which you experienced significant injustice or humiliation,
such as arrogant/offensive behavior of your partner/neighbors or bosses, racial/sexual discrimina-
tion, verbal/physical abuse, oppressive social system or irrational government policy. This could
be a situation you are presently experiencing or something from the past. Begin by writing down
what you remember of the ANGER-INDUCING EVENT, and continue by writing as detailed a
description of the event as is possible. If you can, write your description so that someone reading
it might get angry from learning about the situation. What is it like to be in this situation? Why
does it make you so ANGRY?
(Fear condition) Please describe, as best you can, one situation that made you FEARFUL. In
particular, please write about a situation in which you experienced significant threat, such as the
threat of danger, death, or significant loss or the threat of social rejection or humiliation. According
to surveys, some of the most commonly feared situations are enclosed spaces, tunnels and bridges,
social rejection, home intruders, failure, terror, and public speaking. This could be a situation you
are presently experiencing or something from the past. Begin by writing down what you remember
of the FEAR-INDUCING EVENT, and continue by writing as detailed a description of the event
as is possible. If you can, write your description so that someone reading it might get fearful from
learning about the situation. What is it like to be in this situation? Why does it make you so
FEARFUL?
(Economic Fear condition) The recent economic recession evoked a lot of emotion in Americans.
Many people have lost their livelihoods, jobs, homes, and the economists do not agree on whether
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or when things will get better. We are particularly interested in what makes you most FEARFUL
about the economy. Please describe in detail the one thing that makes you most fearful about these
events. Write as detailed a description of that thing as possible. If you can, write your description
so that someone reading it might get fearful from learning about the situation. What aspect of the
economic recession makes you the most fearful? What is the worst thing you can imagine that would
happen to you financially? (e.g. loss of ability to work, being sued for all you own ...) Why does it
make you so FEARFUL?
Watching the "first" video clip for eliciting the target emotion
For the video part, respondents were asked to put on the headset and watch video clips
according to the emotion condition. Each video clip lasted approximately 3-4 minutes.
Before watching a video clip, respondents were given some information on the video clip
as well as the following messages: As part of our interest in how people respond to visual
information, we want you to be absorbed in the video. We will ask you some questions about
the video and your experience watching it later in the study. In addition, respondents in
the anger, fear and economic fear conditions were asked to imagine how they would feel if
they were experiencing the situation portrayed.
Respondents in the neutral condition watched a video clip about a natural park in
Alaska showing peaceful and calm scenes by Alaska Channel.
Respondents in the anger condition watched a video clip from the movie "The Bodyguard
(1980)" showing a bully who humiliated and beat up a teenager. Before watching the video
clip, they were given the following information: "The bully was charged for his crime and
found not guilty because of a technicality. The bully and his friend walked away from the
trial as free men, and both have been in trouble with the law subsequently."
Respondents in the fear condition watched a scary video clip from the movie "The
Silence of the Lambs (1991)" showing a woman pursuing a psychopath killer who skinned
his female victims. Prior research has shown that these video clips employed for anger and
fear conditions are an effective means of eliciting the target emotions [49].
Respondents in the economic fear condition watched a video clip in which the US eco-
nomic crisis (foreclosure, credit crunch, unemployment, etc.) was shown with an economic
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expert's talk on the gloomy prospects of the US economy. Before watching the video clip,
they were asked to imagine how they would feel if they were experiencing one or more
miserable economic situations portrayed in the video clip.
After watching the "first" video clip, respondents were asked to perform their first
decision task (the neutral, anger and fear conditions) or answer the financial survey on the
banking attitude (the economic fear condition).
Watching the "second" video clip for eliciting the target emotion
Before performing the second decision task (the neutral, anger and fear conditions) or per-
forming the first decision task (the economic fear condition), respondents watched another
video clip for eliciting the target emotion of their emotion condition. Considering possible
influences of experiences during the first decision task on respondents' emotional state, we
added this step for resetting respondents' emotional state to the target emotion.
Respondents in the neutral condition watched a video clip showing fish at the Great
Barrier Reef from a National Geographic Special [35].
Respondents in the anger condition watched a video clip from the movie "Cry Freedom
(1987)" showing the police raiding a black township along with killing and wounding many
residents. Before watching the video clip, they were given the following information: "This
movie clip is from the film based on the true story of Steve Biko, the Black Consciousness
Movement leader during the apartheid era of South Africa, who was arrested and killed
while in police custody."
Respondents in the fear condition watched a scary video clip from the movie "The
Shining (1980)" showing a little boy walking in a hallway. Prior researches have shown that
these video clips employed for anger and fear conditions are an effective means of eliciting
the target emotions [49].
Respondents in the economic fear condition watched an ABC news clip on the story of
scared Americans in tough times of the US economy titled "Tough times".
After watching the "second" video clip, respondents were asked to perform their second
decision task.
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Watching the "third" video clip for eliciting the target emotion
Before answering the financial survey on the banking attitude (the neutral, anger and fear
conditions), respondents in neutral, anger and fear conditions watched the "first" video
clip used for eliciting the target emotion once again, which they had watched immediately
before starting their first decision task.
Before performing the second decision task (the economic fear condition), respondents
in the economic fear condition watched an ABC news clip on the falling US economy and
unemployment situations titled "Falling Fast". Considering possible influences of experi-
ences during the second decision task on respondents' emotional state, we added this step
for resetting respondents' emotional state to the target emotion.
After watching the "third" video clip, respondents were asked to answer the financial
survey and the post-experiment questionnaire.
4.1.7 Decision tasks
The decision tasks under uncertainty were devised to infer how the respondent's experience
and prediction influence their decision behavior. Each respondent played the tasks of two
domains (Domain 1 and Domain 2, explained below) in random order. Each task was a
two-armed bandit task designed for evaluating the respondent's risk attitude: there are two
options whose outcome distributions are unknown to the respondent. The respondent has
25 trials during each task and the goal is to maximize the total outcome (or minimize the
total financial loss) over all trials. For each trial the respondent will receive $20 (or pay
$20) and then select one of two options. Each selection will provide a random outcome so
the respondent may lose (or win) some money.
Domain 1 and Domain 2: One option is risky (involving high variance in outcomes)
and the other option is safe (involving low variance in outcomes). There were two domains
(underlying outcome distributions) used in our experiment. For Domain 1, the safe option
is the optimal option (with a greater outcome on average) and the risky option is the
suboptimal option (with a smaller outcome on average). For Domain 2, the risky option is
the optimal choice and the safe option is the sub-optimal choice.
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Gain and Loss frames: For almost the half (11 respondents), the decision tasks were
given in terms of the gain frame, i.e., on each trial they first paid some amount of bet money
and then won a random amount of money according to their choice. For the other half (10
respondents), the decision tasks were given in terms of the loss frame, i.e., on each trial they
received some amount of bet money and then lost a random amount of money according to
their choice.
" Gain frame:
Please click the Bet button to start a new trial (this is trial XX of 25). (By clicking,
you pay $20 for this bet, but you might win it back.)
" Loss frame:
Please click the Bet button to start a new trial (this is trial XX of 25). (By clicking,
you receive $20 for this bet, but you might lose it.)
Actual outcome distributions used in the experiment
In each domain, the safe option had a Gaussian outcome distribution with a small standard
deviation (= $2) whereas the risky option had its outcome distribution as a mixture of three
Gaussian distributions with different modes.
Gain frame on Domain 1:
" Safe-option outcome distribution - N(mean = $22, std = $2)
* Risky-option outcome distribution - 0.4 N(mean = $30, std = $2) + 0.2 N(mean =
$18, std = $2) + 0.4 N(mean = $6, std = $2)
The risky-option outcomes were sampled from a very high mode N(mean = $30, std =
$2) and a very low mode N(mean = $6, std = $2) with 40% probability each and from a
mid mode N(mean = $18, std = $2) with 20% probability. Note that in this case (Domain
1, gain frame), the average outcome of the safe option over trials (approximately $22) is
greater than that of the risky option (approximately $18).
111
Domain 1
(loss-frame given)
safe mean = -$18
risky mean = -$22
bet money = -$20 or -$14 (receive)
?
bet money
(receive)
Domain2
(loss-frame given)
safe mean = -$22
risky mean = -$18
bet money = -$20 or -$14 (receive)
bet money
(receive)
probability
* (gain-frame given)
mAX
bet money
(pay)
probability
safe mean = $22
risky mean = $18
bet money = $20 or $14 (pay)
monetary
outcome
(gain-frame given)
IAA~
0 1
bet money
(pay)
safe mean = $18
risky mean = $22
bet money = $20 or $14 (pay)
monetary
outcome
Figure 4-1: Four different cases for outcome probability distributions of two options (Gain
frame on Domain 1, Loss frame on Domain 1, Gain frame on Domain 2, Loss frame on
Domain 2). Each respondent played the tasks of two domains (Domain 1 and Domain 2)
in random order given in terms of either the gain frame or the loss frame.
Loss frame on Domain 1:
" Safe-option outcome distribution - N(mean = -$18, std = $2)
" Risky-option outcome distribution - 0.4 N(mean = -$10, std = $2) + 0.2 N(mean
= -$22, std = $2) + 0.4 N(mean = -$34, std = $2)
That is, the risky-option outcomes were sampled from a very high mode N(mean = -$10,
std = $2) and a very low mode N(mean = -$34, std = $2) with 40% probability each and
from a mid mode N(mean = -$22, std = $2) with 20% probability. Note that in this case
(Domain 1, loss frame), the average outcome of the safe option over trials (approximately
-$18) is greater than that of the risky option (approximately -$22).
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Gain frame on Domain 2:
" Safe-option outcome distribution ~ N(mean = $18, std = $2)
e Risky-option outcome distribution ~ 0.4 N(mean = $34, std = $2) + 0.2 N(mean =
$22, std = $2) + 0.4 N(mean = $10, std = $2)
In other words, the risky-option outcomes were sampled from a very high mode N(mean
= $34, std = $2) and a very low mode N(mean = $10, std = $2) with 40% probability
each and from a mid mode N(mean = $22, std = $2) with 20% probability. Note that
in this case (Domain 2, gain frame), the average outcome of the risky option over trials
(approximately $22) is greater than that of the safe option (approximately $18).
Loss frame on Domain 2:
" Safe-option outcome distribution ~ N(mean = -$22, std = $2)
" Risky-option outcome distribution ~ 0.4 N(mean = -$6, std = $2) + 0.2 N(mean =
-$18, std = $2) + 0.4 N(mean = -$30, std = $2)
That is, the risky-option outcomes were sampled from a very high mode N(mean = -$6,
std = $2) and a very low mode N(mean = -$30, std = $2) with 40% probability each and
from a mid mode N(mean = -$18, std = $2) with 20% probability. Note that in this case
(Domain 2, loss frame), the average outcome of the risky option over trials (approximately
-$18) is greater than that of the safe option (approximately -$22).
In our experiment, we actually employed fixed sequences of random outcomes from each
outcome distribution rather than sampling outcomes for each respondent. That is, the
sequence of experienced outcomes for each option is the same across respondents for a given
domain and frame condition. Appendix D lists the fixed sequences of random outcomes
used in the experiments. In addition, for the risky option, we had two kinds of fixed outcome
sequences: one sequence starting with a very high outcome (from a very high mode) and the
other sequence starting with a very low outcome (from a very low mode) on the first trial
of the risky option. Almost half of the respondents in each emotion condition were given a
very high outcome on their first trial of the risky option, and the rest in the condition were
given a very low outcome.
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Self-reported experienced utility (EU), confidence, and predicted utility (PU)
After obtaining an outcome, respondents answered three kinds of self-reported measures in
sequence on each trial: experienced utility (self-report 1), confidence (self-report 2), and
predicted utilities (self-report 3).
Self-report 1 (Experienced utility (EU)): Respondents self-reported their experi-
enced pleasure or displeasure (called the "experienced utility") for the obtained outcome,
answering the following question (See Figtire 4-2):
(Gain frame) In this trial you PAID $XX. But you WON $XX by choosing Option YY.
How pleased or displeased are you with the obtained outcome? (click on the bar below and
adjust the handle that will appear.)
(Loss frame) In this trial you RECEIVED $XX. But you LOST $XX by choosing Option
YY. How pleased or displeased are you with the obtained outcome? (click on the bar below
and adjust the handle that will appear.)
Self-Report1
In this trial you PAID $20. But you WON $14.8 by choosing
Option2.
How pleased or displeased are you with the obtained
outcome? (click on the bar below and adjust the handle
that will appear.)
Very Pleased
Very Displeased
OK
Figure 4-2: Asking the experienced utility (an example of the gain frame)
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Self-Report2
How confident are you that your next choice will result in
minimizing your total financial loss?
Completely Confident
Not at all Confident
OK
Figure 4-3: Asking the confidence in the next choice
Self-Report3
Based on your overall experience with each option (If you
had any), how pleased or displeased will you be with the
outcome If you select Option1 (or Option2) In your next
trial?
[Option1]
Very Pleased
Very Displeased
[Option2]
Very Pleased
Very Displeased
Figure 4-4: Asking the predicted utility of each option
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Self-report 2 (Confidence): Respondents self-reported their confidence in the next
choice in terms of achieving the goal of the task, answering the following question (See
Figure 4-3):
How confident are you that your next choice will result in minimizing your total financial
loss? (click on the bar below and adjust the handle that will appear.)
Self-report 3 (Predicted Utility (PU)): Respondents self-reported their prediction
on the future experienced pleasure or displeasure (called -"predicted utilities") with the
outcome obtained after selecting each option (Option 1 or Option 2) on the next trial,
answering the following question (See Figure 4-4):
Based on your overall experience with each option (if you had any), how pleased or
displeased will you be with the outcome if you select Option 1 (or Option 2) in your next
trial?
4.1.8 Financial survey on the banking attitude
Respondents answered the following financial survey on the banking attitude:
(Q1) If you were going to open a new account or obtain a new loan, how likely would
you be to open a new account or obtain a new loan with Bank of America? (1 10 scale: 1=
not at all likely, 10 = extremely likely)
(Q2) If you were going to open a new investment account such as a brokerage account,
mutual fund or IRA, how likely would you be to open a new investment account with Bank
of America? (1 10 scale: 1= not at all likely, 10 = extremely likely)
Please rate your agreement with the following statements.
(Q3): Overall, Bank of America does not make misleading claims. (1 10 scale: 1 =
poor, 10 = excellent)
(Q4): Overall, Bank of America keeps promises it makes to customers. (1 10 scale: 1 =
poor, 10 = excellent)
(Q5): Overall, Bank of America is trustworthy. (1 10 scale: 1 = poor, 10 = excellent)
(Q6): Overall, Bank of America is financially stable. (1 10 scale: 1 = poor, 10 =
excellent)
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(Q7): Overall, Bank of America is a safe place to keep my money. (1 10 scale: 1 = poor,
10 = excellent)
4.2 Experiment Hypotheses
In each trial, after obtaining an outcome, respondents answered three kinds of self-reported
measures in sequence: experienced utility (self-report 1), confidence (self-report 2), and
predicted utilities (self-report 3). We infer two distinct subjective utility functions: The
experienced-utility (EU) function for evaluating the obtained outcomes is inferred from the
self-report 1. The predicted-utility (PU) function for predicting the future experience is
inferred from the self-reports 2 and 3.
Figure 4-5 shows the experiment design of human decision making under uncertainty
(domains), frames and emotions. In this design, the (used) EU and PU frames can be
viewed as a hidden latent variable inferred from respondents' self-reports.
(Gain frame)
Human Expenment Pay first and Win
'''* (Loss frame)
Receive first and Lose
(Domain 1): the safe (low-variance) option
has a higher average outcome
A Experience Prediction
bet money (pay or receive) E U) P U)
(Domain 2): the risky (high-variance) option
has a higher average outcome
Decision
bet money (pay or receive)
Figure 4-5: Asking the experienced utility (an example of the gain frame)
The data analysis will be based on three different kinds of frames: the given frame, the
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EU frame (i.e., the frame the decision maker actually employed to evaluate experienced-
utility), and the PU frame (i.e., the frame the decision maker actually employed to estimate
predicted-utility). The given frame is set by the experimenter. The EU frame is associated
with the reference point of the EU function computed by the data-fitting analysis of respon-
dents' self-reported experiences during the decision task. The PU frame is associated with
the reference point of the PU function computed by the data-fitting analysis of respondents'
self-reported confidences and predictions during the decision task.)
4.2.1 The analysis based on the give frame
H1. The frame (gain or loss frame given) and the domain (1 or 2) influences
behavioral choices under uncertainty.
[Hi-1] Respondents select the risky option more often on Domain 2, where the risky
option has a higher average of outcomes than the safe option, than on Domain 1, where the
safe option has a higher average of outcomes than the risky option.
[H1-2] On both Domain 1 and Domain 2, respondents employing the loss frame select
the risky option more often than those employing the gain frame. That is,
On Domain 1 (where the safe option has a higher average of outcomes than the risky
option), respondents select the safe option more often in the gain frame than in the loss
frame.
On Domain 2 (where the risky option has a higher average of outcomes than the safe
option), respondents select the risky option more often in the loss frame than in the gain
frame.
H2. The frame (gain or loss frame given) and the domain (1 or 2) influence
subjective discriminability. First, objective discriminability is defined as
_' P1 - A2
obj 2 2
1 + U2
where
M1 = the average of obtained outcomes from the optimal option (i.e., the safe option on
Domain 1 or the risky option on Domain 2) over trials,
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A2 = the average of obtained outcomes from suboptimal option (i.e., the risky option on
Domain 1 or the safe option on Domain 2) over trials,
ai = the standard deviation of obtained outcomes from the optimal option over trials,
2 = the standard deviation of obtained outcomes from the suboptimal option over trials.
The definition of objective discriminability depends on a decision maker's obtained out-
comes over trials. That is, the measure of objective discriminability relies only on the
underlying outcome distributions and samplings from them, but should not be affected by
the gain or loss frame used to evaluate experienced utilities.
Second, subjective discriminability is defined as
d'-= '1,eu - P2,eusubj
~2,e
eu + 2,eu
where
91,eu = the average of experienced utilities from the optimal option over trials,
A2,eu = the average of experienced utilities from suboptimal option over trials,
c1,eu = the standard deviation of experienced utilities from the optimal option over trials,
U2,eu = the standard deviation of experienced utilities from the suboptimal option over trials.
In addition, we define the discriminability ratio as the ratio of subjective discriminability
over objective discriminability:
d' ratio (discriminability ratio) = d'subj/dboj
The definition of subjective discriminability depends on the decision maker's experienced
utilities measured as self-reported values of the experienced pleasure/displeasure after ob-
taining outcomes) over trials. Thus, subjective discriminability is an effective measure to see
how a respondent's subjective experiences of previously obtained choice outcomes influence
their future choice selection under uncertainty.
A larger subjective discriminability makes respondents more likely to choose the opti-
mal option, whereas a smaller subjective discriminability makes respondents more likely to
choose the sub-optimal option. Also, a positive value of subjective discriminability indi-
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cates that experiences generally contribute to selecting the optimal option more, whereas a
negative value means the opposite tendency, selecting the suboptimal option.
[H2-1] On Domain 1, subjective discriminability in the gain frame is significantly greater
than that in the loss frame while objective discriminabilities of the two frames do not differ
significantly.
[H2-2] On Domain 2, subjective discriminability in the loss frame is significantly greater
than that in the gain frame while objective discriminabilities of the two frames do not differ
significantly.
[H2-3] On Domain 1, respondents in the gain frame have a greater subjective discrim-
inability than the objective discriminability, while respondents in the loss frame have a
smaller subjective discriminability than the objective discriminability.
[H2-4] On Domain 2, respondents in the loss frame have a greater subjective discrim-
inability than the objective discriminability, while respondents in the gain frame have a
smaller subjective discriminability than the objective discriminability.
4.2.2 The analysis based on the EU frame
H3. Emotion conditions influence the reference point and the shape of the
experienced-utility function.
Inferring the experienced-utility function: For each emotion condition, the experienced-
utility function over respondents was inferred from the experienced-utility responses (self-
report 1). The mixed-effect model fitting for EU (experienced-utility) assumed that the
shape parameters were considered fixed effects and the reference-point parameters (of two
domains) were random effects. The mixed-effect EU model returns the reference points (for
experience) each respondent employed during two tasks can be inferred (xrefl,j (domain
1) and Xref2,j(domain 2) for respondent j). The reference point for experience (or the EU
frame) is determined by this estimation of the experienced-utility function and its reference
points.
The EU frame is defined as follows. We first compute the average outcome of the
safe (low-variance) option. Then we test if the reference point the respondent used for
experienced utility (self-report 1) is larger or smaller than that average outcome. If it is
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larger, then the EU frame is a loss frame; else it is a gain frame. Note that we could compute
this after each trial, but here it is computed only once, aggregating all trials.
H4. The domain, the EU frame and the emotion condition influence the dis-
criminability ratio (= d'ub/d').
[H4-1] On Domain 1 (where optimal option = safe option), respondents across all emo-
tion conditions will show greater discriminability ratios (leading to more risk-aversion and
optimal selections) in the EU gain frame than in the EU loss frame.
[H4-2] On Domain 2 (where optimal option = risky option), respondents across all
emotion conditions will show greater discriminability ratios (leading to more risk-seeking
and optimal selections) in the EU loss frame than in the EU gain frame.
[H4-3] On each domain, the emotion condition influences the discriminability ratio,
depending on the EU frame (gain or loss frame).
H5. Experience, gender and emotion influence confidence, which influences
future prediction and decision.
[H5-1] When respondents have a relatively good experience, they get more confident in
the task, compared to when they had a relatively bad experience.
[H5-2] When respondents are more confident in the task, they tend to predict that one
option is much better than the other, compared to when they are less confident.
[H5-3] When respondents tend to predict that one option is better than the other, they
are more likely to select the better option (= exploitative choice).
There are the gender difference on risk estimates. Lerner et al. [33] observed that males
had less pessimistic risk estimates than did females, emotion differences explaining 60 to
80% of the gender difference. Here it is hypothesized that there are interaction effects of the
gender and the emotion condition on respondents' self-reported confidence and probability
of selecting the exploitative choices.
[H5-4] The gender and the emotion condition influence confidence and exploitative-
exploratory choice behavior.
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4.2.3 The analysis based on the PU frame
H6. Emotion conditions influence the reference point and the shape of the
predicted-utility function.
Inferring the predicted-utility function: For each emotion condition, the predicted-utility
function over respondents was inferred from the predicted-utility and confidence responses
(self-reports 2 and 3). We used a mixed-effect model to infer the predicted-utility function
of each emotion condition, with the shape parameters considered fixed effects and the
reference-point parameters (of two domains) considered random effects. The mixed-effect
PU model returns the reference points (for prediction) that each respondent employed
during two tasks (xrefj (domain 1) and Xref2,j (domain 2) for respondent j). The reference
point for prediction (or the PU frame) is determined by this estimation of the predicted-
utility function and its reference points.
The PU frame is defined as follows. We first compute the average outcome of the safe
(low-variance) option. Then we test if the reference point the respondent used for predicted
utility (self-report 3) is larger or smaller than that average outcome. If it is larger, then
the PU frame is a loss frame; else it is a gain frame. Note that we could compute this after
each trial, but here it is computed only once, aggregating all trials.
H7. The domain, the PU frame and the emotion condition influence the prob-
ability of choosing the risky option.
Note that this hypothesis is associated with the behavioral choice measure.
[H7-1] On both Domain 1 and Domain 2, respondents employing the PU loss frame
select the risky option more often than those employing the PU gain frame.
[H7-2] On each domain, the emotion condition influences the probability of choosing the
risky option, depending on the PU frame (gain or loss frame).
H8. The domain, the PU frame and the emotion condition influence the average
PU difference of the risky option and the safe option (= Average[PU(risky
option)] - Average[PU(safe option)]).
Note that this hypothesis is associated with the self-reported PU measure.
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By this definition, when the average PU difference (PUrisk - PUsafe = Average [PU(risky
option)] - Average[PU(safe option)]) is positive, the average PU of the risky option is greater
than that of the safe option by the definition. Otherwise, the average PU of the safe option
is greater than that of the risky option. Thus, the average PU difference (PUrisk - PUsafe)
can serve as a measure of risk attitude in terms of the predicted utilities.
[H8-1] On both Domain 1 and Domain 2, respondents employing the PU loss frame
have a greater value of the average PU difference (leading to more risk seeking) than those
employing the PU gain frame.
[H8-2] On each domain, the emotion condition influences the probability of choosing the
risky option, depending on the PU frame (gain or loss frame).
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Chapter 5
Human Decision Experiments:
Analysis and Results
This chapter explains the analysis and results of human decision experiments to confirm
main hypotheses described in Chapter 4. The AC model will be applied to infer the
experienced-utility and predicted-utility functions from respondents' self-reports in each
emotion condition. The data analysis is based on three different kinds of frames: the given
frame, the EU frame (i.e., the frame the decision maker actually employed to evaluate
experienced utility), and the PU frame (the frame the decision maker actually employed
to estimate predicted utility). The given frame-based analysis will show the main effect of
the given frame (gain or loss frame set by the experimenter) on behavioral choices (risk
averse or risk seeking) and subjective discriminability. In addition, the EU and PU frame-
based analysis will clearly show the interaction effects of framing and emotion on human
experience, prediction and decisions under uncertainty.
5.1 The analysis based on the give frame
The analysis based on the given frame will show how the frame condition and the domain
type influence behavioral choices under uncertainty and subjective discriminability.
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(a) domains (b) frames
Figure 5-1: The main effect of domain types (a) or frame types (b) on the probability of se-
lecting the risky option over trials (pooling over respondents in all four emotion conditions).
Note that error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
5.1.1 The frame (gain or loss frame given) and the domain (1 or 2) in-
fluences behavioral choices under uncertainty
A general linear model (GLM) three-factor ANOVA test was conducted to assess the influ-
ence of the domain type (domain 1, domain 2), the frame type (gain or loss frame given), and
the emotion condition (neutral, anger, fear, economic fear) on the probability of selecting
the risky option over all trials during a task.
There were significant main effects of the domain type (Mdomaini = 37% vs. Mdomain2
= 65%; F(1,167) = 84.6, p < .001) (supporting Hi-i) and the frame type (Mgain = 46%
vs. M10,, = 56%; F(1,167) = 9.53, p < .01) on the probability of choosing the risky option,
but no significant interaction between the domain type and the given frame type.
On Domain 1, respondents selected the optimal option (= the safe option) marginally
more often in the gain domain than in the loss domain (Mgain = 68% vs. M10s, = 59%;
F(1, 83) = 3.89, p = .052). Also, on domain 2, respondents selected the optimal option (=
the risky option) significantly more often in the loss frame than in the gain frame (Main
= 60% vs. M10,, = 70%; F(1, 83) = 5.48, p < .05) (supporting H1-2).
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Figure 5-2: The interaction effect of the domain type and the frame type on the probabil-
ity of selecting the risky option over trials (pooling over respondents in all four emotion
conditions). Note that error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
5.1.2 The frame (gain or loss frame given) and the domain (1 or 2) in-
fluences subjective discriminability
Pooling behavioral choice data over respondents across emotion conditions, on each domain,
the frame type significantly influenced respondents' subjective discriminability when the
objective discriminability was not significantly different between frame types. Excluding
the tasks where respondents did not try each option for at least two trials, ANOVA tests
showed the following:
On Domain 1, subjective discriminability in the gain frame was significantly greater
than that in the loss frame (Mgain = .52 vs. Mle,, = .04; F(1,75) = 26.2, p < .001) while
objective discriminabilities of two frames did not differ significantly (Mgain = .29 vs. Ml,,
= .32; F(1,75) = 1.7, NS) (supporting H2-1).
On Domain 2, subjective discriminability in the loss frame was significantly greater
than that in the gain frame (Mgain = .20 vs. Ml,,, = .55; F(1,81) = 14.9, p < .001) while
objective discriminabilities of two frames did not differ significantly (Mgain = .33 vs. Mies,
= .32; F(1,81) = .25, NS) (supporting H2-2).
On Domain 1, respondents in the gain frame had a significantly greater subjective
discriminability than the objective discriminability (Msyb = .52 vs. Mobj = .29; T(38) =
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Table 5.1: Comparisons of the subjective discriminability with the objective discriminability
in gain and loss frames on each domain type (pooling over respondents in all four emotion
conditions).
(a) Domain 1 (b) Domain 2
Figure 5-3: The subjective discriminability and the objective discriminability in gain and
loss frames on each domain type (pooling over respondents in all four emotion conditions).
Note that error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
3.66, p < .001), while respondents in the loss frame have a significantly smaller subjective
discriminability (M8sbj = .04 vs. Mobj = .32; T(36) = -3.90, p < .001) (supporting H2-3).
On Domain 2, respondents in the loss frame have a greater "positive" subjective dis-
criminability than the objective discriminability (Maubj= .55 vs. Mobj = .32; T(38) =
3.42, p < .001), while respondents in the gain frame have a significantly smaller subjective
discriminability (M8sbj = .20 vs. Mobj = .33; T(42) = -2.57, p < .01) (supporting H2-4).
Table 5.1 compares the subjective discriminability with the objective discriminability in
each of the four pairs of the domain type (domain 1, domain 2) and the frame type (gain
or loss frame given) across emotion conditions.
According to the definition of subjective discriminability, higher subjective discrim-
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inability should be associated with higher probability of selecting the optimal option on
each domain. This was confirmed by the behavioral choice data (Figure 5-2) and the sub-
jective discriminability data (Figure 5-3). That is, the frame involving higher subjective
discriminability on each domain (the gain frame on Domain 1 and the loss frame on Domain
2) led to more optimal choices: On Domain 1 the gain frame led to more safe (optimal)
choices that resulted in higher average outcome. On Domain 2 the loss frame led to more
risky (optimal) choices that resulted in higher average outcome.
5.2 The analysis based on the EU frame
The EU frame is the frame the decision maker actually employed to evaluate experienced
utility. The EU frame can be inferred from the data-fitting analysis of respondents' self-
reported experiences during the decision task. The EU frame-based analysis presents the
interaction effects of framing and emotion on human experience and decisions. Figure 5-4
shows some examples of the EU gain frame and the EU loss frame. Note that even though
(objective) outcomes are negative, they can be viewed as gains if the reference point is
smaller than the outcomes. Similarly, even though (objective) outcomes are positive, they
can be viewed as losses if the reference point is greater than the outcomes.
5.2.1 Emotion conditions influence the EU frame and the shape of the
experienced-utility function
Respondents tended to use the bet money as their EU reference point (i.e., the reference
point of their EU function estimated by the EU data fitting) in the (given) gain frame on
Domain 1, in the loss frame on Domain 2, and in the gain frame on Domain 2. In other
words, except in the loss frame on Domain 1, respondents in all emotion conditions tended
to involve the EU gain frame when the bet money is smaller than the average outcome of
the safe option, and involve the EU loss frame when the bet money is greater than the
average outcome of the safe option.
Note that for the loss frame on Domain 1, respondents first received the bet money of
$14 or $20 and then lost some money after selecting an option on each trial. Also, the
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Figure 5-4: Examples of the EU gain frame and the EU loss frame: red dots - selecting the
safe option, blue dots - selecting the risky option
average outcome of the safe option was a loss of $18.
For the loss frame on Domain 1, respondents in the neutral condition tended to use
the bet money as their EU reference point. In other words, neutral respondents involved
the EU loss frame when they received the bet money of $14 (i.e., self-reporting displeasure
for the average loss of $18 from the safe option), but involved the EU gain frame when
they received the bet money of $20 (i.e., self-reporting pleasure for the average loss of $18
from the safe option). That is, they tended to be very rational in light of the net outcome.
Yet, respondents in the negative-emotion (anger, fear, economic fear) conditions tended to
employ the EU loss frame self-reporting displeasure for the average loss of $18 from the
safe option regardless of receiving $14 or $20 initially (Fisher's exact tests, p = .02 (anger),
p < .01 (fear), p = .06 (economic fear)); their EU reference point tended to be greater than
the average outcome of the safe option, so they view the obtained outcomes from the safe
option as losses regardless of their bet-money condition.
Now the following analysis presents the inferred experienced-utility function from self-
reported EUs in each emotion condition. Appendix B describes the EU data-fit method in
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more detail.
The self-reported experienced utility v(t) on trial t during a task depends on the ob-
tained outcome x(t), the reference point Xref and the shape parameters (a, b, AG, AL) of the
experienced-utility function
fEU(x(t) Ia, b, AG, AL, Xref) =
AGW((t) - Xref)a, x(t) > Xref
-AL(Xref - x())b, x(t) < Xref
Also, note that NLMEFIT returns the estimated random effects 6 1,j and 62,j for each
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(5.1)
I
Neutral Anger Fear Economic Fear
Fixed effects Mean (SE) Mean (SE) Mean (SE) Mean (SE)
a 0.77 (0.08) 0.39 (0.05) 0.32 (0.03) 0.37 (0.04)
b 0.45 (0.04) 0.54 (0.04) 0.30 (0.03) 0.42 (0.04)
XG 4.25 (0.95) 10.22 (1.39) 16.47 (1.34) 13.76 (1.48)
_L 10.19 (1.31) 7.48 (0.98) 16.40 (1.36) 10.89 (1.30)
XrIfl -0.47 (2.03) 3.94 (2.49) 1.79 (0.10) 2.07 (2.01)
Xref 2  2.09 (1.91) 3.21 (2.36) 2.17 (0.11) 2.09 (1.63)
Random effects Variance Variance Varian c e Variance
31,j 80.33 122.32 51.04 78.73
82J 73.09 112.09 74.33 54.58
(-)Log Likelihood 4419.1 4449.0 4458.2 4557.6
MSE 231.4 240.7 226.6 290.8
AIC 8856.2 8916.0 8934.5 9133.2
BIC 8900.7 8960.6 8979.1 9177.8
Table 5.2: The EU mixed-effect model parameter estimation for each emotion condition
respondent j = 1 to 21 as well as the variances var(6ij) and var(62,J). Thus, the reference
points each respondent employed during two tasks can be inferred: XrefiJ = Xrefi + 61,J
and Xref2,J = Xref2 + 2,J . Two reference points inferred from the EU mixed-effect model
will be applied to determine respondents' actually used EU frames (gain or loss frame for
experience) for each task and to reveal the influences of the EU frames on their choices
and subjective discriminability. Note that the EU frame for each task may be different
from the (given) frame for that task which was set by the experimenter. The t-tests
tAB_ = (MeanA - MeanB)/ SE2 + SE2 comparing each parameter between any two emo-
tion conditions revealed the following:
* t-tests comparing the parameter a (curvature in the face of gains): Neutral (0.77) >
Anger (0.39), Economic Fear (0.37), Fear (0.32) ps < .001
* t-tests comparing the parameter b (curvature in the face of losses): Anger (0.54) >
Economic Fear (0.42) > Fear (0.30) ps < .05
Neutral (0.45) > Fear (0.30) p < .001
" t-tests comparing the parameter AG (sensitivity in the face of gains): Fear (16.47) >
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Anger (10.22) > Neutral (4.25) ps < .001
Economic Fear (13.76) > Anger (10.22) p < .05
e t-tests comparing the parameter AL (sensitivity in the face of losses): Fear (16.40) >
Economic Fear (10.89), Neutral (10.19) > Anger (7.48) ps < .05
First, the parameter a (curvature in the face of gains) is significantly greater (closer to
linear) in the neutral condition than in other negative-emotion (anger, fear, economic fear)
conditions, explaining that neutral respondents were more risk seeking after experienced
gains (i.e., in the EU gain frame).
Second, the parameter b (curvature in the face of losses) is significantly greater (closer to
linear) in the neutral and anger conditions than in the fear condition, explaining that fearful
respondents were more risk seeking after experienced losses (i.e., in the EU loss frame).
Third, angry respondents (greater b, smaller AL) tended to be less sensitive to relatively
small experienced losses, compared to respondents in neutral, fear and economical fear
conditions, explaining that angry respondents were more risk averse after experienced losses
(i.e., in the EU loss frame).
Fourth, fearful and economically fearful respondents (smaller b, greater AL) tended to
be more sensitive to relatively small experienced gains, compared to neutral and angry
respondents, explaining that fearful and economically fearful respondents were more risk
averse after explained gains (i.e., in the EU gain frame).
Note that angry respondents were less sensitive to both experienced losses and gains,
compared with fearful respondents. Also, the employed EU frame as well as the emotion
condition influenced respondents' choice behavior under uncertainty.
Appendix A shows the EU function in each emotion condition with self-reported EU
data, and the EU function with each respondent's inferred EU reference point on Domain
1 and Domain 2.
5.2.2 Comparing different models for the EU data fit
Different models were compared to fit the self-reported EU data in terms of the BIC
(Bayesian Information Criterion). Compared to the maximum likelihood criterion, the
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BIC criterion takes account of the number of model parameters (i.e., model complexity) as
well as the likelihood in order to avoid overfitting. Thus, BIC is a better criterion for the
model comparison. BIC is defined as follows:
BIC = -2 -InL+kln(n)
where
L = the maximized value of the likelihood function for the estimated model
k = the number of free parameters to be estimated
n = the number of data points (i.e., sample size)
Considering the parameterized EU function
fEu(x(t) a, b, AG, AL, Xref) = ( M - Xrf)a, x(t) > Xrf
AL(Xref - x(t))b, x(t) < Xref
the following models were compared:
* M1. Optimizing a, b, AG, AL, iXref1 (reference point on Domain 1), Xref2 (reference
point on Domain 2) assuming all variables are fixed effects (shared across respondents)
" M2. Assuming a = 1, b = 1 (Linear model), Optimizing AG, AL (fixed effects),
Xrefi, Xref2 (random effects varied across respondents)
" M3. Assuming AG = 1 (PT function model), Optimizing a, b, AL (fixed effects),
Xrefi, Xref2 (random effects)
" M4. Assuming Xref 1 = Xref2 = Xref, Optimizing a, b, AG, AL (fixed effects), Xref
(random effects)
* M5. Optimizing a, b, AG, AL (fixed effects), xref 1, Xref2 (random effects)
" M6. Optimizing a, b, AG, AL, iXref1, Xref2 (all random effects)
It turned out that the data were not sufficiently numerous for being fitted with the M6
model. The M5 model (on which the dissertation focuses) was the best in terms of the BIC.
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Domain 1 Domain 2
Gain EU frame Loss EU frame Gain EU frame Loss EU frame
Neutral 1.32 (N=13) -0.39 ( 0.
T(17)= 3.95, p < .001 T(19)= 1.36, NS
2.40 (N=9) 0.23 (N=8) 0.31 (N=8) 1.29 (N=12)
T(15) = 3.21,p < .01 T(18)= -2.00, p <.05
Fear 2.40 (N=13) -0.74 (N=8) -0.11 (N=9) 2.04 (N=12)T(19)= 5.20, p < .001 T(19)=-4.31,p <.001
Economic 1.65 (N=12) -0.94 (N=7) -0.74 (N=5) 2.00 (N=15)
Fear T(17) = 3.32, p < .01 T(19) = -4.52, p <.001
Overall 1.94 (N=47) -0.46 (N=29) 0.30 (N=27) 1.54 (N=55)F(1,75) = 56.7, p < .001 T(1,81) = 18.7, p <.001
Table 5.3: Discriminability ratio = subjective d' / objective d'
5.2.3 The domain, the EU frame and the emotion condition influence the
discriminability ratio d'Ub~/dsb
Respondents' objective discriminability values were not significantly different for all pairwise
comparisons (across the gain and EU loss frames and across the domain types, and across
the emotion condition). Their subjective discriminability values, however, were significantly
influenced by the EU frame and the domain type for each emotion condition.
Table 5.3 shows how the EU frame (gain or loss frame) influenced the discriminability
ratio (= d[lUbJobj) on each domain for emotion conditions. Note that only the tasks in
which both options were selected for at least two trials were included in this discriminability
analysis. This is the required condition for estimating the standard deviations of sampled
outcomes or experienced utilities.
On Domain 1 (where optimal option = safe option), respondents across all emotion
conditions showed greater discriminability ratios leading to more risk-aversion and optimal
selections in the EU gain frame than in the EU loss frame (supporting H4-1). Respondents
employing the EU gain frame made more risk-averse choices (optimal choices) more often
on Domain 1, compared to "rational" decision makers who were assumed to make decisions
based on objective outcomes (not based on subjective utilities).
On Domain 2 (where optimal option = risky option), respondents in emotion conditions
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Figure 5-8: The interaction effect of the
inability ratio (pooling over respondents i
bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
lomain type and the EU frame on the discrim-
n all four emotion conditions). Note that error
(a) Domain 1 (b) Domain 2
Figure 5-9: The interaction effect of the EU frame and the emotion condition on discrim-
inability ratio for each domain. Note that error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
except the neutral condition showed greater discriminability ratios (leading to more risk
seeking and optimal selections) in the EU loss frame than in the EU gain frame (partly
supporting H4-1). Respondents employing the EU loss frame made more risk-seeking choices
(optimal choices) more often on Domain 2, compared to "rational" decision makers who were
assumed to make decisions based on objective outcomes (not based on subjective utilities).
Note that neutral respondents in the EU gain frame showed greater discriminability ratio
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than in the EU loss frame on Domain 2, but this was not statistically significant (T(19) =
1.36, NS). This can be associated with the fact that the parameter a= 0.77, curvature in
the face of gains of the neutral condition was greater than that of other conditions, leading
to more risk seeking after experienced gains.
Moreover, on each domain, the emotion condition influenced the discriminability ratio,
depending on the EU frame:
On Domain 1, fearful respondents employing the EU gain frame tended to have greater
discriminability ratios (or greater risk aversion) than neutral respondents employing the
same frame (Mneutral=1.32 vs. Mfear = 2.40; T(24) = -2.45, p < .05).
On Domain 2, neutral or angry respondents employing the EU loss frame tended to have
smaller discriminability ratios (or less risk aversion) than fearful or economically fearful
respondents employing the same frame (pairwise T-test comparisons, ps< .05).
On Domain 2, fearful or economically fearful respondents showed negative discriminabil-
ity ratios (or more risk aversion) in the EU gain frame, whearas neutral or angry respondents
showed positive discriminability ratios (or more risk seeking) in that frame, but these were
not statistically significant by pairwise T-test comparisons.
5.2.4 Experience, gender and emotion influence confidence, which influ-
ences future prediction and decision
Association between experience-utility and confidence
Respondents' experienced utility v(t) from the obtained outcome on trial t influenced their
confidence q(t). For each emotion condition (neutral, anger, fear, economic fear), the average
of confidence over trials with relatively higher experienced utility (v(t) > ET[v(T)], trials
on which the experienced utility was greater than the average experienced-utility over the
task) was significantly greater than the average of confidence over trials with relatively
lower experienced utility (v(t) < Er[v(r)]) (ps< .05, Table 5.4). This means that when
respondents had a relatively good experience from the current trial, they tended to get more
confident in their next trial, compared to when they had a relatively bad experience.
There was a significantly high correlation between the moving-averaged experienced-
utility and the moving-averaged confidence, corr = 0.77,p < .001 using equally-weighted
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10-point moving-average filter, and corr = 0.70, p < .001 using equally-weighted 5-point
moving-average filter, pooling over respondents across emotion conditions (neutral, anger,
fear, economic fear).
Averaged Confidence
Lower EU Higher EU
Neutral -1.37 10.39
Neutral T(41) = 6.31, p < .001
Anger -9.80 3.26
Anger T(41)= 7.75, p < .001
-7.23 7.06Fear T(41)= 5.73, p < .001
Economic -12.14 -1.47
Fear T(41) = 5.74, p < .001
Overall -7.64 4.81T(167)= 12.50, p < .001
Table 5.4: Comparing the
each emotion condition
means of confidence for lower-EU trials and higher-EU trials on
PU difference
Low Confidence High Confidence
Neutral 17.58 31.71T(36)= 3.50,p < .001
Anger 19.33 34.28T(31)= 3.25, p < .005
19.97 35.27Fear T(29)= 3.53, p < .001
Economic 27.56 36.83
Fear T(31) = 2.42, p < .05
Overall 21.12 34.43T(130)= 6.42, p < .001
Table 5.5: Comparing the means of absolute PU difference for lower-EU trials and higher-
EU trials on each emotion condition
Association between confidence and predicted-utility difference
Respondents' confidence q(t) influenced the absolute difference of their predicted utilities
I u(t|1) - u(t12) before their next trial. For respondents in each emotion condition (neutral,
anger, fear, economic fear), the average of absolute PU differences over trials with high con-
fidence (50 > q(t) > 0) was significantly greater than the average of absolute PU differences
over trials with low confidence (0 > q(t) 2 -50) (ps < .05, Table 5.5). This means that
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Pr (option = exploitative choice)
Lower PU difference IHigher PU difference
Neutral 59% 75%T(41) = 4.37, p < .001
Anger 61% 78%T(40)= 4.01, p < .001
Fear 52% 74%T(40)= 5.84, p < .001
Economic 56% 77%
Fear T(41) = 5.26, p < .001
Overall 57% 76%T(165) 9.75, p < .001
Table 5.6: Comparing the means of exploitative-choice probability for lower PU-difference
trials and higher PU-difference trials on each emotion condition
when respondents were in a high confidence state, they tended to predict that one option
was much better than the other, compared to when they were in a low confidence state.
Association between predict-utility difference and exploitative-choice probabil-
ity
Respondents tended to select the exploitative choice (= option with the current-estimated
greatest predicted utility) more often as they had higher PU difference of two options
(I u(t|1) - u(t12) ). Table 5.6 compares the probabilities of selecting the exploitative choice
over higher PU difference trials (i.e., trials on which the PU difference is greater than the
average PU difference over all trials) and over lower PU difference trials (i.e., trials on
which the PU difference is smaller than the average PU difference over all trials). Higher
PU difference increased the exploitative-choice probability (resulting in less randomized
choice behavior), whereas lower PU difference increased the exploratory-choice probability
(resulting in more randomized choice behavior). This supports the hypothesis on how the
confidence state influences the sensitivity of the predicted-utility function, which regulates
the trade-offs between exploitation and exploration.
Gender differences in confidence and predict-utility difference
Tables 5.7 and 5.8, respectively, show the associations between experienced-utility and
confidence for male and female respondents. Tables 5.9 and 5.10, respectively, show the
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associations between confidence and predict-utility difference for male and female respon-
dents. In Table 5.8, note that fearful female respondents showed negative (very low) average
confidence both over lower-EU trials (M=-19.41) and over higher-EU trials (M=-9.55). In
other words, fearful female respondents tended to feel less confident even with previous
(relatively) higher experienced utility (v(t) > Er[v(r)]), possibly due to the influence of the
existing incidental fearful emotion. Table 5.13 shows the comparisons between male and
female respondents in terms of experienced-utility and confidence. In the fear condition,
female respondents showed significantly lower average confidence than male respondents for
both cases of previous lower EU (Mmae=-2.36 vs. Mfemale=-19.41, T(40) = 2.23, p < .05)
and of previous higher EU (Mmal=13.70 vs. Mfemale=-9.55, T(40) = 2.89, p < .01).
Average Confidence
Lower EU Higher EU
Neutral 0.92 13.70
T(21)= 5.29, p < .001
Anger -7.84 3.01
T(25)= 6.19, p < .001
Fear -2.36 13.70
T(29)= 5.15, p < .001
Economic -12.17 -0.81
Fear T(19)= 3.41, p < .005
Overall -5.08 7.91T(97) = 9.48, p < .001
Table 5.7: Male respondents: Comparing the means of confidence for lower-EU trials and
higher-EU trials on each emotion condition
Average Confidence
Lower EU Higher EU
Neutral -3.89 6.75T(19) = 3.65, p < .005
Anger -12.99 3.66T(15) = 5.10, p < .001
Fear -19.41 -9.55T(11) 2.59, p <.05
Economic -12.11 -2.07
Fear T(21) 5.22, p < .001
Overall -11.21 0.48T(69) 8.15, p < .001
Table 5.8: Female respondents: Comparing the means of confidence for lower-EU trials and
higher-EU trials on each emotion condition
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Average PU difference
Low Confidence IHigh Confidence
Neutral 17.87 37.98T(17) 3.48, p < .005
Anger 24.12 30.46
T(20) = 2.50, p < .05
Fear 27.88 45.46T(20) 3.45, p < .005
Economic 24.97 32.71
Fear T(15) = 2.32, p < .05
Overall 23.86 36.86T(75) 5.74, p < .001
Table 5.9: Male respondents: Comparing the means of absolute PU difference for low-
confidence trials and high-confidence trials on each emotion condition
Average PU difference
Low Confidence IHigh Confidence
Neutral 19.07 24.60T(18)= 1.43, p = .09
Anger 17.05 37.40T(10) = 2.45, p < .05
Fear 11.69 15.42T(8)= 1.57, p= .08
Economic 32.65 40.48
Fear T(15) = 1.39, p= .10
Overall 21.41 30.28T(54) = 3.21, p < .005
Table 5.10: Female respondents: Comparing the means of absolute PU difference for low-
confidence trials and high-confidence trials on each emotion condition
On low-confidence trials, fearful female respondents reported significantly lower av-
erage PU difference than neutral female respondents (Mneutrai=19.07 vs. Mfear=11. 6 9 ,
T(29)=2.36, p < .05) (Table 5.10). On high-confidence trials, fearful female respondents
reported lower average PU difference than neutral female respondents on average, but this
was not statistically significant (Mnetra=24.60 vs. Mfear=15.42, T(27)=1.29, p < .10).
Since lower confidence led to lower PU difference (Tables 5.9 and 5.10) and lower
PU difference led to more randomized choice behavior (Tables 5.11 and 5.12), fearful
female respondents tended to have more exploratory trials (i.e., more randomized choices)
than fearful male respondents. In other words, fearful female respondents selected fewer
exploitative choices (i.e., fewer selections of the option with the current-estimated greatest
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Pr (option = exploitative choice)
Lower PU difference Higher PU difference
Neutral 63% 79%
T(21)= 2.70, p < .01
Anger 64% 77%
T(25)= 2.98, p < .01
Fear 55% 79%
729)= 5.41, p < .001
Economic 56% 75%
Fear 7(19)= 3.42, p < .01
Overall 59% )=1 78%
T(97)= 7.33, p < .00 1
Table 5.11: Male respondents: Comparing the means of exploitative-choice probability for
lower PU-difference trials and higher PU-difference trials on each emotion condition
Pr (option = ex loitative choice)
Lower PU difference Higher PU difference
Neutral 55% 72%
T(19) 3.68, p < .005
Anger 57% 78%T(1 4)= 2.66, p < .01
Fear 44% 60%
T(10) 2.29, p < .05
Economic 55% 79%
Fear T(21)= 3.93, p < .001
Overall 54% 73%
T(67)= 6.39, p < .001
Table 5.12: Female respondents: Comparing the means of exploitative-choice probability
for lower PU-difference trials and higher PU-difference trials on each emotion condition
Average Confidence Average Confidence
(Lower EU) (Higher EU)
Male Female Male Female
Neutral 0.92 -3.89 13.70 6.75
7{40)= 0.716, NS 7T40) 1.07, NS
-7.84 | -12.99 3.01 3.66
Anger 7(40)= 0.78, NS 7140) -0.08, NS
-2.36 -19.41 13.70 -9.55Fear 40= 2.23p < .05 7(40) = 2.89, p < .01
Economic -12.17 -12.11 -0.81 1 -2.07
Fear 7T40) = -0.01, NS 7(40)= 0.15, NS
Overall -5.08 -11.21 7.91 0.487153)=7.09,(p= .14 T42)=.65, p < .05
Table 5.13: Comparisons between male and female respondents on each emotion condition:
Confidence for lower-EU trials and higher-EU trials
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Average PU difference Average PU difference
(Low Confidence) (High Confidence)
Male Female Male Female
Neutral 17.87 19.07 37.98 24.60T(37) = -0.76, NS 7(38) = 2.38, p < .05
Anger 24.12 | 17.05 30.46 | 37.40
Anger 7(38) = 1.38, p =.09 7132)= -0.64, NS
Fear 27.88 | 11.69 45.46 15.42
Fear 7(35)= 2.26, p < .05 (33)= 3.11, p < .005
Economic 24.97 | 32.65 32.71 | 40.48
Fear T(37)= -0.26, NS T(33) -1.30, p = .10
Overall 23.86 | 21.41 36.86 | 30.28Overall 7(166)= 1.77, p < .05 T(166)= 1.92, p < .05
Table 5.14: Comparison between male and female respondents on each emotion condition:
Absolute PU difference for lower-EU trials and higher-EU trials
Pr (option = exploitative choice) Pr (option = exploitative choice)
(Lower PU difference) (Higher PU difference)
Male Female Male Female
Neutral 63% 55% 79% 72%T(40)= 1.05, NS T(40)= 1.18, NS
Anger 64% 1 57% 77% 78%T(39) = 0.83, NS T(39)= -0.05, NS
Fear 55% 44% 79% 60%T(40)= 1.57, p = .06 T(39)= 2.12, p < .05
Economic 56% 55% 75% 79%
Fear T(40) = 0.13, NS T(40) = -0.44, NS
Overall 59% 54% 78% 73%T(165)= 1.51, p = .07 T(164)= 1.25, NS
Table 5.15: Comparisons between male and female respondents on each emotion condition:
Exploitative-choice probability for lower PU-difference trials and higher PU-difference trials
predicted utility) than fearful male respondents (Mmae= 71.9% vs. Mfemale=54.7% for the
exploitative-choice probability over all trials, T(40) = 2.70, p < .01).
The greater exploitative-choice probability of male respondents in the fear condition
made them more often select the optimal option (i.e., the safe option on Domain 1, the
risky option on Domain 2) on average than female respondents, but this was not statistically
significant (Mmale=65.5% vs. Mfemale= 62.5% for the optimal-choice probability over all
trials, T(40) = 0.46, NS) (Table 5.21). In addition, note that 68.5% of the exploitative
choices of male respondents in the fear condition were optimal option selections, whereas
62.5% of the exploitative choices of female respondents in that condition were optimal option
selections (Table 5.19).
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Figure 5-10 presents the proposed model on the interactions of gender, emotion, expe-
rience, confidence, prediction and exploitative/exploratory decisions. Gender and emotion
(e.g., incidental fear) may influence confidence. Good (bad) experience leads to high (low)
confidence. Also, then, high (low) confidence leads to high (low) predicted-utility difference
and more exploitative (exploratory) choice behavior.
Figure 5-10: Gender and emotion may influence confidence. Good (bad) experience leads to
high (low) confidence. Also, then, high (low) confidence leads to high (low) predicted-utility
difference and more exploitative (exploratory) choice behavior
Average EU
Male Female
Neutral -1.T(40)= 0.51, NS-4.7
Anger -2.6 T(40) = 0.07, NS -3.1
Fear 5.7 -11.9
T(40) = 2.23, p < .05
Economic -2.6 3.5
Fear T(40) = -0.95, NS
Overall 0.2 1 -3.0
___________T(1 66) = 0.93, N S
Table 5.16: Comparisons between male and female respondents on each emotion condition:
Average EU over trials
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.. .. .. ........ ............................  .. ... .....
Average Confidence
Male Female
Neutral 8.0 T(40)= 1.13, NS 0.5
Anger -2.1 T(40) = 0.09, NS -2.8
Fear7.9 -15.7
T(40)= 3.01, p < .005
Economic -6.2 -5.8
Fear T(40) = -0.06, NS
Overall 2.4 1 -5.0
________T(1 66) = 1.98, p< .05
Table 5.17: Comparisons between
Avearge confidence over trials
male and female respondents on each emotion condition:
Pr (option = ex loitative choice)
Male Female
Neutral 75.4% 65.3%
T(40)1.68,p .05
Anger 72.4% 65.6%
T(40) = 0.91, NS
Fear 71.9% 54.7%T(40)= 2.70, p < .01
Economic 68.5% 73.3%
Fear T(40) = -0.70, NS
Overall 72.1% 66.1%
T(166) = 1.82, p < .05
Table 5.18: Comparisons between male and female respondents
Exploitative-choice probability over all trials
Pr (option = optimal I exploitative choice)
Male Female
Neutral 71.1% 70.0%
T(40) = 0.14, N S
Anger 65.6% 77.5%
T(39) = -1.35, NS
Fear 68.5% 62.5%
T(40) =0.06, NS
Economic 69.2% 58.5%
Fear T(40)= 1.05, NS
Overall 68.4% 66.6%
T(165) = 0.40, NS
on each emotion condition:
Table 5.19: Comparisons between male and female respondents on each emotion condition:
Optimal-choice probability over exploitative trials
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Pr (option = optimal| exploratory choice)
Male Female
Neutral 52.1% 53.0%T(36)= -0.08, NS
42.6% 60.0%
Anger T(31)= -1.39, NS
Fear.5% 47.7%
T(39) = -0.02, NS
Economic 45.3% 44.9%
Fear T(38) = 0.03, NS
46.7% 50.6%Overall T(150)= -0.71, NS
Table 5.20: Comparisons between male and female respondents on each emotion condition:
Optimal-choice probability over exploratory trials
Pr (option = optimal choice)
Male Female
Neutral 65.9% 62.8%T(40)= 0.55, NS
Anger 65.5% 66.0%T(40)= -0.08, NS
65.5% 62.5%Fear T(40) = 0.46, NS
Economic 68.0% 56.2%
Fear T(40)= 1.61, p = .06
Overall 66.1% 61.4%T(166)= 1.49, p = .07
Table 5.21: Comparisons between male and female respondents on each emotion condition:
Optimal-choice probability over all trials
5.3 The analysis based on the PU frame
The PU frame is the frame the decision maker actually employed to estimate predicted util-
ity and may or may not be the same as the given frame. The PU frame can be inferred from
the data-fitting analysis of respondents' self-reported confidences and predictions during the
decision task. The PU frame-based analysis presents the interaction effects of framing and
emotion on human prediction and decisions.
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5.3.1 Emotion conditions influence the PU frame and the shape of the
predicted-utility function
Respondents tended to use the bet money as their PU reference point (i.e., the reference
point of their PU function estimated by the PU data fitting) in the (given) gain frame on
Domain 1, in the loss frame on Domain 2, and in the gain frame on Domain 2. In other
words, except in the loss frame on Domain 1, respondents in all emotion conditions tended
to involve the PU gain frame when the bet money is smaller than the average outcome of
the safe option, and involve the EU loss frame when the bet money is greater than the
average outcome of the safe option.
Note that for the loss frame on Domain 1, respondents first received the bet money of
$14 or $20 and then lost some money after selecting an option on each trial. Also, the
average outcome of the safe option was a loss of $18.
For the given loss frame on Domain 1, respondents in the neutral condition tended to
use the bet money as their PU reference point. In other words, neutral-emotion respondents
involved the PU loss frame when they received the bet money of $14 (i.e., self-reporting
displeasure for the expected loss of $18 from the safe option), but involved the PU gain
frame when they received the bet money of $20 (i.e., self-reporting pleasure for the expected
loss of $18 from the safe option). That is, they tended to be very rational in light of the
net outcome. Yet, respondents in the fear condition tended to employ the PU loss frame
self-reporting displeasure for the expected loss of $18 from the safe option regardless of
receiving $14 or $20 initially (Fisher's exact test, p < .01); their PU reference point tended
to be greater than the average outcome of the safe option (i.e., the PU loss frame), so they
view the expected outcomes from the safe option as losses regardless of their bet-money
condition.
Now the following analysis presents the inferred predicted-utility function from self-
reported PUs in each emotion condition. Appendix C describes the PU data-fit method in
more detail.
The predicted-utility sample y(T) corresponding to outcome x(r) (r = 1 to t) is com-
puted using the predicted utility function:
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Figure 5-11: Predicted-utility (PU) functions inferred from self-reported PUs in each emo-
tion condition, drawing the functions when e(t)=0.5 (neutral confidence)
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Figure 5-12: Predicted-utility (PU) functions showing the standard error (SE) of the esti-
mated parameter means (drawing the functions when e(t)=0.5 (neutral confidence))
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Figure 5-13: Comparisons between two predicted-utility (PU) functions showing the stan-
dard error (SE) of the estimated parameter means (drawing the functions when e(t)=0.5
(neutral confidence))
fpu(x(T)Ia,b,AG(T),AL (T),Xref) = Y(T) = {AG (T) (X(T) - Xref)a, X(T) > Xref
-AL (T) (Xref - x(T))b, x( ) < Xrf
Note that sensitivity parameters AG(t) and AL(t) depend on the self-reported confidence
measurement q(t). Thus, y(T) depends on the reference point Xref and the shape parameters
(a, b, AG(t), AL(t)) of the predicted utility function.
Sensitivity parameters AG(t) and AL (t) are functions of the confidence state variable e(t)
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Figure 5-14: Predicted utility (PU) function changing with confidence: the magenta line
when e(t) = 1 (very confident), the black line when e(t) = 0.5 (neutral confidence), and the
green line when e(t) = 0 (not at all confident)
ranging from 0 (= not at all confident) to 1 (= very confident):
e(t) = 1+here = 0.11+ exp(-sq(t))
AG(t) = AG(et)) = AGbase + AGslope(2 e(t) - 1)
AL (t) = AL (et)) = ALbase + ALslope(2 e(t) - 1)
When e(t) = 0.5 (neutral confidence), AG(t) = AGbase and AL(t) = ALbase-
When e(t) = 0 (not at all confident), AG(t) = AGbase - AGslope and AL(t) = ALbase - ALsiope.
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Neutral Anger Fear Economic Fear
Fixed effects Mean (SE) Mean (SE) Mean (SE) Mean (SE)
a 0.64(0.11) 0.34(0.10) 0.22(0.06) 0.39(0.08)
b 0.99 (0.09) 1.40(0.14) 0.40(0.05) 0.03(0.04)
Gbase 5.92 (1.80) (2.70) (2.35) (2.70)
kLase 2.54 (0.71) 0.76(0.35) 14.37 (2.06) 26.87 (2.52)
Gslope 4.07 (1.28) 6.44(1.82) 9.92(1.65) 3.02(0.95)
ksiope 0.04 (0.09) 0.26(0.11) 0.43 (0.55) -3.68 (1.48)
x,,f 1.63 (1.59) 2.01 (1.84) 2.50(0.87) 0.66(0.49)
ref 2  2.60 (1.27) 2.20 (.55) 1.67 (0.03) -0.85 (0.02)
Random effects Varia n ce Variance Variance Variance
o81,. 42.51 49.57 38.28 13.79
2.j (78.57 68.8  35.03 24.08
Log.Likelihood 9166.3 9097 9291 9662.2
MSE 338.5 318.6 375.8 538.0
AIC 18355 18217 18605 19346
BIC 18417 18279 18667 19409
Table 5.22: The PU mixed-effect model parameter estimation for each emotion condition
When e(t) = 1 (very confident), AG(t) = AGbase + AGslope and ALWt)= ALbase ± ALslope.-
Also, AG(t) and ALMt should be always positive. Note that AGbase and ALbase should be
positive values, but that AGslope and ALslope may be either positive or negative.
NLMEFIT returns the estimated random effects 3 1,j and 6 2,j for each respondent j 1 to
21 as well as the variances varQJi,j) and var(6 2,j). Thus, the reference points each respondent
employed during two tasks can be inferred: Xrefl1j =X-ref I + Jj and Xref 2j = Xtref 2 ± 6 2,j -
Two reference points inferred from the PU mixed-effect model will be applied to deter-
mine respondents' actually used PU frames (gain or loss frame for prediction) for each task
and to reveal the influences of the PU frames on their risk attitudes and choices. Note that
the PU frame for each task may be different from the EU frame or the frame given by the
experimenter for that task.
The t-tests (tA-B = (MeanA - MeanB)/ SEA + SE 2) comparing each parameter be-
tween any two emotion conditions revealed the following:
et-tests comparing the parameter a (curvature in the face of gains):
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Neutral (0.64) > Economic Fear (0.39), Anger (0.34), Fear (0.22) ps < .05
" t-tests comparing the parameter b (curvature in the face of losses):
Anger (1.40) > Neutral (0.99) > Fear (0.40) > Economic Fear (0.03) ps < .01
* t-tests comparing the parameter AGbase (sensitivity base in the face of gains):
Fear (16.06), Economic Fear (13.32) > Neutral (5.92) ps < .05
Fear (16.06) > Anger (10.16) p < .05
" t-tests comparing the parameter ALbase (sensitivity base in the face of losses):
Economic Fear (26.87) > Fear (14.37) > Neutral (2.54) > Anger (0.76) ps < .05
" t-tests comparing the parameter AGslope (sensitivity slope in the face of gains):
Fear (9.92) > Neutral (4.07) > Economic Fear (3.02) ps < .01
Anger (6.44) > Economic Fear (3.02) p < .05
" t-tests comparing the parameter ALslope (sensitivity slope in the face of losses):
Anger (0.26), Neutral (0.04), Fear (-0.43) > Economic Fear (-3.68) ps < .05
* t-tests comparing AG(e(t) = 0) = AGbase -AGslope (not at all confident) with AG(e
1) = AGbase + AGslope (very confident) in the PU gain frame:
Neutral (1.85 vs. 9.99) p < .01
Anger (3.72 vs. 16.60) p < .01
Fear (6.14 vs. 25.98) p < .01
Economic Fear (10.30 vs. 16.34) p = .07
* t-tests comparing AL(et) = 0) = ALbase - ALslope (not at all confident) with AL (e M
1) = ALbase ± ALsiope (very confident) in the PU loss frame:
Economic Fear (30.55 vs. 23.19) p < .05
Note: ALslope(= -3.68) < 0 for the economic fear condition
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First, the parameter a (curvature in the face of gains) was significantly greater (closer to
linear) in the neutral condition than in the other negative-emotion (anger, fear, economic
fear) conditions, explaining that neutral respondents were more risk seeking in face of
potential gains (i.e., in the PU gain frame).
Second, the parameter b (curvature in the face of losses) was significantly greater in the
anger condition (= 1.40 > 1) than in the dition (= 0.99), explaining that angry respondents
were more risk averse in face of potential losses (i.e., in the PU loss frame).
Third, the parameter b was significantly smaller in the fear (= 0.4) and economic fear
(= 0.03) conditions than in the neutral condition (= 0.99), explaining that fearful and
economically fearful respondents were more risk seeking in face of potential losses (i.e., in
the PU loss frame).
Fourth, t-tests comparing AG(et) = 0) = AGbase - AGslope (not at all confident) with
AG(et) = 1) = AGbase - AGslope (very confident) in the PU gain frame revealed that respon-
dents' confidence significantly influenced their sensitivity to predicted gains. In all emotion
conditions, when respondents were very confident in the task, they tended to be more sen-
sitive to potential gains. But with lower confidence, they were less sensitive to potential
gains.
Note that the higher sensitivity to potential gains under higher confidence is very likely
to facilitate respondents' optimal decision making under uncertainty. Also, this result is
consistent with our hypothesis H5.
Fifth, t-tests comparing AL(e(t) = 0) = ALbase - ALslope (not at all confident) with
AL(e(t) = 1) = ALbase - ALslope (very confident) in the loss PU frame revealed that respon-
dents' confidence did not significantly influence their sensitivity to predicted losses, except
in the economic fear condition. Interestingly, in the economic fear condition, ALslope= -
3.68 was negative; thus, higher confidence reduced the sensitivity to predicted losses. The
fear condition also had a negative ALsIope= -0.43 while the angry condition had a positive
ALslope= 0.26, but these two conditions did not show t-test significance.
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5.3.2 Comparing different models for the PU data fit
Similarly to the model comparison for the EU data fit (Section 5.2.2), different models
were compared to fit the self-reported PU data in terms of the BIC (Bayesian Information
Criterion). It turned out that the M5 model (on which the dissertation focuses) was the
best in terms of the BIC for PU just as it was for EU.
5.3.3 The domain, the PU frame and the emotion condition influence the
probability of choosing the risky option
There were a main effect of the domain type (Mdomaini = 38% vs. Mdomain2 = 64%;
F(1,167) = 67.2, p < .001), a main effect of the PU frame type (Mgain = 47% vs. MiosS =
55%; F(1,167) = 5.33, p < .05) (supporting H7-1) and a marginal main effect of the emotion
condition (F(3,167) = 2.49, p = .06) on the probability of choosing the risky option. Also,
there was a significant interaction between the PU frame type and the emotion condition
(F(3,167) = 3.37, p < .05).
Figure 5-15: The main effect of the PU frame on the probability of selecting the risky
option. Note that error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
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Pr(option=risky)
gain PU frame
.. .... ......... #WK- .. . .......
loss PU frame
Figure 5-16: The interaction effect of the domain and the PU frame on the probability of
selecting the risky option. Note that error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
Figure 5-17:
selecting the
The interaction effect of the emotion and the PU frame on the probability of
risky option. Note that error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
The probability of choosing the risky option in the PU gain frame
When respondents employed the PU gain frame (i.e., viewing the expected outcomes of
the safe option as gains), there were a main effect of the domain type (Mdomainl = 33%
vs. Mdomain2 = 61%; F(1,80) = 26.3, p < .001), a marginal main effect of the emotion
condition (F(3,80) = 2.28, p = .08) on the probability of choosing the risky option but
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Neutral Anger Fear Econ Fear
Gain PU frame Loss PU frame
Neutral 45% (N=18) 59% (N=24)
T(40)= -1.91, p < .05
Anger 41% (N=21) 50% (N=21)
T(40) = -1.21, NS
Fear 35% (N=18) 61% (N=24)
T(40)= -4.20, p < .001
Economic 45% (N=24) 64% (N=18
Fear T(40) = -2.30, p < .05
Table 5.23: Comparing the probability of selecting the risky option for gain and PU loss
frames on each emotion condition (pooling over two domains)
Pr(option=risky) in the loss PU frame
-4-Domain 1
+Domain 2
Neutral Anger Fear Econ Fear
(a) Loss PU frame
Figure 5-18: The interaction effect of the emotion
selecting the risky option for each PU frame (gain
standard errors of the mean.
(b) Gain PU frame
and the domain on the probability of
or loss). Note that error bars indicate
no significant interaction between the domain type and the emotion condition (F(3,80) =
1.24, NS). Pairwise comparisons (LSD) of the estimated marginal means of each emotion
condition showed that neural respondents selected the risky option significantly more often
than fearful respondents in the PU gain frame (p < .05).
e Domain 1, PU gain frame: When respondents used the PU gain frame on the Do-
main 1 task, pairwise T-tests showed that there were no significant differences in the
probability of selecting the risky option across emotional conditions.
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Pr(option=risky) in the gain PU frame
-4-Domain 1
- Domain 2
Fear Econ FearNeutral Anger
T
I
T
* Domain 2, PU gain frame: Using the PU gain frame on the Domain 2 task, fearful
respondents selected the risky option significantly less often than neutral respondents
(M = 44% vs. 80%; T(9) = -4.43, p < .01). Also, economically fearful respondents
selected the risky option significantly less often than neutral respondents (M = 59%
vs. 80%; T(9.8) = -2.2, p < .05).
The probability of choosing the risky option in the PU loss frame
When respondents employed the PU loss frame (i.e., viewing the expected outcomes as
losses), there were main effects of the domain type (Mdomaini = 42% vs. Mdomain2 =
68%; F(1,86) = 45.1, p < .001) and the emotion condition (F(3,86) = 3.20, p < .05) on
the probability of choosing the risky option but no significant interaction between them
(F(3,86) = 1.31, NS). Pairwise comparisons (LSD) of the estimated marginal means of
each emotion condition showed that fearful and economically fearful respondents selected
the risky option significantly more often than angry respondents in the PU loss frame (ps
< .01). Also, neutral respondents selected the risky option marginally more often than
angry respondents in the PU loss frame (p = .07).
* Domain 1, PU loss frame: For the PU loss frame on the Domain 1 task, angry respon-
dents selected the risky option significantly less often than neutral respondents (M =
27% vs. 45%; T(12) = -2.55, p < .05), fearful respondents (M = 27% vs. 42%; T(15)
= -1.8, p < .05) and economically fearful respondents (M = 27% vs. 52%; T(11)=
-2.2, p < .05).
" Domain 2, PU loss frame: For the PU loss frame on the Domain 2 task, fearful
respondents selected the risky option significantly more often than neutral respondents
(M = 75% vs. 64%; T(29) = 2.07, p < .05) and angry respondents (M = 75% vs.
62%; T(26) = 2.29, p < .05).
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5.3.4 The domain, the PU frame and the emotion condition influence the
average PU difference of the risky option and the safe option (=
Average[PU(risky option)] - Average[PU(safe option)])
Note that, by this definition, when the average PU difference is positive, the average PU of
the risky option is greater than that of the safe option by the definition.
There were a main effect of the domain type (Mdomaini = -13.2 vs. Mdomain2 = 8.5;
F(1,167) = 36.5, p <.001) and a main effect of the PU frame type (Mgain = -10.6 vs. M10 ,,
= 5.9; F(1,167) = 20.9, p <.001) on the average PU difference over all trials (PUrisk -
PUsafe = Average[PU(risky option)] - Average[PU(safe option)]) (supporting H8-1). Also,
there was a marginal interaction between the domain type and the PU frame type (F(3,167)
= 3.82, p = .053).
Figure 5-19: The main effect of the PU frame on the average PU difference. Note that error
bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
The average PU difference (PUrisk - PUsafe) over all trials in the PU gain
frame
When respondents employed the PU gain frame (i.e., viewing the expected outcomes of
the safe option as gains), there were a main effect of the domain type (Mdomainl = -
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Avg[PU(risky)] - Avg[PU(safe)]
Gain PU frameLoss PU frame
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Figure 5-20: The interaction effect of the domain and the PU frame on the average PU
difference. Note that error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
Figure 5-21: The interaction effect of the emotion and the PU frame on the average PU
difference. Note that error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
24.9 vs. Mdomain2 = 3.8; F(1,80) = 24.8, p < .001) on the average PU difference (=
Average[PU(risky option)] - Average[PU(safe option)]), but no main effect of the emotion
condition (F(3,80) = .71, NS) but no significant interaction between the domain type and
the emotion condition (F(3,80) = .41, NS).
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Neutral Anger Fear Econ Fear
Gain PU frame Loss PU frame
Neutral 45% (N=18) 59% (N=24)
T(40)= -1.91, p < .05
Anger 41% (N=21) 50% (N=21)
T(40) = -1.21, NS
Fear 35% (N=18) 61% (N=24)
T(40)= -4.20, p < .001
Economic 45% (N=24 64% (N=18)
Fear T(40)= -2.30, p < .05
Table 5.24: Comparing the average PU difference (= Average[PU(risky option)] - Aver-
age[PU(safe option)]) for gain and PU loss frames on each emotion condition (pooling over
two domains)
(a) Loss PU frame (b) Gain PU frame
Figure 5-22: The interaction effect of the emotion and the domain on the average PU
difference for each PU frame (gain or loss). Note that error bars indicate standard errors
of the mean.
e Domain 1, PU gain frame: When respondents used the PU gain frame on the Do-
main 1 task, pairwise T-tests showed that there were no significant differences across
emotional conditions in terms of the average PU difference of two options.
9 Domain 2, PU gain frame: Using the PU gain frame on the Domain 2 task, fearful
respondents reported negative average PU difference significantly smaller than neutral
respondents (M = -6.4 vs. 14.4; T(9) = -2.55, p < .05).
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The average PU difference (PUrisk - PUsafe) over all trials in the PU loss
frame
When respondents employed the PU loss frame (i.e., viewing the expected outcomes of
the safe option as losses), there were a main effect of the domain type (Mdomaini = -1.5 vs.
Mdomain2 = 13.2; F(1,86) = 11.0, p < .001) and a marginal main effect of emotion condition
(F(3,86) = 2.63, p = .06) on the average PU difference (= Average[PU(risky option)] -
Average[PU(safe option)]) but no significant interaction between them (F(3,86) = .33, NS).
Pairwise comparisons (LSD) of the estimated marginal means of each emotion condition
showed that economically fearful respondents reported significantly greater average PU
difference than neutral and angry respondents in the PU loss frame (ps < .01). Also, fearful
respondents reported marginally greater average PU difference than angry respondents (p
= .07) and neutral respondents (p = .08) in the PU loss frame.
" Domain 1, PU loss frame: For the PU loss frame on the Domain 1 task, angry re-
spondents reported marginally smaller negative average PU difference (i.e., more risk
averse attitude) than fearful respondents and economically fearful respondents (ps =
.06).
" Domain 2, PU loss frame: For the PU loss frame on the Domain 1 task, fearful
respondents reported marginally greater average PU difference (i.e., more risk seeking
attitude) than neutral respondents (M = 18.8 vs. 8.7; T(29)=1.50, p = .07).
5.4 Manipulation checks
At the end of the experiment, respondents were asked to report how they felt while writing
a diary and watching each video clip (video 1, video 2, video 3). To avoid revealing our
interest in specific emotions, we included 8 affective states ("angry", "anxious", "disgusted",
"fearful", "happy", "interested", "irritated", "sad") on the form, although only 4 were of
interest. An anger factor included "anger" and "irritated" (a = .903), and a fear factor
included "anxious" and "fearful" (a = .942). Response scales ranged from 0 (do not feel
the emotion the slightest bit) to 8 (feel the emotion even more strongly than ever before).
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We averaged responses on each emotion for subsequent analyses.
There were four manipulation steps (diary, video 1, video 2, video 3). To control for
individual biases, each individual's self-reported rating on an affective state was standard-
ized using his or her average rating and standard deviation across all affective states over
all manipulation steps:
For the diary step, individual analysis of variance (ANOVAs) on self-reported experience
of anger, F(3,80) = 15.5, and fear F(3,80) = 12.1, revealed strong emotion-induction effects
(ps < .001). Post-hoc comparisons (LSD) for anger showed that the anger condition (M
= .598) induced significantly more anger than the neutral condition (M = -.379) and the
fear condition (M = -.385) (ps < .001). Post-hoc comparisons (LSD) for fear showed that
the fear condition (M = .369) induced significantly more fear than the neutral condition
(M = -. 207) and the anger condition (M = -.355) (ps < .05). The economic fear condition
induced significantly more anger and fear than the neutral condition (ps < .05). In addition,
respondents felt significantly more anger than fear in the anger condition (M = .598 vs.
-.355; T(20) = 5.228, p < .001), and significantly more fear than anger in the fear condition
(M = .369 vs. -. 385; T(20) = 5.125, p < .001). Respondents didn't feel significantly more
fear than anger in the economic fear condition, although the mean level of fear was greater
than that of anger.
Figure 5-23: manipulation check: diary
For the video 1 step, individual analysis of variance (ANOVAs) on self-reported experi-
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ence of anger, F(3,80) = 11.3, and fear F(3,80) = 15.7, revealed strong emotion-induction
effects (ps < .001). Post-hoc analysis for anger showed that the anger condition (M =
.551) induced significantly more anger than the neutral condition (M = -.411) and the fear
condition (M = -.255) (ps < .001). Post-hoc analysis for fear showed that the fear condition
(M = .787) induced significantly more fear than the neutral condition (M = -.368) and the
anger condition (M = -.138) (ps < .001). The economic fear condition induced significantly
more anger (ps < .05) and fear (ps < .001) than the neutral condition. In addition, respon-
dents felt significantly more anger than fear in the anger condition (M = .551 vs. -. 138;
T(20) = 4.423, p < .001), and significantly more fear than anger in the fear condition (M
= .787 vs. -.255; T(20) = 4.688, p < .001). Respondents didn't feel significantly more fear
than anger in the economic condition, although the mean level of fear was greater than that
of anger.
Manipulation Check (Video 1)
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Figure 5-24: manipulation check: videol
For the diary and video 1 steps overall, individual analysis of variance (ANOVAs) on
self-reported experience of anger, F(3,80) = 21.7, and fear F(3,80) = 21.2, revealed strong
emotion-induction effects (ps < .001). Post-hoc analysis for anger showed that the anger
condition (M = .575) induced significantly more anger than the neutral condition (M = -
.395) and the fear condition (M = -.320) (ps < .001). Post-hoc analysis for fear showed that
the fear condition (M = .578) induced significantly more fear than the neutral condition
(M = -.287) and the anger condition (M = -.247) (ps < .001). The economic fear condition
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induced significantly more anger (ps < .005) and fear (ps < .001) than the neutral condition.
In addition, respondents felt significantly more anger than fear in the anger condition (M
= .575 vs. -.247; T(20) = 6.773, p < .001), and significantly more fear than anger in the
fear condition (M = .578 vs. -.320; T(20) = 5.876, p < .001). Respondents didn't feel
significantly more fear than anger in the economic condition, although the mean level of
fear was greater than that of anger.
Manipulation Check (Diary & Video 1)
1 *
0' '-anger
-0.5 
-fear
-1
neutral anger fear econ fear
Figure 5-25: manipulation check: diary and videol
For the video 2 step, individual analysis of variance (ANOVAs) on self-reported expe-
rience of anger, F(3,80) = 22.7 (p < .001), and fear F(3,80) = 4.80 (p < .005), revealed
strong emotion-induction effects. Post-hoc analysis for anger showed that the anger condi-
tion (M = .818) induced significantly more anger than the neutral condition (M = -.382)
and the fear condition (M = -.389) (ps < .001). Post-hoc analysis for fear showed that the
fear condition (M = .487) induced significantly more fear than the neutral condition (M
= -.231, p < .001). The economic condition induced significantly more anger (p < .05) and
fear (p < .005) than the neutral condition. In addition, respondents felt significantly more
anger than fear in the anger condition (M = .818 vs. .262; T(20) = 2.866, p < .01), and
significantly more fear than anger in the fear condition (M = .487 vs. -.389; T(20) = 5.207,
p < .001). Respondents felt more fear than anger in the economic condition (M = .442 vs.
.026; T(20) = 1.99, p = .06).
For the video 3 step, individual analysis of variance (ANOVAs) on self-reported expe-
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Figure 5-26: manipulation check: video2
rience of anger, F(3,80) = 7.390 (p < .001), and fear F(3,80) = 8.056 (p < .001), revealed
strong emotion-induction effects. Post-hoc analysis for anger showed that the anger condi-
tion (M = .474) induced significantly more anger than the neutral condition (M = -.357)
and the fear condition (M = -.410) (ps < .001). Post-hoc analysis for fear showed that the
fear condition (M = .051) induced significantly more fear than the neutral condition (M
= -.429) and the anger condition (M = -.326) (ps < .05). The economic condition induced
significantly more fear (p < .001) than the neutral condition. In addition, respondents felt
significantly more anger than fear in the anger condition (M = .474 vs. -.326; T(20) =
4.780, p < .001), and significantly more fear than anger in the fear condition (M = .051
vs. -.410; T(20) = 2.286, p < .05). Respondents felt more fear than anger in the economic
condition (M = .377 vs. -.094; T(20) = 2.03, p = .06).
Overall, it appears that the protocol of repeatably eliciting a state of fear or of anger
worked well for the pure anger and pure fear states, for all videos and diary elicitors. The
economic fear condition tended to elicit both fear and anger, although more fear than anger.
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Figure 5-27: manipulation check: video3
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Discussion
This dissertation presented a new computational perspective on the role of subjective ex-
perience and affective prediction in human decision making and learning, drawing on the
findings in diverse areas of decision science as behavioral economics, neuroeconomics, psy-
chology and machine learning.
6.1 Summary
In summary, the dissertation
" Defined subjective discriminability. Showed both computationally and empirically
that bigger subjective discriminability leads to more optimal decisions.
" Characterized how subjective and affective influences may help or harm human deci-
sion making depending on domains, frames, emotions and their interactions.
" Constructed a new model combining measures to evaluate risk preferences: behavioral
choices, self-reported experience (subjective discriminability), self-reported predicted
utility (predicted-utility difference), self-reported confidence.
" Introduced two different kinds of subjective value functions (experienced-utility (EU)
function and predicted-utility (PU) function) whose parameters change with emotions
and provided a method to infer PU and EU functions from self-reported EU and PU
data in each emotion condition.
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" Showed how to compute reference points (EU frame, PU frame) for each of the EU
and PU functions.
" Analyzed risk attitudes based on EU and PU frames as well as on the frame given by
experimenter.
" Observed how emotions influence the reference point selection (framing).
" Discovered the frame and emotion effects (main and interaction effects) in decision
making under uncertainty.
" Measured how experience, gender and emotion influence confidence and prediction.
" Introduced the confidence-dependent predicted utility function.
" Presented a new emotion-refresher method.
" Defined the value of risk (VOR).
" Characterized how domain, frame, emotion influence decision making: Negative emo-
tions in face of gains (more risk-averse), Anger in face of losses (more risk-averse),
Fear and Economic fear in face of losses (more risk-seeking).
" Showed how human behavior can be described by emotion-shaped EU and PU func-
tions.
" Provided a theory that better explain/simulate human behavior under uncertainty,
frames and emotions.
6.2 Simulations and Empirical Results
Subjective and affective elements are well-known to influence human learning and decision
making. The research for exploring and exploiting these important influences in computa-
tional learning theory, however, is still in its early stage. This section presents a new model
combining subjective and affective influences within the RL and MDP framework. The
affective-congitive (AC) model involves two different modes: the experience-based mode and
170
the prediction-based mode. To model the total-experienced utility from past experiences,
the AC model introduces a prospect theory (PT)-based parameterized "experienced-utility
function". In order to model affective-subjective characteristics of prediction-based mode,
the AC model employs a prospect theory (PT)-based parameterized "predicted-utility func-
tion". It also models one specific kind of affective state, called the "goal-achieving (confi-
dence) state," which relates to the sense of confidence in the current decision-making policy.
In economics theory, the PT value function is fixed, but it is hypothesized that the affective
state influences the shape of the predicted-utility function (i.e., sensitivities to the expected
gains and losses). An RL-based computational framework that implements this hypothesis
automatically regulates trade-offs between exploration and exploitation while beating the
performance of five other well-known model-free learning algorithms.
The AC model includes both a subjective component (PT value function) and a compo-
nent that captures part of how affective states may influence decision making. It is further
hypothesized that the latter component can influence the former to give performance that
is closer to human behavior. Furthermore, while PT theory has been developed in eco-
nomics for domains with known outcome distributions, this new model enables PT theory
to be used for unknown and changing stochastic outcome distributions. Finally, it is known
that in the face of multiple unknown nonstationary distributions of outcomes, balancing
the trade-offs between exploration and exploitation is very critical; this new model achieves
this balanced trade-off in an automatic and internally-regulated way.
Human decision-making experiments were conducted to empirically infer how people
adjust the parameters (i.e., risk attitude and reference point) of their experienced-utility
and predicted-utility functions in sequential decision-making situations involving incidental
affective states (e.g., anger, fear) and task-related affects (e.g., confidence). Computational
simulations confirmed that the location of the reference point was very critical in optimal
decision making. The same framing effects were observed in human behavioral experiments.
Barberis et al. [2] showed how previous outcomes could influence the risky choice in
terms of the slope change of a piecewise-linear approximation to the traditional PT function.
They assume that previous gains decrease the sensitivity to potential losses and previous
losses increase the sensitivity to potential losses. This is different from the assumption of
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the confidence-based predicted-utility (PU) function in the AC model. The AC model hy-
pothesized that previous gains lead to higher confidence, which increases the PU function's
sensitivities to both estimated gains and losses. The higher sensitivity then increases the
discriminability (PU difference) between two options, facilitating the exploitative choice in
the next trial. Previous losses, however, lead to lower confidence, which decreases the PU
function's sensitivities to both estimated gains and losses. The lower sensitivity then de-
creases the discriminability (PU difference) between two options, facilitating the exploratory
choice in the next trial. The confidence-based hypothesis helped the AC model control the
trade-offs between exploration and exploitation in simulations. The empirical evaluations
from human experiments showed that previous gains (losses) led to higher (lower) confi-
dence, significantly increasing (decreasing) the sensitivity to estimated gains, respectively.
There was, however, no significant changes on the sensitivity to estimated losses.
People evaluate their outcome relative to their reference point. Although I assumed that
the reference point is fixed over trials during a task for the analysis, the reference point may
change over trials during a task. It will be very interesting to investigate how people change
their reference point over trials in a stationary or an unpredictable dynamic multi-armed
bandit tasks. Also, it will be worthwhile to infer the optimal number of trials for initial
exploration and see how the number is related to their selection of the reference point.
The affective sensor data (facial valence and skin conductance arousal) measured during
the experiment will be analyzed in the future and might be used as an objective measure
of the experienced utility. It will be interesting to see if there are any differences between
the self-reported experienced-utility and the sensor-measured experienced-utility (e.g., in
a bandit task involving repetitive trials, the sensor-measured implicit utility might be an
earlier indicator of their liking/disliking of a certain choice than the self-reported explicit
utility).
Regarding the emotion manipulation in human experiments, the same video clips were
used in two different steps of emotion manipulation (the first and the third emotion-
manipulation steps in neutral, anger and fear conditions) to refresh people's emotion con-
dition. The manipulation check through the after-the-test questionnaire confirmed that the
new emotion-refresher method successfully induced similar levels of emotion responses and
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refreshed the emotion condition.
Figure 5-10 presents the proposed model on the interactions of gender, emotion, expe-
rience, confidence, prediction and exploitative/exploratory decisions. Gender and emotion
(e.g., incidental fear) may influence confidence. Good (bad) experience leads to high (low)
confidence. Also, then, high (low) confidence leads to high (low) predicted-utility difference
and more exploitative (exploratory) choice behavior. That is, when respondents have a
relatively good experience, they get more confident in the task, compared to when they
have a relatively bad experience. When respondents are more confident in the task, they
tend to predict that one option is much better than the other, compared to when they are
less confident. When respondents tend to predict that one option is better than the other,
they are more likely to select the better option (= exploitative choice).
Interestingly, female respondents in the fear condition reported significantly lower aver-
age confidence than male respondents in that condition. Fearful female respondents tended
to feel less confident even with previous (relatively) higher experienced utility, possibly due
to the influence of the existing incidental fearful emotion. Moreover, since lower confidence
led to lower predicted-utility (PU) difference and lower PU difference led to more random-
ized choice behavior, fearful female respondents tended to have more exploratory trials (i.e,
more randomized choices) than fearful male respondents. In other words, fearful female
respondents selected fewer exploitative choices (i.e., fewer selections of the option with the
current-estimated greatest predicted utility) than fearful male respondents.
Consider a two-armed bandit task (such as Domain 1 or Domain 2) in which each
option involves a different outcome variance. For reinforcement-learning algorithms with
an exploration strategy such as the value of information (VOI), the option with a greater
outcome variance is chosen (or explored) more often than the one with a smaller uncertainty.
This sort of exploration strategy might be linked to curiosity-dependent human behavior
(e.g., curiosity for an option may be modeled by the entropy of the posterior outcome
distribution).
Also, some well-known economic models of choice such as the Markowitz-Tobin portfolio
selection model make a trade-off between mean (p.) and outcome variance (o-) in computing
the expected utility of an option [48]: expected utility (X) = px - ao2 where X denotes a
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random outcome variable of the option and a (> 0) is the risk-aversion coefficient. Thus,
as the outcome variance of an option becomes greater, the choice preference for that option
becomes lower.
In contrast, I hypothesize in the AC model that human decision behaviors are influenced
not only by the attitude to maximize long-run average outcome, but also by the risk attitude
associated with the selected reference point.
* Under the gain frame, people would not prefer the option with a high outcome variance
to its certainty equivalent. As the outcome variance of an option becomes greater,
people tend to show less preference for that option (risk aversion in the gain frame).
People are risk averse when it comes to gains.
" Under the loss frame, people would prefer the option with a high outcome variance
to its certainty equivalent. As the outcome variance becomes greater, people tend to
show more preference for that option (risk seeking in the loss frame). People are more
willing to gamble when it comes to losses.
Compared with the value of information (VOI), I will conceptualize the value of risk
(VOR) regarding the AC model. VOR measures the risk attitude for a stochastic outcome
distribution. The VOR for an outcome distribution can be defined as the difference between
the subjective value of the outcome distribution (X) and that of its certainty-equivalent
(p2): VOR = f(X)-f(p) where the subjective value function f can be either the predicted-
utility (PU) function or the experienced-utility (EU) function. Note that the value of f(X)
depends not only on px and o- but also on the reference point selection, and that VOR < 0
(risk aversion) in the gain frame and VOR > 0 (risk seeking) in the loss frame. That is,
the VOR is not absolute, but relative to the location of the reference point. The analysis
results of human experiments on peoples risk attitudes supported the hypothesis that the
VOR critically influences respondents' choice behavior. That is, the VOR explains framing
effects.
Even for the same outcome distribution, people would have different levels of risk
attitudes according to their information on outcome distributions or their availability of
sampling experiences. Shafir et al. [52] have suggested that perceptual accuracy and dis-
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criminability in experience-based decisions influence risk-taking behavior. That is, under
the gain frame, the risk-averse tendency (certainty effect, people's tendency to select the
safer of two prospects) emerges when it is difficult to discriminate between the different
outcomes (e.g., hard-to-assess outcomes in the form of graphical dots), whereas the risk-
averse tendency disappears when the discrimination is easy (e.g., easy-to-assess outcomes
in the form of digital numbers). Althoug they focused on the perceptual discriminability
involving different forms of outcomes, it would be very interesting to examine how the
subjective discriminability as defined in this dissertation influences peoples risk attitudes
in their experience-based decision behavior. For instance, in experience-based decisions,
people might show evident risk attitudes for low-discriminability cases, but might not show
risk attitudes for high-discriminability cases. In other words, in high-discriminability cases,
it might be too easy for people to judge which option is better than the other, thus the
choices might not be critically influenced by risk attitudes.
The incidental emotion state can influence the risk attitude or the parameter values
of the PT-based experienced-utility and predicted-utility functions. I conducted human
two-armed bandit experiments to infer peoples predicted utility and experienced utility
functions under different incidental emotion states. My hypotheses on these functions with
fear and anger in Section 2.5.7 were based on Lerner and Keltner's studies [32, 34, 35]. I
hypothesized that the risk attitudes found in PT description-based predictions would appear
in experience-based decisions. In my experiment results, however, there were significant
interactions between framing and emotion. In the loss frame, anger made people more risk
averse and fear made people more risk seeking. This seems to go against a wide range of
findings.
At first this seems to go aganist the existing findings; however, my conditions are actually
different in an important way. For example, Lerner and Keltner's paper [34] focuses on
how dispositional anger and fear influence people's prediction-based risk attitude (one-shot
prediction such as in the prospect theory experiments) but my dissertation focuses on how
incidental anger and fear influence sequential adaptive decisions under uncertainty in which
the role of experience is very critical [21, 44, 23]. The experience-based learning situations
are more uncertain and arousing than the one-shot prediction situation, due to the lack of
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information (we only told them one option has a higher mean than the other). Thus, this
could make my results differ from others who examined the influences of anger and fear
without arousal and without sequential experiences.
The experienced-utility (EU) analysis on respondents' self-reported EU data in Figure
5-7 (d) confirms that
" Angry respondents tended to be less sensitive to relatively small experienced losses
(e.g., moderate losses from the safe option) and very sensitive to relatively large
experienced losses (e.g., very big losses from the risky option), compared to fearful
respondents. This tendency made angry respondents more risk averse after several
loss experiences.
* Fearful respondents tended to be more sensitive to relatively small experienced losses,
compared to angry respondents. Also, due to this greater sensitivity to relatively small
experienced losses, fearful respondents may have felt very bad for moderate losses from
the safe option. This eventually contributed to a more risk-seeking attitude of fearful
respondents after several loss experiences.
One possible explanation for the anger shaping we are seeing may be that anger is often
present with some amount of pain - usually psychological or physical (e.g. somebody hits
you or irritates you repeatedly and your quite normal reaction is anger). Here the "some
amount of pain" includes a small financial loss, and so you are not that sensitive to it while
angry. But as you receive larger losses, you then begin to react much more strongly than
you would in a neutral state - (enhanced sensitivity to losses). We see this shape in the
responses we measured in all the cases where there was anger.
The same tendency was found more clearly from the self-reported predicted-utility (PU)
data analysis. The analysis of self-reported predicted-utility (PU) data in Figure 5-13 (d)
confirms that
e The PU function shape in the angry condition (greater b parameter and smaller ALbase
parameter) implies that angry respondents predicted lower displeasure for relatively
small losses (e.g., outcomes from the safe option) and greater displeasure for relatively
176
greater losses (e.g., very bad losses from the risky option), compared to neutral and
fearful respondents.
e The PU function shape in the fear condition (smaller b parameter and greater ALbase
parameter) implies that fearful respondents were very sensitive to potential small
losses (e.g., outcomes from the safe option). This leads to more risk seeking in face of
potential losses.
These findings from the self-reported PU data analysis are consistent with those from
the self-reported EU data analysis. Angry people tended to be less sensitive to potential
small losses (e.g., moderate losses from the safe option) and very sensitive to potential big
losses (e.g., big losses from the risky option), whereas fearful people tended to be very
sensitive to even potential small losses. These prediction tendencies in the face of likely
losses contributed to a more risk-averse attitude of angry respondents (selecting the safe
option more often) and a more risk-seeking attitude of fearful respondents (selecting the
risky option more often).
Note that the findings from the cognitive measures (self-reported EU measure in Section
5.2.3 and PU measure in Section 5.3.4) were consistent with those from actually observed
behavioral choice measure (i.e., probability of choosing the safe vs. risky options during the
tasks) in Section 5.3.3.
The AC model can be effectively applied to a non-human system that involves the affect-
like state and is affected by that state. For instance, the stock market has market sentiment,
"the intuitive feeling of the investment community regarding the expected movement of the
stock market" (Wikipedia, 2008). A bullish or bearish market sentiment would be indicated
by expected rising or falling prices, respectively. When a stock market sentiment is bullish or
bearish, investors sensitive to the market sentiment would be more risk-seeking or more risk-
averse, respectively. These decision behaviors could be described by the change of investors
predicted-utility function influenced by the market sentiment. Also, investors should have
an appropriate level of sensitivity to market sentiment for their best investment decisions.
Another interesting phenomenon in the stock market is associated with "disposition effect".
This refers to the tendency of investors to sell winning stocks, while holding onto losing
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stocks. When the stock price is increasing, investors are often eager to realize gains. Also,
they often become too anxious (economically fearful) and predict that the stock price would
drop soon. That is, they tend to view the current investment in terms of gain framing and
be too risk-averse. However, when the stock price is decreasing, investors are often reluctant
to realize losses. They are likely to view the current investment in terms of loss framing
and more anxiety in loss framing will increase the risk-seeking tendency.
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Appendix A
Experienced-utility (EU) function
in each emotion condition
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Figure A-1: Experienced-utility (EU) function in the
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Figure A-2: Experienced-utility (EU) function with the inferred EU reference point (shown
by the magenta line) for each respondent in the neutral condition on Domain 1. The points
show self-reported EUs: red circle (safe option) and blue circle (risky option). Note that
the EU reference point is varied over respondents on Domain 1.
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Figure A-3: Experienced-utility (EU) function with the inferred EU reference point (shown
by the magenta line) for each respondent in the neutral condition on Domain 2. The points
show self-reported EUs: red diamond (safe option) and blue diamond (risky option). Note
that the EU reference point is varied over respondents on Domain 2.
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Figure A-4: Experienced-utility (EU) function in the anger condition (pooling over respon-
dents). The points show self-reported EUs: red circle (safe option) and blue circle (risky
option) on Domain 1, red diamond (safe option) and blue diamond (risky option) on Domain
2.
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Figure A-5: Experienced-utility (EU) function with the inferred EU reference point (shown
by the magenta line) for each respondent in the anger condition on Domain 1. The points
show self-reported EUs: red circle (safe option) and blue circle (risky option). Note that
the EU reference point is varied over respondents on Domain 1.
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Figure A-6: Experienced-utility (EU) function with the inferred EU reference point (shown
by the magenta line) for each respondent in the anger condition on Domain 2. The points
show self-reported EUs: red diamond (safe option) and blue diamond (risky option). Note
that the EU reference point is varied over respondents on Domain 2.
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Figure A-7: Experienced-utility (EU) function in the fear condition (pooling over respon-
dents). The points show self-reported EUs: red circle (safe option) and blue circle (risky
option) on Domain 1, red diamond (safe option) and blue diamond (risky option) on Domain
2.
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Figure A-8: Experienced-utility (EU) function with the inferred EU reference point (shown
by the magenta line) for each respondent in the fear condition on Domain 1. The points
show self-reported EUs: red circle (safe option) and blue circle (risky option). Note that
the EU reference point is varied over respondents on Domain 1.
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Figure A-9: Experienced-utility (EU) function with the inferred EU reference point (shown
by the magenta line) for each respondent in the fear condition on Domain 2. The points
show self-reported EUs: red diamond (safe option) and blue diamond (risky option). Note
that the EU reference point is varied over respondents on Domain 2.
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Figure A-10: Experienced-utility (EU) function in the economic fear condition (pooling over
respondents). The points show self-reported EUs: red circle (safe option) and blue circle
(risky option) on Domain 1, red diamond (safe option) and blue diamond (risky option) on
Domain 2.
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Figure A-11: Experienced-utility (EU) function with the inferred EU reference point (shown
by the magenta line) for each respondent in the economic fear condition on Domain 1. The
points show self-reported EUs: red circle (safe option) and blue circle (risky option). Note
that the EU reference point is varied over respondents on Domain 1.
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Figure A-12: Experienced-utility (EU) function with the inferred EU reference point (shown
by the magenta line) for each respondent in the economic fear condition on Domain 2. The
points show self-reported EUs: red diamond (safe option) and blue diamond (risky option).
Note that the EU reference point is varied over respondents on Domain 2.
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Appendix B
Inferring experienced-utility
functions
Let v(t) denote the respondents' self-reported experienced utility for the obtained outcome
x(t) on trial t during a task. Note that self-reported experienced-utility responses were
converted to a scale v(t) from -50 (=very displeased) to 50 (=very pleased). In each emotion
condition, there were 21 respondents conducting two decision tasks (Domain 1 and Domain
2).
The following assumptions were made to infer the experienced-utility function from the
experienced-utility responses of respondents in an emotion condition.
1. The self-reported experienced utility v(t) on trial t during a task depends on the
obtained outcome x(t), the reference point Xref and the shape parameters (a, b, AG, AL)
of the experienced-utility function
fEu(x(t) Ia, b, AG, AL, Xref) AG (x(t) - Xef)a, x(t) Xref
-AL (Xref - X(t))b, x(t) < Xref
2. Respondents in the same emotion condition employ the common fixed shape param-
eters (a, b, AG, AL) of the experienced-utility function, which were also fixed across
tasks (Domain 1 and Domain 2).
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3. The reference point Xref is varied among respondents. Also, xref is fixed within a
task, but varied between tasks.
For the mixed-effect model to infer the experienced-utility function of each emotion
condition, the shape parameters were considered fixed effects and the reference-point pa-
rameters (of two domains) were random effects.
xij(t): obtained outcome on trial t during the task of domain i( = 1,2) for respondent j
vij(t): self-reported experienced-utility on trial t during the task of domain i (= 1,2) for
respondent j (-50 < vi,j(t) < 50)
vi,j(t): estimated experienced-utility
Xref i,j: reference point during the task of domain i (= 1,2) for respondent j
vi~j(t) = fEu(xij(t) a, b, AG, AL, iXref1,j, Xref2,j) =
AG(Xijt) - Xref i,j)a, Xij(t) Xref i,j
-AL (Xref i,j - Xi,(t))b, xijt) < Xref i,j
xj(t) Xw(t) 
-m,j
mi,j = bet money (paid (+) / received (-)) during the task of domain i (= 1,2) for respon-
dent j
Xrefl,j =ref1 + 1,j
Xref2,j = Xref2 + 62,j
The model is:
fixed effects # = (a, b, AG, AL, Xref 1Z Xref2)
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random effects og = (0, 0, 0, 0, 6 1,j, 6 2,j)
j= /3+ j = (a, b, AG, AL, Xref1 ± 6 1,j, Zref2 + 6 2,j) = (a, b, AG, AL, Xref1,j, iref2,j)
vij(t) = vi,j (t) + sij(t) = fEU(Xi,j (t) Ij) + sij M
og ~ N(0, T) where T = diag(0, 0, 0, 0, var(Ji,j), var(62,j))
i~j(t) ~ N(0, -2 ).
The model was fitted with data using NLMEFIT (nonlinear mixed-effects estimation) in the
MATLAB Statistics Toolbox. NLMEFIT fits the model by maximizing an approximation
to the marginal likelihood, i.e., with the random effects integrated out, and assumes that:
a) the random effects are multivariate normally distributed, and independent between
groups, and
b) the observation errors are independent, identically normally distributed, and inde-
pendent of the random effects.
By default, NLMEFIT fits a model where each model parameter is the sum of a cor-
responding fixed and random effect, and the covariance matrix of the random effects is
diagonal, i.e., uncorrelated random effects.
Algorithm
In order to estimate the parameters of a nonlinear mixed effects model, we would like to
choose the parameter values that maximize a likelihood function. These values are called
the maximum likelihood estimates. The likelihood function can be written in the form
p(D13, o.2 , p) = p(DI/, j, o.2) p(JIT) do
where
D is the response data,
# is the vector of population coefficients,
a.2 is the residual variance,
qI is the covariance matrix for the random effects,
6 is the set of unobserved random effects.
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Each p( function on the right-hand-side is a normal (Gaussian) likelihood function that
may depend on covariates.
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Appendix C
Inferring predicted-utility
functions
The self-reported predicted utility responses were linearly converted to a scale from -50 =
very displeased to 50 = very pleased. Let u(tlk) denote the converted measure of self-
reported predicted utility response of option k (=1,2) on trial t during a task. Also, the
self-reported confidence response on trial t was converted to a scale from -50 = not at all
confident to 50 = very confident. Let q(t) denote the converted measure of self-reported
confidence response on trial t.
In each emotion condition, there were total 21 respondents conducting two decision tasks
(Domain 1 and Domain 2).
The following model assumptions were made to infer the predicted-utility function from
the predicted-utility responses of respondents in an emotion condition.
1. Prediction can be viewed as mapping the current-estimated outcome distribution into
the predicted-utility distribution through the predicted-utility function whose shape
depends on the current emotion state and confidence state. Note that the shape of
the predicted-utility function in an experiment (emotion) condition is assumed to be
trial-dependent due to the confidence state that may change over trials.
2. The self-reported predicted utility u(tlk) of option k on trial t can be modeled by the
average of the predicted-utility distribution.
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3. The estimated outcome distribution of option k on trial t can be modeled by the set of
previous outcomes obtained from selections of option k on previous trials {X(T) c(r) =
k, T = 1 to t}, where c(r) and X(T) are the selected option and the obtained outcome
from that selection on trial r (< t).
4. The predicted-utility distribution of option k on trial t can be modeled by the predicted-
utility samples {y(T)|c(r) = k, r- 1 to t} or the mapping of the set of previous
outcomes of option k ({x(T)|c(T) = k, r = 1 to t}) through the current shape of the
predicted-utility function.
5. The predicted-utility sample y(r) corresponding to x(T) (r=1 to t) is computed using
the predicted utility function:
fpU (x(T)|a, b, AG (T),AL (T), Xref) = y() A (T) (XT) - Xref)a, XT) Xrf
-AL (T) (Xref - X(T))b, X(T) < Xref
Note that sensitivity parameters AG (t) and AL (t) depend on the confidence measure-
ment q(t). Thus, y(r) depends on the reference point Xref and the shape parameters
(a, b, AG(t), AL(t)) of the predicted utility function.
6. Sensitivity parameters AG(t) and AL(t) are functions of the confidence state variable
e(t) ranging from 0 (= not at all confident) to 1 (= very confident):
e(t) = 1+exp(-sq(t)) where K = 0.1
AG(t) = AG(e(t)) = AGbase + AGslope(2 e(t) - 1)
AL(t) = AL (et)) = ALbase - ALslope(2e(t) - 1)
When e(t) = 0.5 (neutral confident), AG(t) = AGbase and AL(t) = ALbase.
When e(t) = 0 (not at all confident), AG(t) = AGbase - AGslope and AL(t) = ALbase -
ALslope-
When e(t) = 1 (very confident), AG(t) = AGbase + AGslope and AL (t) = ALbase - ALsiope-
Also, AG(t) and AL(t) should be always positive. Note that AGbase and ALbase should
be positive values, but that AGslope and ALslope may be either positive or negative.
7. The predicted utility of option k, denoted as ft(tlk), is modeled by the average of
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predicted-utility samples of option k (i.e., samples when c(r) = k for r = 1 to t):
ft(tlk) = Er=1:t[y(r)c(r) = k].
8. Respondents in the same emotion condition employ the common fixed shape param-
eters (a, b, AGbase, ALbase, AGslope, ALslope) of the predicted-utility function, which were
also fixed across tasks (Domain 1 and Domain 2).
9. The reference point Xref was varied among respondents. Also, Xref was fixed within a
task, but varied between tasks. Note that, for each task, it is assumed that the refer-
ence point of the predicted-utility function is independent of that of the experienced-
utility function.
For the mixed-effect model to infer the predicted-utility function of each emotion condi-
tion, the shape parameters were considered fixed effects and the reference-point parameters
(of two domains) were random effects.
xij(t) : obtained outcome on trial t during the task of domain i (= 1,2) for respondent j
cij(t): option (1 or 2) selected on trial t during the task of domain i (= 1,2) for respondent j
uij(tjk): self-reported predicted-utility of option k ( = 1,2) on trial t during the task of
domain i ( = 1,2) for respondent j (-50 < ui,j(tlk) < 50)
fni,j(tlk): model estimation of predicted-utility
Xref ij: reference point during the task of domain i (= 1,2) for respondent j
yi,j(t): predicted-utility sample corresponding to the obtained outcome xzi,j(t)
yi,j(t) = fpU(xi,j(t)|a, b, AGbase, ALbase, AGslope, ALslope, iXref1,j, iXref2,j)
AGi,j(t) (XiJ(t) - Xref i,j)a, Xijt) Xref i,j
-AL ij(t) (Xref i,j - XiJ(t))b, Xi, (t) < Xrefij
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eij(t) = 1+exp( where n = 0.1 and q,j(t) = confidence measurement
AG ij t) =G ij eij t)) = AGbase + AGslope (2 ei,j (t) - 1)
Ai,jt) = Z ij t)) ALbase + ALslope(2 ei,j(t) - 1)
niij(t k) = Er_:t[ij(T)|C(T) = k]: average of predicted-utility samples of option k (i.e.,
samples when c(T) = k for T = 1 to t)
xi,j(t) = XI"w(t) 
- m,,j
mij - bet money (paid ( + ) / received ( - )) during the task of domain i ( = 1,2) for
respondent j
Xrefl,j = Xref1 -+ 61,j
Xref2,j = ref2 + 62,j
The model is:
fixed effects # = (a, b,
random effects 6j = (0,
AGbase, ALbase, AGslope, ALslope, Xrefl, Zref2)
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 61,, 62,j)
pj = +o6 = (a, b, AGbase, ALbase, AGslope, ALslope, Xref1 + 6 1,j, Xref2 ± 6 2,j)
= (a, b, AGbase, ALbase, AGslope, ALslope, Xref1,j, Xref2,j)
uij(tIk) = ni ,(tIk) +-i ej(t k) = ET=1:t[Yij(T)|C(T) = k] + Eij(tIk)
where Qj ) = fpu(xi,j(t)|pj)
oj ~ N(O, T)
200
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Ei~j(t Ik) ~ N (0, o.2).
202
Appendix D
Fixed sequences of random
outcomes used in the experiments
* Gain frame on Domain 1:
Case 1: starting with a very low outcome on the first trial of the risky option
" Safe option: 19.85, 24.45, 18.20, 27.50, 19.01, 24.69, 17.13, 20.78, 25.32, 23.44, 22.47,
23.69, 22.49, 22.57, 19.44, 21.93, 22.43, 21.77, 23.57, 23.76, 22.49, 21.13, 20.86, 20.77,
22.97, 20.96, 20.99, 22.61, 19.82, 20.94
" Risky option: 3.99, 32.01, 4.98, 31.41, 18.00, 33.41, 2.63, 30.18, 6.46, 13.44, 30.64,
29.27, 5.65, 20.61, 29.08, 4.76, 28.80, 9.56, 33.43, 7.24, 14.92, 31.26, 21.44, 5.40, 31.15,
6.10, 16.25, 31.14, 28.02, 4.45
Case 2: starting with a very high outcome on the first trial of the risky option
" Safe option: 24.15, 19.55, 25.80, 16.50, 24.99, 19.31, 26.87, 23.22, 18.68, 20.56, 21.53,
20.31, 21.51, 21.43, 24.56, 22.07, 21.57, 22.23, 20.43, 20.24, 21.51, 22.87, 23.14, 23.23,
21.03, 23.04, 23.01, 21.39, 24.18, 23.06
e Risky option: 32.01, 3.99, 31.02, 4.59, 18.00, 2.59, 33.37, 5.82, 29.54, 22.56, 5.36, 6.73,
30.35, 15.39, 6.92, 31.24, 7.20, 26.44, 2.57, 28.76, 21.08, 4.74, 14.56, 30.60, 4.85, 29.90,
19.75, 4.86, 7.98, 31.55
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* Loss frame on Domain 1:
Case 1: starting with a very low outcome on the first trial of the risky option
" Safe option: -20.15, -15.55, -21.80, -12.50, -20.99, -15.31, -22.87, -19.22, -14.68, -16.56,
-17.53, -16.31, -17.51, -17.43, -20.56, -18.07, -17.57, -18.23, -16.43, -16.24, -17.51, -
18.87, -19.14, -19.23, -17.03, -19.04, -19.01, -17.39, -20.18, -19.06
" Risky option: -36.01, -7.99, -35.02, -8.59, -22.00, -6.59, -37.37, -9.82, -33.54, -26.56,
-9.36, -10.73, -34.35, -19.39, -10.92, -35.24, -11.20, -30.44, -6.57, -32.76, -25.08, -8.74,
-18.56, -34.60, -8.85, -33.90, -23.75, -8.86, -11.98, -35.55
Case 2: starting with a very high outcome on the first trial of the risky option
" Safe option: -15.85, -20.45, -14.20, -23.50, -15.01, -20.69, -13.13, -16.78, -21.32, -19.44,
-18.47, -19.69, -18.49, -18.57, -15.44, -17.93, -18.43, -17.77, -19.57, -19.76, -18.49, -
17.13, -16.86, -16.77, -18.97, -16.96, -16.99, -18.61, -15.82, -16.94
" Risky option: -7.99, -36.01, -8.98, -35.41, -22.00, -37.41, -6.63, -34.18, -10.46, -17.44,
-34.64, -33.27, -9.65, -24.61, -33.08, -8.76, -32.80, -13.56, -37.43, -11.24, -18.92, -35.26,
-25.44, -9.40, -35.15, -10.10, -20.25, -35.14, -32.02, -8.45
* Gain frame on Domain 2:
Case 1: starting with a very low outcome on the first trial of the risky option
" Safe option: 15.85, 20.45, 14.20, 23.50, 15.01, 20.69, 13.13, 16.78, 21.32, 19.44, 18.47,
19.69, 18.49, 18.57, 15.44, 17.93, 18.43, 17.77, 19.57, 19.76, 18.49, 17.13, 16.86, 16.77,
18.97, 16.96, 16.99, 18.61, 15.82, 16.94
" Risky option: 7.99, 36.01, 8.98, 35.41, 22.00, 37.41, 6.63, 34.18, 10.46, 17.44, 34.64,
33.27, 9.65, 24.61, 33.08, 8.76, 32.80, 13.56, 37.43, 11.24, 18.92, 35.26, 25.44, 9.40,
35.15, 10.10, 20.25, 35.14, 32.02, 8.45
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Case 2: starting with a very high outcome on the first trial of the risky option
e Safe option: 20.15, 15.55, 21.80, 12.50, 20.99, 15.31, 22.87, 19.22,
16.31, 17.51, 17.43, 20.56, 18.07, 17.57, 18.23, 16.43, 16.24, 17.51,
17.03, 19.04, 19.01, 17.39, 20.18, 19.06
* Risky option: 36.01, 7.99, 35.02, 8.59, 22.00, 6.59, 37.37, 9.82,
10.73, 34.35, 19.39, 10.92, 35.24, 11.20, 30.44, 6.57, 32.76, 25.08,
8.85, 33.90, 23.75, 8.86, 11.98, 35.55
14.68, 16.56, 17.53,
18.87, 19.14, 19.23,
33.54, 26.56, 9.36,
8.74, 18.56, 34.60,
* Loss frame on Domain 2:
Case 1: starting with a very low outcome on the first trial of the risky option
" Safe option: -24.15, -19.55, -25.80, -16.50, -24.99, -19.31, -26.87, -23.22, -18.68, -20.56,
-21.53, -20.31, -21.51, -21.43, -24.56, -22.07, -21.57, -22.23, -20.43, -20.24, -21.51, -
22.87, -23.14, -23.23, -21.03, -23.04, -23.01, -21.39, -24.18, -23.06
" Risky option: -32.01, -3.99, -31.02, -4.59, -18.00, -2.59, -33.37, -5.82, -29.54, -22.56,
-5.36, -6.73, -30.35, -15.39, -6.92, -31.24, -7.20, -26.44, -2.57, -28.76, -21.08, -4.74,
-14.56, -30.60, -4.85, -29.90, -19.75, -4.86, -7.98, -31.55
Case 2: starting with a very high outcome on the first trial of the risky option
* Safe option: -19.85, -24.45, -18.20, -27.50, -19.01, -24.69, -17.13, -20.78, -25.32, -23.44,
-22.47, -23.69, -22.49, -22.57, -19.44, -21.93, -22.43, -21.77, -23.57, -23.76, -22.49, -
21.13, -20.86, -20.77, -22.97, -20.96, -20.99, -22.61, -19.82, -20.94
" Risky option: -3.99, -32.01, -4.98, -31.41, -18.00, -33.41, -2.63, -30.18, -6.46, -13.44,
-30.64, -29.27, -5.65, -20.61, -29.08, -4.76, -28.80, -9.56, -33.43, -7.24, -14.92, -31.26,
-21.44, -5.40, -31.15, -6.10, -16.25, -31.14, -28.02, -4.45
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